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Abstract
This report considers the situation of young people in Eastern and Western Europe. It draws 
upon theories of youth and data about them from both halves of Europe in order to draw 
comparisons. The report begins by considering the main theories of youth in each context. 
The report argues that youth as an age category is a product of processes of European 
modernization which have served to construct youth. However, recent trends such as 
flexibilisation in the labour market, the expansion of education and rising youth 
unemployment have helped to extend the period of youth and could be described as post- 
modernising tendencies: they deconstruct youth as an age category. However, the authors 
are able to point examples of both tendencies in contemporary European societies. The 
report covers the field of the historical youth movements, education and work, family life- 
course, youth cultures and young people in politics.
Zusammenfassung
Diese Studie analysiert die Lage der Jugend in Osteuropa einerseits und in Westeuropa 
andererseits. Sie stützt sich auf Jugend-Theorien und empirische Daten von beiden Hälften 
Europas mit der Hauptperspektive, daraus internationale Vergleiche abzuleiten. Die Studie 
beginnt mit der Darstellung der zentralen Theorien Ober “Jugend" in unterschiedlichen 
systemischen und historischen Kontexten. Die Untersuchung stellt die These auf, daß 
Jugend als Alterskategorie ein Ergebnis des Prozesses der europäischen Modernisierung 
darstellt, welcher die Konstruktion des Konzeptes "Jugend" bewirkte. Dessen ungeachtet 
haben aktuelle Trends wie die Flexibilisierung des Arbeitsmarktes, die Ausweitung des 
Bildungssektors und der Anstieg von Jugendarbeitslosigkeit dazu beigetragen, die Periode 
der “Jugend” zu verlängern. Wir sprechen von den “postmodernen Tendenzen” der 
Dekonstruktion von Jugend als einer Alterskategorie. Dennoch konnten wir Beispiele sowohl 
für Prozesse der Modernisierung als auch der Postmodernisierung im Bereich der 
Jugendforschung aufzeigen. Die Studie befaßt sich mit den Themenbereichen der 
historischen Jugendbewegungen, mit Bildung, Beschäftigung und Arbeitsmarkt, mit dem 
Zusammenhang von Jugend, von Familien, mit Lebenszyklen, mit Fragen der Jugendkultur 
und mit dem Wechselspiel von Jugend und Politik.
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Chapter 1
introduction: towards an understanding of age relations in Europe
Europe is a very large and diverse region. There are about 350 million people in Westernern 
(European Union) Europe, of whom 14 per cent are aged 15-24 and a further 200 million people 
in East (former communist) Europe (Eurostat 1993b). The collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989 
and the expanding role of the European Union in both western and eastern Europe has 
prompted some to ask: what is Europe? (Rose 1996). Although Europe is divided by politics, 
religion, culture, climate and a host of other factors, it is possible to identify some common 
trends in the construction of youth. Eastern and western European countries are characterised 
by highly developed industrial societies, with a generally high standard of living and and 
extensively elaborated welfare states and this gives them common features in comparison with 
other parts of the world. The identification of youth as a social category and as a target for 
various kinds of interventions is also a product of the European experience, to the extent that 
‘youth’ is not only a product of advanced industrial societies, but particular kinds of advanced 
societies. The project of writing a book about youth in Europe therefore makes some sense, 
especially when the Cold War division of Europe has gone and deepening of ties within the 
European Union, the harmonization of policies and common social trends make comparisons 
important. However, such a book cannot hope to do justice to the diversity of regional 
developments and state systems within Europe. Therefore, we have concentrated particularly 
upon certain countries where we have personal and research experience: Britain, Germany, 
Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine(1). We have referred to broad 
regions of Europe which these countries could be used to represent - whilst eastern Europe 
usually refers to the former communist countries, it now represents the former Soviet Union, 
central Europe spans the former Cold War divide in the middle and south eastern Europe 
covers both former communist and non-communist Balkan countries. Where possible we have 
drawn upon other studies and European-level data to show the more general trends and the 
contrasting experiences of other European regions. The general argument which we develop in 
the book is about the way in which age relations in general and youth in particular are socially 
constructed as a phenomenon of modern European societies and this thesis could also be 
applied to other European societies which we have not covered to any extent here. The general 
tendency to construct youth as a social category can be found with modernization and is 
accompanied by a tendency to deconstruct youth in the process of postmodernization. 
However, these phases do not follow one another - rather, they interact. At the end of the 
twentieth century affluent and advanced European societies also contain a large and rising 
number of economically and socially excluded youth who suffer disproportionately from 
unemployment, homelessness and criminalization at the same time as they are one of the most 
privileged generations in history.
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What other trends are common to European societies? Here we can list some general features 
which will be further developed later in the book:
* the fall in the number of young people following previous falls in the birth rate
* the expansion of education and training
* the increased participation of young women in education and in the labour market
* the contraction of the formal youth labour market (but increase in casual and informal 
jobs)
* the rise in youth unemployment
* the spread of youth cultures
* the postponement of marriage and childbearing
* new forms of household organization including living alone, cohabiting, single parenthood
* the over-representation of young people in crime, drug use and suicide
* increasing longevity
These themes are explored throughout the book. They mean that young people are more and 
more likely to be found in education or training rather than in work and that the period of 
transition - into families, into an independent household, into full time work - has been extended 
in the last three decades. A discussion has developed in most countries in recent years about 
what social policies are most appropriate for these large numbers of people who are not quite 
children and not quite adults but somewhere in limbo in between. Furthermore, it is not even 
very clear where childhood ends, as adult culture and behaviour extends to incorporate younger 
and younger age groups on the one hand, neither is it clear on the other hand where youth ends 
as the markers of adult citizenship in terms of a job and an independent household are 
postponed or remote for large numbers of young people. This blurring of the age boundaries is 
not only discernible in the case of young people - at the other end of the age spectrum there are 
arguments both for early retirement and for the postponement of the age of retirement as older 
people expect to live active lives for longer. This results in a new alignment in the relationship 
between generations, and a new 'generational contract' especially as contributors to and 
beneficiaries from hard pressed welfare budgets. The meaning of ‘young’ and ‘old’ become 
more relative and individual. A re-assessment of age-relations in Europe is therefore required 
and here we begin by looking at young people, although ‘young’ is a relative concept and 
makes sense only in contrast to other age groups (Wyn and White 1997). We can therefore 
pose the question ‘What is youth’? Our argument is that this needs to be seen in terms of a long 
historical perspective in order to understand how age-relations were first of all shaped by 
modern societies and then continually reshaped and at the same time de-structured and 
undermined.
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This is then the general theme of the book. In the remainder of the introduction we shall develop 
our general argument further and then consider this in relation to sources of diversity and 
difference in Europe. Finally, we shall consider some of the other theories of 'youth' and 
generational relations in order to better delineate our own perspective.
Modernity and Postmodernity
The classical sociological theorists struggled to understand and explain the changes they 
witnessed in the nineteenth century as upheavals associated with the birth of modern society, 
brought about a new social world, one which was different from the traditional, feudal or peasant 
societies which had existed in Europe previously. Whilst Marx emphasized the forces of the 
economy as the motor of change, Weber and Durkheim stressed more culture, beliefs, society 
and the growth of rationality as a principle of organization. Features of this society which they 
(and those who followed later) described were those of industrialization, urbanization and the 
creation of mass society - large classes and interest groups based upon their relationship to the 
means of production and their position in the labour market. In this competitive world, 
universalistic and achievement oriented roles replaced those based upon kinship and tradition. 
The creation of universal education systems compulsory up to a given age, also tended to 
follow upon industrialization in most parts of the world. Political parties, trades unions and formal 
associations represented these groups. Mass media and leisure industries entertained people, 
as time was divided between ‘work’ (normally outside of the home) and 'leisure'. The growth of 
state systems was reflected the creation of large bureaucracies which increasingly intervened in 
society and the post-Second World War period was characterized at first by the dominance of 
Keynesian models of managing the economy, which provided the rationale for more 
comprehensive welfare provision. These changes, their impacts and the attempts by social 
theorists to account for them have been well documented (see Giddens 1971). However, more 
recent social theorists have tended also to emphasize the 'enlightenment project’ of science and 
social improvement through the application of rational principles of understanding leading to the 
creation of 'grand theories’ attempting to explain human life and 'grand ideologies’ attempting to 
change it (Kumar 1995, Bauman 1992). One of the most far reaching of these in terms of its 
consequences was Communism which attempted to self consciously construct a better and 
more modern society, based upon the scientific shaping of social and productive forces. The 
collapse of Communism in Europe during since 1989 illustrates perhaps the limitation of that 
project (Kumar 1995).
During the last few decades we can also discern alternative tendencies in European and 
industrialized societies, ones which have been termed ‘postmodern’ (Harvey 1989, Jameson 
1991). Daniel Bell (1973) and others first identified the move towards a ‘post-industrial’ society 
but these were followed in the 1990s by descriptions of a culture shift towards ‘post-materialist’ 
values, ones which preferred self-fulfillment and a search for the quality of life to the Protestant 
work ethic and a concern with survival (Inglehart 1990). It was argued that culture and 
communications were supplanting production as the motors of change (Lash 1990) leading to
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the study of consumption and taste as ways of defining social groups (Bourdieu 1986, Lury 
1996, Featherstone 1991). Changes in the organization of production itself were also visible, 
beginning in the 1970s with the ‘de-industrialization’ of some western European societies 
involving the closure of traditional manufacturing and extractive industries such as mining, steel 
production and ship-building or their transfer to developing countries and more recently to 
eastern Europe. This leads to spatial realignments with the decline of the traditional industrial 
areas and disappearance of jobs in those areas but the rise and expansion of new areas based 
upon information, communications and service sector employment (Lash and Urry 1987). Not 
all of these jobs are highly skilled - there is also a demand for a casual workforce, often young 
people and foreigners, to serve in the various service industries and the people who work in 
them (Sassen 1991). Mass production is being replaced by organisations linked by linked by 
communications media, employing fewer people directly and by more flexible patterns of work 
(Amin 1994). This is characterised by more extensive sub-contracting so that large hierarchies 
are broken up into specialised services and different functions, from accounting to cleaning, are 
franchised separately so that contracts can be swiftly terminated if the organisation needs to 
rationalize. The corollary of this is that the old idea of training for one job for life has 
disappeared for ever larger numbers of people, and ‘skill’ becomes something provisional, in a 
constant state of change (Ainly 1993). Temporary and insecure employment, along with 
frequent redundancies or job change, once a hazard of the unskilled working class, is now more 
common at all social levels.
The continued expansion of the welfare state in Europe, a distinctive aspect of European 
capitalist societies in contrast to others in the world, also reached its end during the 1990s 
(earlier in some countries) as it consumed larger and larger shares of national budgets. Since 
the 1970s there has been a dismantling of European welfare states which includes creating 
‘quasi-market’ systems (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993), through the privatization of selected 
services and through sub-contracting functions to the private or non-governmental sector 
(Burrows and Loader 1994). As in industry, contracting, out-sourcing, privatization or just 
neglect have replaced a comprehensive model of welfare associated with Keynesian economic 
management and large bureaucracies (Flyn forthcoming). In post-Communist Europe the same 
changes have happened even more rapidly as states have been forced to retreat from the 
formerly comprehensive social coverage due to acute financial crisis compounded by rising 
unemployment and inflation. The fashion for privatization was introduced into these countries 
as well. The result is that citizens are increasingly left to find their own resources and organize 
their own paths through life in an ‘individualized’ way which is ‘privatization’ in another sense - 
removing the problem from public recognition and turning it into something outside of state 
intervention. Some have pointed to ‘postmodern’ tendencies as the delivery of benefits is 
targeted upon more and more specialized groups, in response to specialized campaigns, 
reflecting the the increased recognition of ‘difference’ (Penna and O'Brien 1996).
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Politics itself moved from the representation of mass interests to more specialized groups and 
the increasing disconnection of parties from their class bases (Haerpfer 1994). 'New social 
movements’ based upon gender, race, sexuality, environment mobilized people and the 
postmodern discussion and recognition of 'difference’ helped to create a new ‘identity politics’ 
(Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1993).
Modernity was associated with the need to divide people into strongly distinguished groups and 
the elaboration of theories to sustain and justify this division. Hence for example, Zygmunt 
Bauman (1989) argued that the scientific idea of 'race’ was a product of modernization and the 
desire to classify people and to put them into hierarchies. Its consequences were the ordering of 
societies according to these classificatory principles and the forcible destruction or segregation 
of some people who were so classified: the holocaust and apartheid. The scale and rational 
efficiency of modern socities made it possible to carry out such large scale selection and 
destruction. Others have argued that there was likewise a tendency to create ‘essentialist’ 
categories of gender - that is, categories of men and women which are based upon 'natural' and 
necessary distinguishing features, which are rooted in biology, psychology, sex and from which 
a whole range of other characteristics follow which explain social differentiation as well (Abbott 
and Wallace 1997). We will argue here that within modernity ‘youth’ was similarly constructed 
as an essential category. Postmodern writers have generally challenged this view, arguing that 
the construction of such categories is a social process open to critical analysis and that it is not 
possible to fix age or sex or race so easily (Butler 1990). Many have argued for a postmodern 
ethic of recognizing and tolerating a variety of sources of 'difference’ instead (Bauman 1992). 
Thus gender and age become uncertain and mutable instead of fixed and taken for granted.
Other social theorists attempting to understand and analyze these changes taking place at the 
end of the twentieth century have insisted that they represent a continuation of the 
modernization process rather than a radical break (Beck 1986). This has been the dominant 
tradition in the German-speaking countries and Giddens (1991) terms this 'high modernity’. 
Beck (1986) in his analysis of what is termed Mate modernity’ argues that the collective 
identification associated with class and other mass interests have dissolved or become weaker. 
Instead, there is a ‘risk society': one in which roles and relations have become increasingly 
uncertain and one where people are threatened by science (from nuclear destruction to mad 
cows) rather than able to use science to control the world. He and others also identify a process 
of ‘individualization’ by which they mean that people are increasingly responsible for charting 
their own course through an uncertain world. It seems to us that ‘late modernists’ and ‘post 
modernists' are often describing similar kinds of social changes but with a different emphasis,
A feature of late-twentieth century society which is under-emphasized or ignored altogether in 
these accounts of social change is that the general changes in production and de- 
industrialization have created new categories of people who are losers. The former workforce 
and their offspring left behind by the changing tides of capitalist development form a majority in
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some parts of Europe where the prospect of regular work for men has disappeared. They are 
no longer the working class as they are not working (at least not regularly) and have to manage 
in the informal economy to make ends meet. Other people who lose out are women heading 
families, elderly people, young people unable to gain entry to the workforce or to housing 
markets, some ethnic groups and people without official citizenship. The dismantling of welfare 
states has left people additionally vulnerable as benefits are cut or increasingly narrowed in 
focus. Of course, the welfare states of Europe will not disappear. But they are unable to protect 
people from misfortunes in any comprehensive way and being built upon outdated ‘modern’ 
principles of full employment an insured workforce and stable nuclear families, they are 
increasingly incapable of coping with the changes described here. This means that problems 
have been ‘individualized’ and 'privatized' in the sense that it is for people to find their own 
solutions to the problems that confront them. This tendency was assisted by the influence of 
‘new right’ ideologies in some countries in the 1980s (Abbott and Wallace 1992) but now the 
same strategies are introduced by more traditional conservative and even socialist or labour 
governments. It is difficult to know how to characterize these new and old forms of disadvantage 
and the term ‘social exclusion’, although rather imprecise, helps us to conceptualize multiple 
forms of disadvantage. 'Social exclusion’ also helps us to include a range of forms of difference 
which can become disadvantages including (dis)ability, ethnicity, homelessness, old age, 
sexuality and so on but need not be so.
Eastern European societies were modernized rapidly and forcefully under communism (2). 
Industrialisation, urbanization and the creation of centralized state hierarchies followed, often 
with tremendous sacrifices in terms of hard working and living conditions, damage to the 
environment and the elimination of those who opposed it. G. Dimitrov (1995) argues that the 
'catastrophe’ of socialist modernization permanently crippled Bulgarian society to the extent that 
it is very difficult to construct a genuine civil society now. The collapse of communism was also 
the end of the experiment to scientifically shape society and the postmodern chaos which 
emerges has in turn had many impacts upon western Europe. Tendencies towards de­
industrialization, liberalization and the rationalization of industry in western Europe has been 
accelerated by from competition with cheaper eastern producers. Tendencies towards 
nationalism and racism are seen in both parts of Europe along with rising crime, rising drug use 
(using routes through eastern Europe) and rising unemployment. On the other hand, trends 
discussed in western Europe appeared in eastern Europe in an almost exaggerated form. 
Eastern Europe became once more an experimental laboratory for prominant theories - this 
time theories of privatisation, monetarism and rolling back the state.
Postmodernism is usually associated with social theories. These theories reject overarching 
and rationalistic explanations of society in favour of critical theories aiming to 'deconstruct' 
rather than construct explanations. These theories at their most extreme end in relativist 
positions which make social science itself (as a rational enlightenment philosophy) impossible 
(Gellner 1996). Whilst we would adopt a postmodernist 'skepticism of metanarratives' in the
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words of Lyotard (1984) we would not subscribe to theoretical postmodernism. Rather, we 
use the concept to describe aspects of social change which seem to us to be in contrast to the 
general tendencies within modernization described by classical social theory. However, we are 
not arguing that postmodernity followed modernity as an historical stage - modernity is still very 
much with us, we do not live in a ‘postmodernity’. Rather we are arguing that aspects of 
postmodernization are tendencies within contemporary European societies (Jameson 1991, 
Harvey 1989, Kumar 1995, Inglehart 1997). Nor do we argue that modernization (or 
postmodernization) are linear developments leading to convergence in societies as the earlier 
modernization theorists argued (see Bryant and Mockrzycki 1994). Quite the contrary, we 
illustrate the divergent models of modernization within Europe with often quite different 
consequences for family, gender roles and work and we assume that if one looks around the 
world one could find even more different examples.
Some general tendencies associated with late modernity and postmodernity are set out in the 
chart below. In the remainder of the chapter we turn to how these ideas can be applied to the 
study of youth.
Modernity Late Modernity and Postmodernity
Industrialization De-industrialization, growth of information 
and service industries
Urbanization More flexible locations connected with 
communications networks
Achievement orientation and 'Protestant 
work ethic'
Post-materialist values of self-fulfillment and 
and leisure ethic
Social groups based upon relation to means 
of production or labour market
Social groups based upon consumption and 
taste
Also ‘socially excluded' groups
Education systems tied to labour market Extended education linked less to labour 
market
Mass consumption Individualized consumption
Nuclear family Fragmented family, negotiated roles
Political parties representing the interests of 
large social groups - workers, farmers, 
industry etc.
New social movements addressing single 
issues such as the building of a motorway, 
also ecology, women’s movement, gay and 
lesbian liberation etc.
Race as an essential, scientific category Ethnic differentiation and post-colonialism
Essentially based male/female gender roles Gender and sexual differentiation. Flexible 
roles.
Welfare state protecting people from 'cradle 
to grave’
Fragmented and contracted welfare 
services, individualized self-help
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Youth and Modernity
As we grow through the life course our bodies and our minds change. However, age relations 
are a social construct, because the significance which this has in any society depends upon the 
social, economic and political order in that society. Any individual experience of growing up or 
growing old is therefore shaped by these beliefs and assumptions, and by the rights and duties 
which a society or a state expects of a person. There are also important variations within any 
society since, for example someone may be seen as ‘too old’ to get married/have 
sex/smoke/vote etc. in one social group, but ‘too young’ by another. Heterosexual sex, for 
example is allowed at an earlier age than homosexual sex in many countries. Thus notions of 
young and old - although they may seem self-evident and ‘natural’ - are socially relative.
Sociologists have therefore argued that youth is a social construct. But constructed of what? A 
broader look at Europe enables us to explore some of the different historical, social and political 
contexts from which youth have emerged. Ideas of ‘youth’ have had a long history and for many 
centuries there was speculation about the ‘ages of man’ (sic) as we see from the quotation from 
Shakespeare, but we also see that youth was a masculine concept. This meaning is still implicit 
in the term ‘youth’. However, youth was associated with states of mind, of passion and love, 
rather than with precisely calibrated ages. ‘Adolescence’ or 'youth' as a social category in the 
sense in which we use it here, is a product of modernity - that is of the development of the 
modern world associated with professional bureaucratic power, industrial society and 
enlightenment rationality. In the words of Musgrove (1964), adolescence appeared at about the 
same time as the internal combustion engine. Individuals mature at different rates and in 
different ways, but modernity has imposed more uniform categories of life stage and attached 
these to chronological age. In fact childhood, adolescence and 'youth' along with what is now 
termed 'post-adolescence' or ’young adulthood' have all emerged as separate life-stages in the 
course of modernization (Klein 1990). Life stages are therefore historicaily relative rather than 
universal in character and they also vary between different state regimes in different parts of 
Europe as we shall show in this book.
Why does 'youth' emerge from modernity? A number of factors seem relevant. First of all, the 
development of wage labour and a labour market, depending increasingly upon universalistic 
achievement-oriented principles, replaced the familial transmission of property as a source of 
subsistence. Then the development of universal education introduced a system for 
distinguishing unsocialized children from fully socialized adults able to compete in the labour 
market and societies with increasingly complex divisions of labour. At the intersection of these 
two institutions lies youth. The extension of the franchise also lead to a definition of who should 
be accepted as a fully socialized citizen able to exercise a political choice - gradually this was 
defined by age. In the 'modern' family too, roles of age and sex are defined by the external 
relationship to the labour market and the education/state systems. Modernization therefore 
helped to define youth as a social category between education and work, between unsocialized 
childhood and fully socialized adulthood. Modernization also introduced a certain amount of self­
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determination in youth as an earned income introduced access to housing, consumer markets 
and an independent life-style. Partnerships leading to the nuclear conjugal family could be 
based upon 'choice' or 'romantic love' irrespective of property ownership. Social and cultural 
independence along with urbanization was made possible through the creation of space in 
urban areas where young people could congregate outside traditional forms of social control. 
The formation of peer groups as mediums for creating age-status groups helped young people 
to create their own communities of interest and later on consumer culture, popular music and 
youth sub-cultures spread these communities further and further afield.
However, most important has been the development of the modern state system with 
bureaucratic mechanisms, increasing rationalization and the capacity to grade, sort, control, 
punish, mobilize and put under surveillance those it defines as its population. One rational form 
of classification used by the state is that of numerical age. The systems of social support have 
been uneven in recognizing the self-determination of youth but in most advanced industrial 
societies there gradually evolved a system of social support for students, young unemployed 
and trainees, which allowed them to develop a measure of autonomy and independence. Youth 
came to be increasingly recognized as part of the development of welfare states. Thus, with the 
modern state 'citizenship' comes to determine membership and access to social goods such as 
income support, education, training and political participation - all determined increasingly 
according to numerical age (Jones and Wallace 1992). The date of birth becomes an essential 
item of information on all forms and documents as a way of locating a person.
This is linked to the sense of time which developed with modernity. Time seen as a progression, 
a linear march through history, created sense of continuity. Time divided into parcels by which 
to measure the hours of the day, the days of the month and the months of the year has 
transformed notions of work and social life (Lash and Urry 1994). With modernity, social life was 
divided according to 'working time' and 'leisure time' and even these units were ever more 
discretely divided for the better control and utilization of time as a resource: time is ever more 
efficiently measured and used. Life regulated by the clock implies a different kind of living to one 
regulated by the seasons or by the weather. Similarly, the life course as measured by calibrated 
units of time becomes a different entity to one patterned by the rhythm of cycles of birth, 
inheritance and death. Thus the life-course starts to be measured in chronological units of time 
rather than by natural phenomena or seasons. As people's lives are removed ever further from 
dependency upon natural events, so the life course becomes increasingly a subject of rational 
control. In this way people's lives can be sectioned and structured according to human 
institutions and accurately measurable units of time: at 6 a person starts school, at 18 they are 
able to vote and at 16 they are allowed to have sex (which has nothing to do with either their 
levels of maturity or their inclinations!). The life course becomes a progressional path 
punctuated by these discrete stages. Whether a person is 'young' or 'old' has less to do with the 
biological process of aging so much as with their relation to these age-status transitions: 13 is 
'too young' to have a baby (although women obviously do have babies at this age) because it is
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before the age of consent and marriage. Similarly, 70 is 'too old' to work because it is after the 
age of retirement (although people obviously do work at this age). People move from one stage 
to the other in seemingly purposeful movement and this constitutes their life. Zygmunt Bauman 
(1995) likens it to a 'pilgrimage'. However, we need to bear in mind that such age-phases are 
socially constructed and therefore relative to different societies at different points in time.
There were different roads towards modernity in different parts of Europe. These have implied 
different kinds of state development with different welfare systems forming an integral part. 
Britain, one of the first countries to be industrialized evolved a modern state over the last three 
centuries. However, measures aimed explicitly at youth have been fairly recent (since the 
twentieth century and mostly since 1944) piecemeal and not greatly institutionalized. Germany 
modernized with more rapid intensity at the end of the nineteenth century and following the 
unification of the country, there was a desire to build social cohesion through legislation. The 
result was that youth were targeted more specifically than in England. Universal education was 
introduced in the Austrian lands before either of these two countries and prior to industrialization 
by the ‘enlightened' monarch, Maria Theresia, in the eighteenth century. In southern Europe, 
many of the trends described as being associated with modernization and youth have only just 
started to happen and until the last decades, gender and generational roles based upon 
traditional patriarchal authority were more the norm, with women and youth being subordinated, 
contained within the private sphere (Chisholm et al. 1995). In other parts of Europe, where 
modernization came later, such as Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Bulgaria, it took place at a 
forced pace through communism after the Second World War. Women and youth were brought 
out of the home and installed in the public sphere of the workplace, education system and 
political organization. The effects of war, invasion and the imposition of totalizing ideologies 
such as fascism or communism have affected most European countries and some are still 
recovering from this experience, especially those in eastern and central Europe. The way in 
which modern states develop affects in turn the nature of their welfare legislation and therefore 
the way in which 'youth' Is constructed.
We have used the term 'modernity' and 'modernization', because it encompasses all these 
developments and because it can be used to describe eastern Europe under Communist 
regimes as well as Westernern Europe under welfare capitalist ones. It is no longer possible to 
speak of ‘capitalist industrial society’ as if there was only one kind. Rather, modernization can 
include a range of processes with diverse results (Bryant and Mokrzycki 1994). Nor is 
modernization a one-way march of progress. In some regions of East-Central Europe, such as 
the Czech Republic, communist modernization arrested the development of a diversified 
economy, imposing nineteenth century styles of centralized, heavy industry. In Bulgaria, post­
communist modernization in agriculture over the last eight years has replaced the collectively- 
owned tractor with the privately-owned horse and cart. Other developments follow the socio­
cultural traditions of the region and therefore modernization is not a uniform phenomenon. New 
forms of social relations are continually thrown up and reshaped. Whilst we are mainly
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concerned with generational relations in this book through the perspective of youth, this 
inevitably draws upon other kinds of social relations such as gender, region, ethnicity and 
nation. What it means to be young and female in Greece, for example, can be very different to 
Denmark, Thus we need to simultaneously grasp processes of continuation and processes of 
change (Chisholm et al. 1995, CYRCE 1995).
In the study of youth, evidence of postmodernization can be found in the way age status are 
becoming de-standardized or eroded. Youth is extended downwards into childhood through 
participation in consumer markets which introduce young people earlier into adult consumption 
and through communications technologies such as TV which destroys the innocence of 
childhood by giving children access to the adult media world (Postman 1983). The 
commercialization of popular culture means that children and encouraged to become 
consumers and are encourged to consume adult products as something exciting and 
sophisticated. Youth is also extended upwards into older age groups as periods in education 
and training are extended, encouraging people to experiment with life-styles, sub-cultures and 
identities for longer periods of time. Thus it is not clear where youth ends and adulthood begins 
as standardized age transitions - such as getting qualified, starting work, getting married, 
starting a family - have all become diluted and unclear. They are more likely to happen in no 
particular order and are reversible at all stages (Oik 1988, Wallace 1987). The age-status 
transitions which were connected together under some conditions of modernity now start to 
become disconnected and our sense of time becomes more elastic. This is reflected for 
example, in the way in which we view the body. The use of fashion, styles, clothing, play and 
physical manipulation in the maintenance of the body (diet, exercise, plastic surgery) can all be 
used to defy biological processes of aging (Featherstone and Hepworth 1991). Thus, the 
youthful body is as desirable as ever as the ideal, but unlike in Shakespeare's time it no longer 
belongs only to the young! It is an aspiration for everyone. Youthful styles of behaviour such as 
falling in love, dancing, enjoying popular music and so on are also not necessarily confined to 
the young but can take place at any stage in life. Pop stars such as Tina Turner and Cher are 
more concerned to project a youthful, sexual body image than they were in their first 
incarnations thirty years ago.
'Post modernist' and more recent social theories associated with the work of Bourdieu (1986) 
argue that rather than inhabiting consistent and definable social strata, people are identified by 
their consumer tastes and interests. Diversification rather than mass consumption are 
emphasized. There has thus been the development of what some have termed a 'postmodern' 
trend in consumer styles based upon information culture and telecommunications, and here 
young people have been prominent. This has helped to create what Douglas Coupland termed 
'Generation X’ , a generation of young people defined more by what they are not than what they 
are, who are self-conscious and 'reflexive’ about their manipulation of styles and tastes, who are 
skeptical towards metanarratives, being no longer able to believe in the certainties of previous 
generations of youth, who do not expect firm job prospects or life chances but who 'sample'
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different parts of the world and different periods of history in order to construct identities, like 
they try on a new set of clothes. Young people who have grown up in a world of advertising 
signs, are able to manipulate and reinvent them as part of their own culture (see Rushkoff
1994). They are the over-educated and under-employed. These sub-cultures are now not 
associated with working youth so much as with youth in an extended state of transition and with 
the opportunity to experiment with life-styles, ideas and identities. The spread of leisure styles 
throughout Europe has certainly been noticeable. For youth in eastern Europe, popular 
Westernern music and styles (such as jeans) were influential even before the fall of communism 
and represented a subversive appeal. It is partly through these consumer styles that youth are 
defined and define themselves as a group. Other aspects of youth culture also link together 
different youth in Europe, including the spread of sub-cultures such as skinheads or punks 
which we consider in Chapter 5.
The diversification of life-styles is reflected in changing family relationships and transitions in 
and out of life-stages. The diversity of family forms and means of entering them is associated 
with the de-coupling of family from labour market transitions. It is no longer necessary for a man 
to have a job in order to start a family. It is no longer necessary for a woman to give up work in 
order to raise children. She does not even need to be married in order to do so. This in turn 
leads to the possibility of challenging normative standards such as the institution of 
heterosexuality, or conventional gender relations, which are strongly reinforced in many 
countries not just through cultural conservatism but also through social policies in access to 
housing, custody of children and so on. Young people have been significant in making such 
challenges and it is through such generational renewal that social relations can be transformed 
as we explore in Chapters 4 and 6. However, this diversification also includes an increasing 
polarization in fortunes between excluded youth and others as their incomes have declined and 
access to jobs and homes becomes ever more remote in many parts of Europe, creating 
groups of young people existing on the margins of society (Carlen 1996, Coffield et al. 1986).
In all countries the period of youth has been growing longer. In Western Europe the trend has 
been for youth to become a more and more extended condition over the post-war period. A 
combination of educational reforms, increased demand for Higher and Further Education, the 
introduction of increased vocational training and rising unemployment have served to create a 
'moratorium' period between ending compulsory schooling and starting full time work which is 
becoming increasingly extended. The extent and pace of this varies between different countries
- in Germany it was a discernible trend many years ago, whereas in Portugal it has only just 
started. In central and eastern Europe too, the trend was well established. The success of the 
education system under communism raised aspirations so that more groups wanted to obtain 
Higher Education and this was seen as an important route to mobility. In Bulgaria, for example, 
education was introduced to semi-literate populations after 1945 and by the 1990s a sizable 
slice of the age cohort were in tertiary education. However, housing shortages and low incomes 
ensured that young people were dependent upon parents for very long periods, even after
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marriage and the arrival of children - they were often co-resident into their 30s. Their full 
economic independence was therefore a very long term goal.
As a consequence, the earned income of young people becomes less important and they 
become increasingly dependent instead upon families or upon systems of grants and social 
security. Some might view this optimistically, seeing it as a progressive development - rather 
than being thrown 'prematurely' into the labour market to sink or swim unaided, young people 
are being granted a longer period of orientation and assistance (Hartmann 1985, 1987). From 
this perspective young people appear to be better off than ever before because they have 
more choices, more opportunities and more assistance from parents and the state. They are 
better educated, better trained and more 'liberated' from traditional patriarchal familial authority 
than any other generation in history. Others see this more pessimistically as creating a loss of 
income and a rise in the numbers of unsupported youth leading also to a rise in crime, 
unemployment, homelessness and poverty (Coles 1995). Young people are no longer 
independent, but rather segregated into their own age-ghetto, excluded from adult responsibility. 
This, according to Musgrove (1964) leads to a kind of infantilization: young people act 
irresponsibly because they have no responsibilities. Thus, in some ways this is the most 
privileged generation of youth seen in historical perspective, with the best material and cultural 
opportunities ever but at the same time large numbers are marginalized from what was 
assumed in the past to be normal integration into dominant society. We explore this paradox 
throughout the book.
There has been a growth in youth leisure and welfare services over the last hundred years 
staffed increasingly by professional as well as volunteer workers. Linked to this is a growth in 
programmes for young people within the criminal justice system, signaling them as a group 
requiring special treatment. The expansion of these different services, encompassing every 
aspect of young people's lives and behavior is justified in terms of the need to help young 
people assume their place in an increasingly complex society and to assist them to adjust 
where they are thought to be having difficulties. All manner of professional guidance services 
help to 'manage' the transition from one life phase to another. In communist countries youth 
organizations performed this role, ensuring the almost complete surveillance of young people in 
their movement through life. However, the retreat of the welfare state and the fragmentation of 
its services has undermined some of these bases of professionalism (Banks 1994, 1996), as 
we explore in Chapter 2.
Various new kinds of expertise have developed: different and not necessarily consistent, ideas 
of youth are constructed through the market and commercial media, the education system, the 
training system, the criminal justice system, youth services and youth organizations. We need 
also to consider the role which academic 'youth' research has had in creating a basis for 
intervention. On the one hand there is the possibility for more self-determination as young 
people define their own peer groups, their own tastes and styles and chart their own courses
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through an increasingly complex and confusing set of transitions, on the other hand they are 
increasingly subject to professional surveillance. In addition young people also impose their own 
meanings and ideas upon the institutional structures which surround them.
In some countries youth have been targeted more specifically as objects of political or social 
intervention. Although this has not been the case for the most part in Britain, in Germany youth 
have been the object of social policies since the nineteenth century as they were thought to be 
a group which needed integrating into the modern state. Youth have been increasingly 
recognized as a category within all European welfare states over the last century (Jones and 
Wallace 1992). Youth policies have been institutionalized through Ministries of Youth in a 
number of countries (although this is usually combined with other ministries). In Germany the 
state sponsored 'Youth Institute' for research and policy development has played an important 
role in identifying youth issues and assisting state responses. In all communist countries, youth 
were targeted very explicitly and official youth organizations set up which young people were 
under pressure to join and which all young people were obliged to use, because these were the 
only youth organizations existing, with a monopoly over leisure facilities. In many communist 
countries, Youth Institutes were formed to investigate the problems of youth and in Bulgaria for 
example, this became an important and influential body. The monitoring and co-optation of 
youth was felt to be Important for the future of the regime. However, with the collapse of 
communism the youth institutes, youth organizations and many of the facilities which they 
owned, have disappeared (or gone into decline). At a supra-national level, the European Union 
t targets youth explicitly in a variety of programmes aimed at academic and other exchanges 
but also in terms of regional aid which has filtered into a wide variety of programmes for youth. 
The European Union, by encouraging the modernization of the more backward and rural parts 
of Europe, such as southern Italy, Greece and Portugal has encouraged an accelerated 
‘modernization’ of the youth phase in those countries, bringing women and young people more 
into education, the labour market and into public recognition (Chisholm et al. 1995). Thus, 
youth are identified and targeted in different ways in different parts of Europe.
All over Europe there have been attempts to recruit young people to various causes and to see 
them as vehicles for social reform. Indeed, much of the post-war youth research agenda has 
been guided by the need to ensure that young people are fully incorporated as democratic 
citizens (Stafseng 1994). There has therefore been monitoring of young people's political 
attitudes in the fear that they were more inclined to join extreme political organizations. 
However, in capitalist countries the majority of youth have followed mainstream political parties 
or been uninterested in politics. Nevertheless there are certain so-called ‘new social 
movements’ which are associated particularly with young people, including the movements 
against nuclear power and military bases, the green movement, animal rights and other such 
issues, which tend to be outside of mainstream politics. The student movement of the 1960s 
branded the consciousness of a whole generation of intellectuals. In Communist countries it 
was the political activity of young people in joining the 'gentle revolutions' which helped to topple
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the old regimes and now it is young people who are joining the nationalist and quasi-fascist 
organizations, taking politics once more into the streets. For this and other reasons it is 
important to address the issue of why under some circumstances youth become politically 
active. This we consider in more detail in Chapter 6.
Diversity and Difference in Europe
Despite the general trends in common through European countries, there remain distinct forms 
of inequality and difference. Here we can enumerate sources of variation which are further 
elaborated through the book:
* social class backgrounds
* gender
* sexuality
* ethnicity and 'race'
* citizenship status
* disability
* special educational needs
* institutional care backgrounds
* involvement in the criminal justice system
* region
* religion
Access to education, jobs and life chances all depend upon where one lives in Europe, as do 
the relative positions of young men and women (Chisholm and Bergeret 1991). Marked 
differences between urban and rural areas still persist in many parts of Europe and between the 
Mediterranean countries and the affluent North. Religion can shape different models of social 
welfare, different family expectations and different gender expectations as Europe is divided 
between Greek and other Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic Churches in the Christian faith, 
then Muslim, and other non-Christian faiths.
Furthermore, there are marked disparities between different groups with those at the bottom of 
the education system and some ethnic minorities being most vulnerable to high unemployment, 
likely to find the worst jobs, the least likely to travel or enjoy leisure opportunities (Roberts, 
Campbell and Furlong 1990). In general the lower one goes down the educational system, the 
more accelerated are the life transitions. These differences appear to be increasing rather than 
decreasing in today's Europe where educational advantage is increasingly important in 
determining other life chances. Educational advantages or disadvantages are affected by the 
factors listed above (see Chapter 3).
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Gender has been studied as a fundamental division amongst young people in Westernern 
Europe over the last twenty years and studies have consistently highlighted the disadvantages 
faced by young women in terms of career opportunities. Despite the increasing numbers of 
women in the labour force, women's careers are still broken by responsibility for childcare and 
the segments of the labour market which they enter are the worst paid with the least prospects. 
Women are also most likely to be in poverty at some point in their lives. Many of these issues 
have been discussed due to pressure from feminist research and politics. In many European 
countries feminist ideas, which may have been previously revolutionary, are now accepted by a 
wide range of women who would not identify themselves with feminism (Wilkinson and Mulgan 
1995). The younger generation of women take such things as the right to financial 
independence, an education or a job as given.
In Communist Europe, women were obliged to work and there is still a far higher rate of female 
participation in the workforce than In Westernern Europe. Women also had the obligation to 
care for families, often under very difficulty conditions, which involved hours of queuing and 
seeking comestibles with little in the way of domestic labour-saving equipment (Corrin 1992). 
Older women bear the brunt of the changes which have taken place in post-communist 
societies and still lead lives of hard manual labour caring for animals, planting food for the 
household in their gardens and managing the household budget often for children and grand 
children as well (Wallace 1997). Meanwhile, a younger generation of women have rejected the 
serious, coarse, work-oriented images of the socialist woman and have turned towards more 
glamorous and playful role models. Childbearing and household formation is being postponed. 
New femininities are being constructed in such circumstances from different cultural materials. 
In the past, the token representation of women was ensured through quotas in formal political 
organisations. However, this was little valued in practice. The private sphere was in reality more 
valued and here women had an important role. Now women have lost even their token 
representation in the public sphere whilst the private sphere has been devalued in importance 
(Watson 1993). New problems have joined the old ones in affecting women, such as the lack of 
adequate contraceptive facilities, increasing restrictions on abortion in some countries and the 
privatization and individualization of welfare which hits women particularly hard as the main 
users of welfare services (Bridger and Kay 1996, Dimitrieva 1996).
Different state regimes emphasize masculinity in various ways too. Mac an Ghaiil (1994) has 
described the way in which education systems can reproduce particular kinds of masculinity 
and this is also a way of interpreting youth cultures and criminal careers. However, probably the 
most important institution for classifying and distinguishing male youth is that of military service. 
Although in Britain it was abolished in 1950, military service continues for young men in every 
other country and all young men are obliged to serve between one and two years. It is an 
institution which deliberately maintains and strengthens an essentialist concept of gender roles 
and what it means to be a man. In many countries it is possible to do voluntary service of some 
kind instead, but with the penalty that this takes longer. Military service is intended as an
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obligation of citizenship to defend the state and preserve peace by demonstrating military 
strength. It also serves another very important purpose of social control and discipline for 
young men and this traditionally marked the end of their 'youth'. When they returned, they were 
supposed to be grown men, hardened by their military service. In some countries there are 
even elaborate 'rite de passage’ rituals associated with going to and coming from military 
service. For modern states this is far more than just a form of self-defense: it helps to create a 
homogenized and disciplined group of people who can be appropriately socialized. This is 
sometimes also legitimized as a form of social service, whereby the cross section of young men 
can be monitored for physical and social problems and helped, if necessary. In the former 
Soviet Union military service was used as a form of ethnic leveling. This emphasis upon 
regulated 'modern' forms of masculinity is particularly important during war times when more 
young men are mobilized and to fight, as has been the case in the Balkan countries and in 
some parts of the former Soviet Union.
However, there has been considerable resistance to military service both eastern and western 
Europe through campaigns to get the period reduced to or to substitute civilian service, and at 
an individual level by simply avoiding the draft. Since political reform in 1990, many aspects of 
communist society have been jettisoned, but military service was retained In eastern and central 
European countries (although In many countries the length of service was reduced and civilian 
service introduced as an alternative). The newly emerged states are trying to re-define their 
positions within the new military world order and a national defense force is still felt to be a 
necessary requirement. There has, however, been a transformation in young people's attitudes 
towards it. They have become increasingly critical of an institution which is now revealed to 
include violence, bullying and starvation. Far from being an ethnic leveler, it informally reinforced 
ethnic intolerance and hostility. Information about suicides and brutality against recruits to the 
army has been revealed. It seems that the disillusionment during the 1980s with the army 
increased with disillusionment with communism generally. Some people now exert all their wits 
to find ways of avoiding military service, which is seen at best as years lost from study or 
starting a business and at worst as a form of tribulation. Young men would continue studying 
until they had passed the age for being eligible for military service or spend a great deal of time 
and energy to find a doctor who was prepared to classify them as physically unfit (Roberts et al. 
1995). Avoiding conscription was one very strong reason for emigration, especially from those 
countries experiencing war (Wallace and Palyanitsya 1995).
One possible explanation for this rejection of military service is that it represents an 
homogenized, standardized construction of masculine youth which is incompatible with young 
people's search for personal freedom and individuality. Military service was important in 
creating and constructing a category of (male) youth as a separate entity. However, the 
widespread individualized resistance to this institution may imply that it is no longer compatible 
with young people's own perception of age-status transitions.
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Divisions of ethnicity and race are also factors which encourage diversity in Europe. Whilst in 
Britain and the Netherlands this takes the form of discrimination and disadvantage faced by 
black and Asian people from the former colonies, in France people from North Africa make up 
the main disadvantaged group, whereas in other countries it is those who lack citizenship 
status, often from the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, North Africa or Africa. The demand for labour 
in the post Second World War years was fulfilled in different ways by different countries. 
Whereas Britain recruited from the former colonies overseas, Germany, Austria and the Nordic 
countries imported workers from the South, initially on a temporary basis. The lack of full 
citizenship status of some of these workers - even those who have been resident more than 
one generation - means that they are not eligible for some rights and benefits in the same way 
as citizens. These earlier labour recruits have been followed by new waves of immigrants from 
eastern Europe - for whom Germany and Austria have been the main target countries, but also 
from the south shores of the Mediterranean, for whom France, Spain and Italy have been the 
main destination countries. Many of these have no legal citizenship. Generally the children of 
these ethnic minorities leave school less well qualified that their indigenous neighbours, but this 
varies also between different ethnic groups. Whilst policies towards these migrant groups 
varies, policies of assimilation have generally been under pressure to give way to ones which 
recognize ethnic differences and this has coincided with the increasing demand for regional 
autonomy and the recognition of indigenous sub-groups such as Catalans, Welsh or Basques. 
One ethnic minority against whom there is continuing and even increasing persecution is that of 
the gypsies or Roma and Sinti, prevalent throughout eastern and southern European countries. 
Despite being present in Europe for centuries, their rights to citizenship and other benefits are 
still questioned Institutionalized racism against Roma is compounded by the fact that they have 
generally resisted being controlled and regulated in the way required by many modern state 
systems, and have retained their own (mostly officially unrecognized) languages, cultures and, 
in some cases, styles of nomadism.
Despite the persecution of migrant Roma, the idea of nomadism and Diaspora have been 
important in defining some new directions in social theory termed 'post-colonial'. These 
postmodernist tendencies have emphasized hybridity instead of ethnic homogeneity, the 
recognition of difference, but also the likelihood that people might hold a range of different ethnic 
affiliations of greater or lesser importance to them (Anthias and Yuval Davies 1993, Donald and 
Rattansi 1992). The backlash against this has come in the desire to form modern states which 
are ethnically pure and which are based upon an aggressively essentialist concept of race or 
ethnicity. This has resulted in a new wave of brutal ethnic differentiation in many former 
Communist states but this backlash is also evident in the increasing success of far right and 
explicitly racist movements in western Europe (Gellner 1994).
Migration and youth have always been associated, postmodernization has brought new forms of 
nomadism. The kind of white middle class and educated young people exemplified in 
'Generation X' , from core capitalist countries such as Sweden or the USA are described as
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typically nomadic in their movement around the world for example, but as privileged post­
materialist cultural travelers (Rushkoff 1994), For this group of 'postmodern migrants’ traveling 
is a stage of life, perhaps lasting some years a part of their education an interlude between 
University courses or before starting a career. Although they may undertake casual jobs in other 
countries, this is not considered a permanent position for them. Such young, postmodern 
migrants form colonies in particular cultural centres such as Prague or Amsterdam (there are an 
estimated 20 000 young Americans in Prague see Wallace 1998). They are connected to one 
another and to ‘home’ through various communications media including telephone, fax and 
email which mean they can be simultaneously abroad but In touch with things 'back home’, able 
to return any time. Rather than sending money home, like classical migrants, they have money 
sent from home through credit cards of electronic banking. These are the postmodern 
equivalent of the 'Wanderjahr' youth of the pre-modern period. Having access to 
communications media, these young people are able to write about themselves and thus 
publicize their own problems.
Those leaving institutional state care or who have been involved with the criminal justice system 
represent the other end of the privilege spectrum because they are marginalized often against 
their own will. They are disproportionately over-represented in the numbers in poverty, 
homeless, or unemployed and for them this is not 'slumming’, they may well be trapped there. 
Coles (1995) has indicated the ways in which such young people can suffer multiple 
disadvantages in Britain and this pattern also occurs in other countries in an increasingly 
competitive world (see contributors to Hurrelmann 1994). However, even this group find their 
own way of forging a life-style which offers autonomy and some cultural freedom which may be 
preferable to institutional ’help’ and control. Young people like those in ‘Trainspotting’ are also 
searching for a cultural space outside of mainstream institutions, like 'Generation X', albeit with 
different resources.
Unfortunately, it is not possible for us to document in detail the forms of difference or 
disadvantage experienced by many young people in Europe. This is because we lack 
consistent comparative information about these factors as well as explanations for how they 
work in different contexts. They could be said instead to be the 'absent voices’ in the words of 
Griffin (1993), the gaps in our explanations. Thus, for example, whilst educational participation 
is well documented, it is not always possible to find out the ethnic variations and non-citizens 
may not be counted at all in official statistics.
These factors raise issues as to the rights and benefits of young people. In all European 
societies young people are entitled to a package of rights and benefits which are allocated 
according to age. However, as welfare systems have faced fiscal pressure in the 1980s and 
1990s due to rising unemployment, the need to care for an aging population and increased 
global competition, the rights of young people have in some cases been threatened. In France 
and in Britain benefits for young people were cut in the 1980s and 1990s. However, in general
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the changes described here mean that their incomes have declined, making young people more 
dependent upon parents or others for assistance. The rights and benefits of young people differ 
between different countries. The development of the European Union has meant an increasing 
importance of trans-national organizations and one successful policy has been that of 
educational and youth exchange to encourage a better understanding of other countries and 
cultures. Most of the focus has been upon education and training, on getting young people into 
the labour market although they have also been the beneficiaries of various structural aid 
programmes aimed at improving conditions in the more deprived parts of Europe. There is no 
sign as yet of any harmonization in social policies towards youth. Whilst some countries feel a 
need to recognize youth, even to having a Ministry of Youth, other countries such as Britain, 
refuse to acknowledge young people as a social group for welfare purposes (Chisholm and 
Bergeret 1991, CYRCE 1995).
Thus far we have developed our argument about youth as a product of modernity and the 
changes associated with postmodernity. Now we shall consider how this differs from other 
arguments.
Models of Youth
Although youth have been identified as troublesome for their elders since the time of Plato - and 
even in Shakespeare's time there was rumination about the 'ages of man' (sic) - our argument is 
that youth as a social category associated with a calibrated numerical age and particular 
defined features is a product of modern society. Social theories play some part in defining the 
characteristics of age groups and much social theorizing has been devoted to youth. We can 
read these theories as attempts to construct an 'essentialist' model of youth, one which was 
rooted in biological factors and psychological or ‘necessary’ social stages and which justified 
their separation and treatment by professional interests and bureaucracies in the modern 
period. Not only was there an attempt to construct an essential category of youth, but divisions 
between male and female youth as natural and functional categories were also created. Here 
we can identify distinct waves of studies which have identified youth in various ways.
The Construction of Youth as a Life Stage
The first main 'modern' theorist to provide a universal, scientific and precise definition of 
'adolescence' was G. Stanley Hall (1907) in the USA, who tried to unite the disciplines of 
sociology, psychology, medicine and education to achieve a universal definition. He described 
adolescence as a problematical period of 'storm and stress'. Young people, it was suggested, 
were going through a difficult psychological phase as they adjusted to the biological changes in 
their bodies and they experience emotions and bodily changes over which they have no control 
and find difficult to understand. Each person goes through a process of development from early 
animal-like primitivism (childhood) to civilization (adulthood). In this social-Darwinist view of
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evolutionary development, adolescence was seen as an especially troublesome period, as it 
was a period when young people were being pulled in two directions - backward towards the 
primitivism of childhood and forwards towards the rational and civilized state of adulthood.
Hall did not see female and male youth as maturing in the same ways. Female youth did not 
undergo the same stresses and strains as male youth because they did not mature to the same 
extent as male youth, being more child-like and closer to nature. Furthermore, he was greatly 
concerned with the control of the adolescent body - with preventing boys from masturbating and 
with protecting the ripening bodies of young women. Rather than reading it as a scientific 
treatise, we can now read his work as a way of understanding how youth have been 
conceptualized (Cohen 1997). The idea of studying adolescence as a problematic life stage has 
continued. Coleman and Hendry (1990) for example, describes it as the period in which young 
people 'come to terms' with hormonal and physical changes of their bodies.
We would argue however, that this is not simply a biological process. When a person is deemed 
’mature’ can vary considerably between different societies and within the same society over 
time. It can even vary within the same society as those lower down the social ladder tend to 
have accelerated transitions into adulthood, whereas those higher up have more protracted 
transitions, as we shall illustrate later on. 'Storm and stress' as a feature of adolescence can be 
related to transitions through major institutions. For example, the peak age of delinquency tends 
to follow the school leaving age - it is highest in the year before and after leaving school. As the 
school leaving age has risen so has the age of peak delinquency (Corrigan 1979). In countries 
where there is military service, young men are supposed to 'settle down' by the time they come 
out (and this in itself can be quite variable). Therefore factors which appear to be psychological 
or biological universals often turn out to be socially relative. This is even more evident when we 
consider the different ages associated with 'adolescence', ’youth1, or young adulthood in 
different societies: in some places those up to 35 would count as 'youth' whereas in Britain we 
frequently think of it as ending after 18. Studies of youth are notoriously imprecise about this 
and it seems that they can be carried out on any group between the ages of 13 and 40. This 
lack of consistency in typification of adolescence and youth, indicate not the lack of scientific 
precision, but the arbitrariness of the category itself.
Another well-known and influential psychological approach is to identify definite life stages in the 
development of the individual. Developmental psychologists such as Erikson (1968) have 
argued that individuals grow up through distinct stages through which they are integrated into 
society. The adolescent stage (Stage 3) is associated with identity crisis and peer group 
associations. These peer group associations help the individual to come to terms with their 
identity and if successful, this leads eventually to the integrated person (O'Donnel 1985). For 
Erikson, youth represents a period of 'moratorium', of experimentation and self-discovery before 
taking on adult responsibilities. It is argued that the aim of research is to identify adolescence 
as a stage of development and (implicitly) to assist in turning out better socialized individuals.
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Hence, John Coleman and Leo Hendry (1990) argue that there are four 'developmental tasks’ 
of adolescence:
1. Development of intellectual and social competence in order to acquire independently 
and responsibly scholastic and subsequently occupational qualifications with the 
purpose of taking up a job and thereby ensuring the economic and material basis for 
an independent existence as an adult.
2. Development of a gender role and building of heterosexual partnership which in the 
long term may form the basis for the upbringing of one’s own children.
3. Development of a system of values and norms and of an ethical and political 
consciousness which provides the capacity to act responsibly in all areas of social 
participation.
4. Development of competence in the use of consumer goods and leisure activities 
available (including the media and luxury goods) for the purpose of developing a 
independent lifestyle.
(Quoted in Hurrelmann 1994: 2-3)
Here we can see the attempt to construct an ‘essential’ model of youth justified by the ‘need’ for 
biological reproduction and supposedly natural and necessary social roles. In constructing the 
idea of adolescence, defined by the ‘developmental tasks’ a normative and universal model is 
used. The failure to develop ’normally’ or the display of anti-social behavior is attributed to 
something going wrong in this developmental process, to hormonal changes or to problems in 
the relationship with parents, to individual failures of adjustment. Other problems associated 
with this life-phase include eating disorders, suicide and depression (Furlong and Cartmel 
1997). The psychological or social psychological model was used extensively in the guidance 
and treatment of the young. It was influential in the treatment of ‘problem1 groups such as 
offenders in the 1960s and 1970s, whose development is deemed to be incomplete or 
problematical, although social psychologists themselves now take a less essentiaiist 
perspective and are more sensitive to variations within youth as a social group (Archer 1994, 
Heaven 1994).
In fact the reality is often far from this model as many young people are unable to find jobs, do 
not have useful qualifications (or perhaps any qualifications) and may not have access to 
consumer goods - especially luxury ones. Young people may indeed be better than their elders 
at handling consumer goods and the media. Increasing numbers are rejecting the building of 
conventional gender roles and heterosexual families deemed a necessary task of adolescence - 
or at any rate postponing them. The construction of homosexuality as some kind of abnormal
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development or a problem that will pass Is no longer acceptable in a world where sexual 
differentiation is increasingly recognized for all age groups (Griffin 1993).
We argue in contrast that the problems young people experience need to be set in the context 
of not just their personal growth, but also the social institutions within which they are situated. 
For example, the contradictory pressures exerted by media culture which encourages 
participation in general youth consumer styles and cultural autonomy on the one hand and the 
increasing dependence upon parents and institutions of education and training on the other 
hand. This tension between self-determination and dependency has psychological impacts too. 
This is pressure affects not only deviant but ‘normal’ youth as well. Similarly the need to 
conform to dominant cultural models of masculinity or femininity can in itself create pressure 
upon individual search for 'identity' rather than being seen as the normal or ‘natural’ end product 
of the 'developmental task'. Finally, it is difficult to see what the final aims of these 
'developmental tasks’ are when the youth labour market for many young people has collapsed 
and large numbers of young people are permanently excluded from the model presented 
above.
As with the biological categorization of young people, the developmental model assumes that 
youth is a universal category which can be ascertained using objective principles - that it is an 
'essential’ category. However, very often the normative models being implicitly used represent 
those from dominant social and ethnic groups. Erikson's own model, like that of G. Stanley 
Hall, is in some respects specific to a middle class white group in the USA and the problems 
which were associated with them at the time that they were writing. We shall argue that the 
individual development of young people is not universal, but depends upon their historical 
location and upon the way in which 'youth' is constructed in that society. It is no longer 
possible to have a universal concept of youth. ‘Modern’ institutional tendencies try to create 
such categories whilst 'postmodern' tendencies undermine them.
The Construction of Youth as a Social Category
Whilst there are undoubtedly biological and developmental components to what we 
understand by youth, it is also evident that these are related to the definition of youth as a 
social category. Anthropologists have argued that we can see youth in terms of a 'rite de 
passage' from one state 'childhood' to another 'adulthood'. This is accomplished in different 
ways in different societies but the anthropologist who is best known for drawing inferences for 
Westernern Society is Margaret Mead (1943). In her study of growing up in Samoa, she 
attempted to show that the American idea of troubled adolescence and the 'generation gap' was 
not universal: in Samoa young people were more successfully integrated into society as they 
did not have to endure confusing and conflicting moral standards. Although it has been claimed 
that she over-emphasized the degree of harmony in these societies and under-emphasized the 
degree of juvenile delinquency, the work of Mead is nevertheless important in demonstrating the
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relativity of our ideas of youth. It is also evident from this debate that the categories and theories 
used for describing non-industrial societies are drawn from preoccupations in our own and this 
is why it is important to examine the different models of how youth is constructed. Despite the 
criticisms, we find this relative concept of 'youth' and adolescence a helpful way to understand 
how age-status are socially constructed in different contexts.
One of the first serious sociological attempts to develop a theoretical framework for age 
relations was that of Karl Mannheim writing in the 1930s. He analyzed the issue of age and 
class as competing forms of stratification and argued that each generation developed a 
consciousness at a particular point in history and was formed by events at that time. 
Hence, we can talk about the 'generation of 68' as those who were particularly influenced 
by events at that time. In Germany this issue has been more obvious, as in Mannheims's day, 
the generation experiencing the First World War were indelibly stamped by that experience. 
Mannheim thus did not claim that all generations were created in the same way, because this 
would depend upon historical circumstances. We find this a helpful concept because 
subsequently, those who had experienced fascism and the Second World War were similarly 
shaped by that experience. In Post-Communist countries such a generation gap is also 
emerging between those who were seen to be part of the system and those who came 
afterwards. Mannheim has been heavily criticized and has often marked a point of departure for 
more recent theories. First, it is claimed that it is not clear why 'generations' should be 
particularly identified with youth or formed by youth (Murdock and McCron 1976). It seems to 
us in Mannheim’s defense, however, that he argues that forming an historical consciousness 
can take place in a dramatic way in the lives of young people as they become critically aware of 
their surroundings for the first time with no personal memory of what went before. Secondly, it 
is argued that the concept applies perhaps more in some contexts than in others: in Britain it 
is difficult to see such distinct generations (except perhaps those formed by youth culture: the 
‘Beatles generation' are distinct from the ‘punk generation’) whereas in other social contexts 
they are far more obvious. In our opinion the experience of having lived through great historical 
moment or changes creates a generational difference in the experiences and consciousness of 
people - between those who have been shaped by that experience and those who follow and 
were too young to have constructed their conscious lives in this way. This is often reflected in 
political movements and parties as we shall later show. Thirdly, Cohen (1997) criticizes 
Mannheim for failing to account for differentiation within the generations and the material bases 
of such differentiation. Mannheim’s sociology of generations has enjoyed a recent rehabilitation 
as a way of understanding contemporary patterns of social change (Pilcher 1994). However, 
Pilcher makes the point that we need to distinguish between two meanings of generation: that of 
broad groups of young people or cohorts, and that between older and younger members of a 
family.
The most ambitious attempt to define youth in the context of modernity came from the 
structural-functionalist theories of the 1950s and early 1960s such as Parsons (1973), Parsons
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and Bales (1956), Eisenstadt (1956) and Musgrove (1964), These authors argued that youth is 
a period when people are between the particularistic values of the family and the universalistic 
values of the wider world. The separation of home and work means that young people cannot 
be socialized into the former by the latter and youth is the pivotal point of tension between the 
two systems. The peer group thus becomes the means by which young people learn the 
values of wider society. This work reflected concerns during the 1950's with the emergence of 
separate 'youth cultures' and the so-called 'generation gap1 between the conformist 
elders brought up on war time rationing and the hedonistic, consumer oriented youth. 
According to structural-functionalist theories, this is not evidence of a 'failure to adjust', but 
rather a form of adaptation, a'normal'part of growing up. In the work of Musgrove (1964) 
and the influential work of the American sociologist James Coleman (1974) it was argued that 
youth were becoming a separate entity with their own forms of communication, 
subordinated to adult society - indeed, almost as a class in themselves. The problems faced 
by young people can be seen as a 'passing phase' and before they are incorporated into 
dominant society. However, Musgrove was critical of this construction of youth, arguing that 
young people should be better integrated into society rather than kept apart. The functionalist 
view sees society as something stable and necessary, something into which youth should 
eventually be integrated, and this view is held also by many practitioners working with young 
people. This is once more an 'essentiallst' construction of youth, one using normative 
assumptions and one which fixes people into a ‘natural’ and inevitable age-specific role.
De-constructing Youth as an Age Category
From the late 1960s onwards, more critical, Marxist perspectives developed, often stimulated 
by developments in the sociology of deviance where a body of work on 'sub-cultures' had been 
developed. The Marxists began by attacking structural-functionalist for their static view of 
society and for their neglect of the dynamics of class. For example, it was trenchantly criticized 
by Sheila Allen (1968) who argued that youth should not be seen as a universal category, but 
as a group divided by sex, race and class. Moreover, she argued that the idea of two 
generations was too simple; what was needed was a more complex account of the 'dialectics 
of structural change', a position which was taken up and developed in the critical perspectives 
which followed.
Particularly influential in this was a group of Marxist scholars at the Center for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies (CCCS) at Birmingham University in the UK. They argued that youth as a 
concept was 'unthinkable'. It made no sense to talk about age as a form of stratification. 
Instead they argued that class was the most important social variable and youth cultures 
were simply the way in which different classes of young people expressed their opposition to 
the dominant order. The developments of this work by Willis (1977) and Corrigan (1979) 
situated sub-cultures in the transition from school to work in which working class boys 
developed responses to the dominant school order and in preparation for working life.
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The desire to relate cultural phenomenon to 'real' material relations, however, meant that the 
way in which youth was constructed through legislation and professional interests was 
ignored. The more recent work of Bernard Davies (1986) provides a critical corrective to this 
by looking at the way in which social policy has responded to the phenomenon of 'threatening 
youth' - mostly through more social control, which he argued is reflected consistently in the 
different arms of the state which deal with young people - the criminal justice system, the 
training schemes, the education system and the Youth Service in Britain. Griffin (1993) argues 
that there has been a continuing tradition of this 'critical' discourse which has counterpointed 
mainstream youth theories and initiatives. Most recently, sexism, racism and the recognition of 
'difference' has dominated this critical discourse whereas previously it was class. These 
therefore tend towards anti-essentialist constructions of youth.
However, the model of class analysis used in the Marxist model is problematical, since the 
notion of class is reified and assumed rather than demonstrated (Connel 1983). Jones (1987a) 
has attempted to develop a more empirically based model of the class locations of young 
people and Jenkins(1983), Brown (1987) and Wallace (1987) have shown that there are 
important cultural divisions within classes as well as between them and there are arguments 
that the more 'ordinary' youth should be studied in detail too (Brown 1987). The emphasis on 
class at the expense of other kinds of divisions is a feature of 'modernist' perspectives whilst 
more recent perspectives have emphasized other kinds of social divisions based upon style, 
ethnicity, gender, dis(ability), sexuality and so on. The emphasis on 'style' for example denies 
that there is any consistent or material basis for social divisions, although most youth 
researchers would retain the idea of socio-economic divisions, if in a weaker form (Furlong and 
Cartmel 1997).
More recently the volume of work produced by British researchers in the 1980s and 1990s has 
tended instead to focus upon 'career trajectories' - that is routes through education, training and 
work rather than straightforward class reproduction, perhaps because class reproduction is no 
longer straightforward. It is instead fragmented and channeled through a variety of new 
structures such as training schemes and college courses (see Banks et al. 1992). This work 
has helped to provide a large volume of empirical data about the changing experiences of 
young people during the 1980s based upon cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis (Raffe 
1988). The implications of such studies is that we need to take account of the expanding 
structures of training and education in order to understand the fortunes of different groups of 
school leavers and this coincides with continental approaches to young people in which they are 
generally divided between different educational levels rather than in terms of social background. 
Although until the 1980s, social class was seen as the dominant paradigm for analyzing youth in 
Britain, this recent empirical work would suggest that more complex forms of stratification are 
emerging, created through the interaction of training, education and the labour market. What 
used to define working class youth was that they went straight from school into jobs at the 
minimum age, whereas now this is not necessarily the case. Nevertheless, social background
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continues to play a role in the allocation of youth to different positions in society (Wyn and White 
1997).
There are nevertheless a large and growing group of young people in Europe, who are socially 
excluded from the labour market and from other parts of mainstream society. They may be 
homeless, jobless, without incomes, without qualifications and without prospects. Some social 
theorists define these as an ‘underclass' (Murray 1986) and further identify them with crime, 
with drug taking, with fatherless children and with black people (Murray 1990). Many of these 
factors do not apply to European societies where the unemployed are mostly white and where 
fatherless children are increasingly uncommon among teenagers. However, we can also reject 
the ‘underclass’ thesis because we can see different groups of young people find themselves 
disadvantaged for different reasons and at least some of the reasons are the regional changes 
in the structure of employment which we have already discussed (Coles 1995). They do not all 
form one homogenous group. For this reason the term ‘social exclusion’ has gained currency 
as a way of conceptualizing such disadvantages whilst avoiding the stigmatizing idea of an 
‘underclass’ and the implication that it is a self-reproducing class of culturally deviant people as 
described by Murray (Abbott and Wallace 1992).
The Marxist and other perspectives have been criticized for neglect of gender. Feminists have 
developed their own perspective on youth, emphasizing the roie of the gender typing, the family 
and sexuality in shaping the experience of young women and men (McRobbie 1991, Griffin 
1985, Nava 1992, Lees 1986). Others have applied such ideas to exploring how young men 
acquire a gendered identity and the idea of 'masculinity' under these circumstances (Wood 
1984, Mac an Ghaill 1994). In Westernern sociology the idea of gender has become accepted 
as an important source of disadvantage, but as we have already indicated, ideas of gender 
relations need to be somewhat re-defined to fit the new expanded European reality and in 
eastern Europe the gender perspective has not been so well developed.
A further critical perspective has emphasized the importance of 'race' and ethnicity in structuring 
the experience of youth generally but also in understanding the experiences of black and Asian 
youth in Britain. They have criticized white youth studies for assuming that the experience of 
white youth are universal and have developed different theories, emphasizing 'race' as a 
fundamental factor of division in society. Racism, like sexism, is seen as an endemic part of 
British institutions and not reducible to the prejudices of the population (Wrench, Cross and 
Barret 1989, Solomos 1988). Youth researchers have emphasized the different experiences of 
ethnic minority youth and have criticized the institutions which tend to turn them into a 'problem' 
category rather than dealing with their problems. Rather, we should see racism as helping to 
construct race and some young people as the victims of the resurgence of racism throughout 
Europe since the 1980s. Many Afro-Caribbean, Asian, Arab and Turkish youth in inner city 
areas particularly have been hit hard by the recession and by state expenditure cuts creating 
groups of unemployed and socially excluded youth who also suffer racial persecution and
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prejudice. It is possible to read the various social policy recommendations and reports on inner 
city rioting in the 1980s as attempts to deal with the 'problem' of so-called 'black' youth and their 
perceived threat to white society (Solomos 1988). However, when we consider the general 
European context, these definitions of race and racism need to be broadened to include ethnic 
and religious differentiation and persecution of minorities more generally (to apply for example 
to Bosnia). The construction of both race and racism should be seen as situationally defined 
rather than consistent and homogenous (Back 1996).
In Britain the critical perspectives which began by emphasizing class, race and gender in the 
study of youth started to develop into post-structuralist and postmodern directions (Griffin 1993). 
These theories tended to reject any overarching explanation of youth or young people's 
problems and to emphasize instead the differences and diversities in young people’s 
experiences. Hence new divisions of sexuality, disability and other factors were introduced 
which were not reducible or even comparable to the classic social class divisions. There have 
therefore been rejections of 'essentialisf notions of age, gender, 'race' in preference for looking 
at how these categories construct the people in them. This has lead to a focus on young 
people's media tastes and preferences, seeing consumerism as a positive value rather than a 
form of capitalist oppression (see for example McRobbie 1991). This represented then a 
postmodernist tendency. However, this perspective in turn neglects the widening inequalities 
between different groups of young people and the fact that not all of them have equal access to 
consumption and leisure styles (for further critique see Jones and Wallace 1992). We shall 
develop this more later in the book.
An important perspective originating in Germany is that of Beck (1986) who deriving his 
analysis from theories of modernization, suggests that the loss of class solidarity and the 
traditional support networks of the family and community has lead to an increased 
emphasis on the individual private world. However, 'new socio-cultural communalities' 
could emerge, based upon the interests, ambitions and commitments of individuals rather than 
upon class identity (see Jones and Wallace 1990, 1992 for a critique of this perspective). One 
expression of individualization processes is the increasing demand from all sectors of 
society for more individual control over one's life and its corollary is increased risk and 
uncertainty. People need to choose their way between complex and competing alternatives 
with the risk of failure, if they make a wrong move: life thus becomes a 'biographical project'. 
Youth is a crucial moment in this biographical project because it is a period in which choices 
have to be defined and routes chosen (Bertram 1985, Hartmann 1985, Oik 1988). This affects 
young women in particular, it is argued, because they are no longer confined by the 'normal 
biography' of schooi-work-children-work. It is argued that they no longer perceive family-building 
as their only goal, but may be more likely to seek fulfillment in the labour market (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim 1995). Indeed, according to a review of current research by Wilkinson and 
Mulgan (1995), young women are becoming more ambitious than young men.
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A number of studies of youth have reflected this 'individualization' perspective and provided 
evidence for it. For example, Hartmann (1987) argues that technology and housing 
developments mean that they have more choice: they can afford to buy their own leisure and 
have their own rooms in which to pursue these choices. Young people are able to seek their 
own pursuits regardless of parental direction and as young people develop their own 
unique cultural styles and adult authority is decreased (Zinnecker and Fuchs 1981). Parents 
have less control over their children: for example, the parents of young people who were 
questioned during riots in Stockholm often did not know where their children were at the 
time (Hartmann 1987). The increased emphasis on individual rights has been reflected in 
legislative changes which define children's rights as distinct from those of their parents, 
women's rights as distinct from those of men's . Family relationships require negotiation and 
choice rather than blind acceptance of parental or patriarchal authority (du Bois-Reymond et al.
1995).
Most recently, Furlong and Cartmel (1997) had tried to apply this concept of the ‘risk society’ to 
young people. They found that young people did suffer increased risk of unemployment, 
educational failure and homelessness and this was manifested in the increase in psychological 
disorders such as eating disorders, suicide and mental health problems. However, we find this 
concept of risk rather a weak one. Whilst it is evident that young people in western Europe do 
suffer from anxiety, it is clear that their real risk from dangers such as starvation, political 
persecution, hunger and deprivation or destruction is less than it was for previous generations 
or for young people in other parts of the world. Risk is therefore relative. What we do find 
convincing however, is the idea of individualization not just of risk, but of problems previously 
tackled by employers, formal associations (such as trades unions and youth organisations) and 
the welfare state. This can be seen one form of the ‘privatization’ of problems. Problems are 
thrown back out of the public realm and left for private solution.
Some have tried to account for the extension of youth by adding on new stages. This idea was 
first first raised by Keniston (1970) in the USA and applied to Germany by Zinnecker and Fuchs 
(1981) is that a period of what they call 'post adolescence' is being created based upon an 
extended period of preparation, free from responsibility. 'Post adolescence' is characterized by 
postponement of marriage and childbearing; by experimentation with ideologies, political beliefs 
and life-styles; by education and training rather than full-time work (Klein 1990).
Ideas about individualization and.'post adolescence’ were developed in the 1970s and 1980s in 
Germany and the USA to account for more affluent young people who enjoy the most extended 
transitions. In Germany at least, the risk of unemployment for young people was very small 
until recently. The 'risk' was one of making the wrong decision rather than being excluded 
altogether from the labour market and individualization was developed in the context of a 
growing 'postmaterialist’ orientation (Inglehart 1990). However, the situation where young 
people are in increasing risk of non-employment and where problems of failure are less and
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less cushioned by institutions, individualization takes on a different meaning - it becomes a the 
way in which the problems are privatized.
In his description of the ‘civilizing process’ Norbert Elias (1976) argued that people were 
increasingly required to excersize self-discipline in the course of civilization, something which 
was also stressed as one of the 'developmental tasks’ of growing up. For Elias, civilization as a 
form of modernization, was associated with more future security and longer term planning 
horizons anchored by the welfare state. Now, however the contrary situation is emerging, one 
where there is less future security for the individual and shorter term planning horizons. We 
could say that market capitalist ideologies which have supplanted Keynesian models of social 
policy management in most European countries have lead to a situation where it is impossible 
to plan in the long term - only short term solutions are possible in a rapidly fluctuating market. 
The provisionality and ephemerality of the market enters other areas of social life. Many older 
skills are regarded as rapidly obsolete and people are encouraged to ‘sell’ themselves or their 
ideas on the labour market, like a product. Education systems increasingly resemble a 
‘supermarket’ model of off-the-shelf courses. In such a system, individuals are left to manage 
their own educational and employment careers and are blamed for their own failures to do so. 
Although the individualization thesis did not originate in this climate, it fits very well the situation 
of young people having to find their own way, not guided by traditional paths into the labour 
market and unprotected by the welfare state. Social problems are privatized.
In eastern and central Europe individualization has not developed to the same extent as in 
western Europe, because individual interests were subordinated to group ones and the scope 
for independent decision-making was less. Transition processes were planned and controlled 
to fit centralised state-controlled economy. On the other hand there was no risk of 
unemployment as long as one conformed. Nevertheless, tendencies that have encouraged 
some measure of individualization including the elaboration of the education and training 
systems and since 1989, marketization has helped to create choice of lifestyles so that more 
individualized identities could be constructed. At the same time unemployment and rising 
poverty for some families has been introduced. Young people are increasingly left to manage 
their own careers and prospects without much guidance from institutions and in a very uncertain 
economic climate. For young people in eastern Europe too, problems are individualized and 
privatized.
Perspectives on Youth in Eastern Europe
Under the former communist regimes no competing perspectives were allowed, so conceptions 
of youth were often implicit rather than explicit although they also changed over time (Pilkington 
1994). Youth were not considered a 'real' social category - only class was important in this 
respect. However, youth, heavily ideologized as being the future prospect of society, were an 
important tool of communist policy. They could also be potentially better indoctrinated since 
they carried with them less ideological baggage from previous regimes. In exchange for
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privileges they were expected to demonstrate loyalty and gratitude to the regime. Age and 
gender equality were proclaimed by the Constitutions and supplemented with an elaborate 
system of protective legislation. Youth were also an important source of labour as both in the 
early days of communist reconstruction and also later, volunteer or low paid labour from young 
people formed an important component of the workforce.
In practice youth were divided into three stages corresponding with the different youth 
organizations. At the basic level of schooling, young people joined a junior youth organization 
(given different names in different countries) and then from age 10 to 14 they joined the 'Young 
Pioneers'. From then to age 28 they joined the official youth organization, which was known in 
many countries as the 'Komsomol'. The youth organizations organized excursions, cultural 
events and a whole range of educational and cultural activities, including mass rallies on 
significant occasions. Age-status transitions were therefore highly structured: everybody knew 
who youth were - they were those eligible to join the Komsomol (or equivalent organization)!
Youth research was one of the expanding fields of sociology in the communist dominated half of 
Europe. Although it was under the same ideological pressures as other research work, the 
generous support for empirical investigation which it enjoyed allowed the possibility to work out 
new concepts and methods, often as a reaction to the ’official' construction of youth. Many 
researchers, doing a variety of kinds of research, were able to hide under the mantle of 
legitimate youth research.
One of the early themes of this research in the 1970s was the specification of youth as a social 
group, especially whether youth were a biological or social category. Eventually a compromise 
was reached in describing them as a socio-biologicai category. This was a tortured topic 
because both the biological and social definitions were inconsistent with the official Marxist 
philosophy of social groups being defined by their relation to the means of production. The new 
social and biological definition of youth did make it possible to begin empirical research with 
large-scale sample surveys to measure these characteristics. Thus, the obscurantist disputes 
about the specification of youth served as a legitimation for researchers to develop a sociology 
of youth and obtain state financing of this field.
The study of youth's integration into society and their life plans was developed through the more 
elaborate concept of socialization in Soviet sociology through the work of I. Kon and N. 
Andreyenkova. Although this was useful insofar as it enabled sociologists to study the 
development of personality in relations to specific institutions and social relations, it was heavily 
criticized by ideologists, who detected western influence (Kenkmann n.d.:1).. Nevertheless, this 
paradigm persisted, strengthened in the 1970s by multi-national comparative surveys focusing 
on social reproduction, particularly in education.
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An innovation of East European sociologists in this field was the idea of 'juventization'. First 
attributed to the Rumanian social scientist, Fred Mahler, but later developed by Bulgarian 
sociologists, they criticized the concept of socialization as representing merely the passive 
absorption of social norms through young people's conformist integration into society 
(Gospodinov 1981, Mitev 1982). Instead they argued that young people not only internalize and 
reproduce social norms, but that they also produce new ones. Using Marxist ideas of the 
relationship between people and their environment, they argued that society imposes norms on 
young people, but young people, through their active participation in social life, in turn change 
and 'juventicize' society. This was the basis for youth's highest form of social activity: their 
active role in transforming society (although in practice a very passive role was encouraged - 
see Chapter 2). In this way young people could become actors for real social change.
Among Baltic sociologists, the concept of 'self determination' was developed (Kenkmann n.d.). 
This was not self determination in a western sense, but rather it allowed the opportunity to look 
at young people's own attitudes and responses, something much neglected in communist- 
dominated sociology. Using this paradigm, it was argued that young people make choices with 
regard to education, occupations, work, marriage and so on, choices that needed to be 
explored through empirical investigation. Titma (n.d.) concluded from the results of these 
surveys, that young people in fact controlled very few areas of their lives.
In Bulgarian sociology the same paradigm was interpreted as the 'self realization' of personality
- the need for young people to realize potentialities in the various spheres of life. The entry into 
work attracted particular attention. The idea of 'career' was discouraged, being considered as 
unsocialist, but by considering the problem of professional realization, sociologists were able to 
detect some of the mismatch between qualifications and aspirations of young people and the 
jobs that were actually available to them.
The influential Institute for Youth Studies in Sofia helped to better elaborate theories of youth, 
and an early book by Peter Mitev in the 1960s claimed that youth - along with class struggle - 
formed an important element in the transformation of society. This afforded the possibility of 
legitimately studying the position of youth in society and their activities. At first in this discourse 
youth problems - such as vandalism, social apathy or sub-cultures - were regarded as 
deviations explained by the infiltration of the capitalist West. From the end of the 1970s, 
however, sociologists began to explain young people's problems in terms of the growing 
generational alienation revealed through their surveys.
Consequently, a range of surveys were conducted in the 1970s which detected increasing 
signs of young people's alienation. However, these were not allowed to be published and even 
now it is difficult to gain access to them. The growing consumer market from the 1970s 
onwards helped to fuel the idea of youth as a separate stage in life - but defined by themselves. 
The party hierarchy were powerless to prevent what they saw as this disastrous and decadent
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subversion of the communist ideal of youth (Riordan 1989a). In fact Riordan concludes of the 
communist Soviet Union, that the institutionalized structures containing youth were themselves 
so strong that youthful deviance was strictly limited. However, we argue that this limitation 
resulted in every action and every lack of compliance becoming politically charged. Passive 
resistance (termed 'apathy' or 'political and ideological deviance') was widespread, recognized 
as a problem by the authorities for whom anything short of wholehearted conformity was a 
problem of social control. There also seems to have been a growing questioning of the soviet 
system from a generation too young to have experienced Stalinist terror or invading Warsaw 
pact armies restoring order (as happened in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968).
In the 1980s, the more grand theoretical concepts were left behind in favour of studying the new 
social reality. Thus, it was possible for the first time to study openly the range of youth cultures 
and what were called 'non-formal' groups in communist countries. Studies appeared showing 
the discontent of young people with working conditions, their participation in the informal 
economy, the formation of non-formal youth groups and their growing consumerism (Pilkington 
1994). The youth sociologists were some of the first to detect and identify the changes taking 
place, but they were still not allowed to publish their results.
Many of the results referred to here are drawn from these surveys that at the time were not 
made public. However, even now access to them is difficult since many are held in private 
homes, by individuals. It is particularly difficult to find information about young people's own 
perceptions since this was seldom investigated, and when it was, the results remained 
confidential. For this reason we have had some difficulty in finding information which gives any 
accurate picture of the experiences of young people in communist regimes.
After 1990 the Youth Institute in Bulgaria closed. The extensive library moved and is still not 
open to the public. Many of the researchers who conducted youth research as a way of 
concealing the subjects in which they were really interested, were now able to openly study 
these subjects. Other researchers went off to join public opinion and market research 
organizations, currently a growth industry. Some of the key members of the research teams 
took up places or scholarships in Westernern Europe and the USA or became involved in 
politics. The Youth Institute in Moscow has suffered from slow death rather than execution, as 
its resources were cut off, and many of its personnel have left. In other countries the youth 
research teams and Youth Institutes vanished almost immediately. In East Germany the 
substantial staff of the Youth Institute in Leipzig were laid off and only a skeleton staff remained, 
run from the West German Youth Institute in Munich. Now, youth is no longer seen as an 
interesting or relevant topic of research: it disappeared along with the official youth 
organisations such as Komsomol. Youth studies are treated with some distaste, as a relic from 
the old regime.
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Conclusions
In the preceding pages we have reviewed a number of contemporary and past theories of youth
arguing that they have themselves been used to construct youth as a social category. Whilst 
some theories were attempting to construct an 'essential' view of youth - one based upon 
'natural' or normative biological, social and psychological imperatives and marked differences 
between the sexes - others were arguing for a more non-essentialist view of youth. We have not 
given a definition of youth and do not intend to offer one because our argument is that youth - 
and life-stage transitions associated with it - are social constructs. We aim instead to look at 
some of the ways in which youth is constructed in different social and historical contexts. A 
view across both East and West Europe is helpful in this respect as it helps to see our own 
theories of youth in whatever culture they were developed, in more relative terms. A 
comparative perspective enables us to grasp general tendencies in modernization and post­
modernization regardless of whether these occurred in welfare capitalist, communist or post­
communist contexts and to look at their implications for age-status transitions. We argue that 
generations are relevant to an understanding of youth in Europe, not because we hold an 
essentialist concept of age, but because historical events and regimes do serve to shape the 
consciousness of those who spent most of their lives within them. Such historical experiences 
are more easily forgotten by those who did not experience them directly and not forgotten by 
those who did. We hope to demonstrate in the following pages how youth can be constructed 
in 'weak' or 'strong' ways: in some places and points in time, they are an important social 
category and at others less so. Inevitably our analysis of the construction and re-construction of 
age relations leads us back to the modern state system, its different political regimes and the 
role it plays in classifying and monitoring its populations. The tendency of modern state 
systems over the last 100 years to classify, monitor and construct a category of 'youth' in 
different ways is undermined by increasing marketization, the withdrawal of the state and the 
increasing influence of media communications and culture which all undermine such 
tendencies, deconstructing youth in a way which is more postmodern in character. We have 
confined ourselves to descriptions of Europe because in this sense, ‘youth’ is a western concept 
associated with the development of welfare states characteristic of European societies. In many 
non-western countries children are supporting their families through work from a relatively early 
age and do not have the luxury of an extended youth.
In the remainder of the book we take up some of these themes in more detail. Chapter 2 
considers the construction of youth in Europe through modernization and the expansion of the 
state; Chapter 3 looks in more detail at changes in employment, training and education for the 
construction of youth. Chapter 4 looks more closely at family transitions for the way in which 
the relationship between different generations is changing and in Chapter 5 we consider the role 
of youth cultures and consumerism in creating a distinctive idea of ‘youth’. In Chapter 6 we look 
at young people's involvement in politics as a way of understanding under what circumstances, 
if at all, youth could be said to mobilize as a social category.
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Notes
(1) Information is drawn from the following research projects: 16-19 Initiative (ESRC); 
Anglo-German Foundation comparison of young people in labour markets in Germany 
and Britain; East-West Initiative (ESRC) study of young people in Poland (with Ken 
Roberts); ACE-Phare and INTAS programmes, studies of young people in Poland, 
Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia; McArthur Fund and Soros Open Society Institute, study 
of student activists in Plovdiv. We would like to gratefully acknowledge the support of all 
these organisations.
(2) We have referred throughout this book to 'communism1. The word is a convenient label 
for the Soviet-style socialist regimes which existed behind the iron curtain. These states 
did not consider themselves 'communist' (they had yet to evolve to this stage in official 
socialist theory). Nor would they be considered communist by many western socialists. 
Many western analysts would not even regard them as true 'socialist' states and few 
socialist parties in the West saw them as role models. They were states built on a 
version of Marxist theory and had many similar features - although even communism 
took many different forms. Communist domination through the former Soviet Union 
imposed some kind of uniformity on otherwise very disparate countries and so we feel 
justified in classifying them all together as 'communist' as a convenient label.
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Chapter 2
Modernization and the Construction of Youth
The idea of youth emerged as a chronologically defined category with modernization, but in 
different ways in different parts of Europe. In this chapter we will consider how this happened. 
The periodization used here reflects the process of industrial change and the development of 
the state. In the second part of the chapter we look at the way in which youth services became 
incorporated into state provision for youth and the way in which modern and post-modern 
tendencies are reflected in it.
Youth in the Pre-industrial Period
Youth was a distinctive phase in North Western Europe even before industrialization but its 
duration depended upon other factors than numerical age (Rosenmayr 1992). The North West 
European marriage pattern was one whereby people lived in small nuclear families based upon 
neolocal monogamy. A new household could be set up once the means - in terms of property 
or a craft - were acquired:. 'youth' was thus the long period between leaving childhood and 
setting up as an independent household (Mitterauer 1993). Childhood ended at some time 
between the ages of 8 and 15 when offspring were sent away to live in other people's houses 
either as servants or as apprentices (Gillis 1981, Wall 1987). Adulthood began when they 
married and inherited property or obtained access to a livelihood of some kind, which was 
usually around their mid to late 20's: the rather long stage in between was 'youth'. Marriage 
and the inheritance of property were therefore connected as form of transition and the age of 
marriage depended upon when property or a means of livelihood became available 
although there was also ante-mortem transfers in the form of dowries or gifts and there was 
a great deal of variability in this pattern depending upon the area of Europe and the 
circumstances of individual households. Thus, the determination of youth was not so much 
age, as marriage, gender, inheritance and access to a livelihood. The age at which young men 
left home, went to college, went to work and so on was fairly loose and depended upon the 
demand for their labour by the household, funds available and a variety of other factors. Young 
men would move in and out of various activities depending upon their circumstances and 
young men of a variety of ages could be found in the same classrooms (Kett 1977). 'Youth’ 
was not therefore a precise, age-graded category.
Youth was also associated with a period of apprenticeship to a craft or trade, which often 
involved living in the household of the master. Apprentices developed their own sub-cultures 
to judge by the anxiety this provoked in some of their elders and the laws which forbade them 
to gamble, go out at night, wear extravagant clothing or grow their hair long although this 
applied more to male youth. The long period which young people spent outside the family 
encouraged some autonomous social life. In Germany social control was more formalized
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through a tradition of strong fraternities and sororities which further regulated behavior by 
encouraging celibacy and controlling courtship (Gillis 1981). These also acted as a form of 
social support for itinerant and apprenticed youth or journeymen. However, young people 
generally were subject to the patriarchal authority of the household in which they lived and 
where they worked for their keep. Although youth meant male youth, Mitterauer (1993) 
suggests that there may also have been cultural life for young women based upon sex- 
segregated employment and activities such as spinning. Youth at this period was therefore a 
stage of life wherein young people were semi-dependent upon other households.
In South Eastern Europe a different family form prevailed, one based upon the extended co­
resident household and this meant that youth was not such an extended period, but rather the 
period between childhood and getting married at some time between age 12 and 18. Only 
women left home on marriage and youth was seen as a brief carefree period before hard 
agricultural and domestic labour started to wear people down. The needs of the group took 
priority over those of the individual and parents chose the marriage partners of their children 
(Bobchev 1906, Khadzijski 1974). Hajnal (1965) has suggested that the European style of 
nuclear families with small numbers of children, late or no marriage and relative independence 
for women can be distinguished from the more communal styles of household which existed 
further east in such countries as Bulgaria where children and women were strictly subordinated, 
expected to show proper obedience and modesty, and youth was very brief or non-existent 
(Grekova 1991).
Disruption and Change: the consequences of industrialization
These age-relations broke down with the advent of industrialized urbanization. In North West 
Europe this occurred mainly during the nineteenth century and even earlier in some regions. In 
other areas of Europe similar changes followed much later - in Bulgaria not until the twentieth 
century. The growing predominance of wage labour and the migration from rural to urban areas 
meant that the traditional link between marriage and inheritance was severed. The physical 
concentration of the population and the regulation of work by time and wage labour which was 
brought about by industrial capitalism meant that young people became a more conspicuous 
unregulated group in the cities. In many parts of Europe, 'youth' are still considered to be an 
urban phenomenon for these reasons until quite recently, because in rural areas they were 
simply absorbed into the unwaged household economy (Pavelka and Stefanov 1985). With the 
concentration of young people with 'free' time and not necessarily holding regular jobs, came 
the concomitant problems of social control and Pearson (1983) documents the various 'moral 
panics' and street crime which escalated at this time in Britain as a result.
It is usually the case that younger people are the ones to migrate, and this may have helped to 
break down traditional patterns of authority and dependency. However, to begin with, the 
authority of the family may have actually been strengthened, as chain migration and early
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industrial conditions, including 'out work' and the employment of the entire family in the same 
factory under the authority of the father, provided an inducement for working families to keep 
their children at home. In general though, industrialization lead to the growing independence of 
young people; for the first time they were able to earn a wage and wage labour also meant that 
young people could set up families independently at an earlier age.
Modernization brought with it mass education, but at first there was only education for the elite. 
The reform of middle class education, particularly in the public schools of England between 
1827 and 1839, was accompanied by the development of pedagogic theories which held that 
schooling was supposed to provide a moral, physical and intellectual training for young men as 
a preparation for later life. Indeed, for Gillis (1981), it was here that the whole concept of 
'adolescence' was born. Education also became important for access to middle class careers. 
As competition for professional places increased, with an increasingly complex division of 
labour, so the period of training and study was prolonged and access regulated through 
examinations (Gillis 1981). The professions themselves began to develop their own theories 
of practice and identities which lead to them demanding longer periods of preparation and 
later ages of entry (Kett 1977). Hence preparation in schools and universities had be taken 
more seriously.
The influence of Protestant Christianity, particularly in America, led to a concern with the 
moral development of the individual, particularly with their 'conversion' as a developmental 
stage in life, and thus a focus on youth (Kett 1977). However, perhaps more important was the 
idea of the male 'individual' which was nurtured within capitalist society and deriving from the 
Enlightenment concept of the individual as a moral agent - as a free standing moral agent 
capable of exercising choices, making decisions and forming contracts. If such an individual 
was necessary in an industrial, capitalist economy, at what stage were they capable of 
becoming free agents? How much preparation did they need for this?
Hence, for bourgeois social groups, adolescence became a period of preparation for adult 
life with seclusion from the outside world through sexual and age segregation. Furthermore, 
the fact that these sectors could afford to segregate their offspring in special institutions 
was also a source of status and privilege - as indeed, in England it still is - even though the 
standard of instruction in many of these institutions was low or non-existent. The discourse of 
education as a reform movement, a way of training and socializing the young had yet to gain 
wide currency. Preparation was achieved through the kinds of academic and physical training 
which the public schools sought to promote. At this time, the idea of adolescence was not 
thought to apply equally to working class youth or to women. For middle class young women, 
the separation of work and home meant that the 'respectability' of the household could be 
demonstrated through cloistered femininity. Marriage and domestic pursuits became the main 
focus of women's and girls' lives and the adolescent middle class girl was the ideal 
embodiment of Victorian femininity: dependent, child-like and innocent (Gorham 1982).
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For the working class, youth was far more brutal. For them, the pre-industrial notion of 
extended youth had disappeared. Far from being cloistered from the adult world of 
employment, they were forced into long, hard hours of labour from the time they were small 
children. Indeed, Gillis estimated that in the first decade of the ninteenth century, 80 per cent of 
workers in English cotton mills were children. Children carried out a variety of services or joined 
a form of 'apprenticeship' which was often used to exploit them as unpaid workers. These 
conditions shocked middle class reformers because by mid-century they had grown up with a 
different, more 'cloistered' and 'innocent' idea of adolescence (Giilis 1981, Muncie 1984). Gillis 
goes on to argue that the concept of ‘adolescence’, which the middle class had developed, was 
gradually imposed upon the working class through the course of the nineteenth century. The 
ideal of seclusion, sexual segregation and innocence meant that they were continually 
concerned about the 'unnatural' precocity and worldliness of working class youngsters, which 
they saw as evidence of delinquency.
Hence, with industrialization, social changes served to radically alter the way in which work 
and the family were organized. Moreover, the advent of urbanization and wage labour 
significantly effected the social construction of youth. For the working class, youth was a 
shorter period as they were absorbed into the production process from childhood onwards 
whilst for the middle class it was longer as they were removed from work until later. Natural 
and 'essentiallsed’ age and sex differences were inscribed into modern institutions which also 
segregated social classes.
In South Eastern Europe industrialization also brought with it changes in the concept of youth 
and in youth transitions, but delayed industrialization and economic backwardness under 
authoritarian states meant that there was little room for the kind of civil society which would 
have encouraged social reform movements and the small middle class were involved mainly in 
nationalist struggles {Schopflin 1992). Even by 1939, for example Bulgarian industry accounted 
for only 15 per cent of national income and the average enterprise employed only 26 people. 
The labour of young people between 9 and 25 was important in early industrialization in this 
region, as they comprised 50-70 per cent of the labour force, mainly in textile, tobacco and coal 
production. Young women and girls were a particularly important source of labour because 
they were cheaper to employ (Mitchev 1987). Although protective legislation restricting child and 
female labour was some of the first welfare legislation passed in 1907 in Bulgaria it was never 
properly implemented and children and young people continued to work very long hours in 
hazardous conditions. Those working in factories were usually migrants from the countryside 
with nowhere to sleep but on the factory floor. As in Britain, the early industrialisation may have 
upset traditional hierarchies of sex and age but in the next phase of modernization these were 
institutionalized in different ways.
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The beginning of state intervention
From the late nineteenth century adult male labour increasingly replaced that of child and 
female labour in the workplace in North Western Europe as the idea of 'the family' as a 
domestic haven spread. With the ideal of domesticity came that of childhood as a period 
requiring nurture and intensive care with women as the carers. However, most working families 
could not afford to fit this model and brought work home as well as going out to work (Allen and 
Walkowitz 1987). The Trade Unions defended this division between home and work 
campaigning for better working conditions and helping to construct a 'respectable' working class 
(Stedman Jones 1971). For some, an apprenticeship became the respectable route into skilled 
working class jobs, although it was a system much abused by some trainers. For this section of 
the working class, 'youth' was also a period of tutelage and dependency, and this was in 
contrast to both the more extended dependency of the middle class or the rapid independence 
of the casualized working class. However, the extent of this 'apprenticeship' system was limited 
in England; in Germany the Medieval system of crafts and trades absorbed the range of new 
trades and divisions of labour. There was a deliberate attempt to develop a strong 'respectable' 
and conformist working class rather than an unskilled and unreliable one. This idea of skill and 
training became more and more identified with masculine trades.
In Britain and Germany from the late nineteenth century, ideologies of interventionism began to 
replace laissez faire economics. The centralization of the nation state and the rationalization of 
its functions as It came to regulate more and more areas of social life made the intervention in 
youth possible. The impetus for reforms came at first from individual middle class reformers 
and from philanthropic and religious institutions, from campaigns and organisations. Very often 
it was exposure of the horrors of some of the effects of early capitalism and the brutal 
exploitation of children described by novelists such as Charles Dickens and Charles Kingsley, 
which helped to promote such reforms.
In Germany it was the work of the 'youth savers' from late nineteenth century period onwards 
which helped to shape a distinct 'youth politics' in Germany. The unification of Germany under 
Prussian domination from 1870 lead to a strategy for social legislation designed to unite the 
different communities, including the Protestant and Catholic churches. The tradition of loyalty to 
the supreme state combined with rapid industrialization, meant that in Germany social 
intervention took place in a more self-conscious and far reaching way. The social insurance 
legislation for health, old age and other contingencies along with universal education introduced 
at this time was designed to create a loyal, conforming and respectable working class with a 
stake In the system. Of particular concern were young males between the ages of 14 when 
they left school and 20 when they joined the army and so this was the age range which were 
defined as 'youth' and a locus of intervention.
Industrialization also caused major disruptions to traditional life. In Central Europe it was 
characterized by migration from the rural areas to the cities and from the eastern agricultural
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regions to the western industrial ones. The migration was mostly undertaken by young people 
who often left their families behind them, leading to problems of under-employment and 
homelessness in cities. The old craft apprenticeship system based upon small family workshops 
was replaced by large factories employing unskilled workers and the tines of patriarchal 
authority which has existed in the family and the craft industry regulating young people, broke 
down. Consequently, there was a fear of unregulated young people who may become morally 
degenerate or turn towards subversive political movements, especially after the Paris 
Commune of 1870. Hostels were set up to house young people and a number of youth 
organisations tried to create new forms of association in this industrial setting to compensate for 
the lack of social support for youth. The churches were particularly active in providing hostels, 
but municipalities also helped to house the In-coming young people. Thus in Leipzig the number 
of places provided In hostels rose from 9,604 to 22, 897 between 1880 and 1900 and In Berlin 
there were 100,000 beds provided (Linton 1991). In Germany and Central Europe voluntary 
associations and churches played an important role in providing for the needs of young people 
and youth associations also played a role in this. For example, the Weimar Republic laid down 
some very comprehensive legislation for young people, who were by that time recognized a an 
important target of intervention.
Social intervention took a number of forms: Intervention in working conditions, through 
education and through the criminal justice system. Here we consider each of these In turn.
a. Constructing youth through the regulation of working conditions
Industrialization brought concentrations of workers in mass production living and working in 
apalling conditions. In Britain, reforms of working conditions took place with the introduction of 
the Factory Acts from 1833 onwards and these were reinforced by campaigns by reformers to 
protect orphans and avoid the economic exploitation of children. This employment legislation 
served to gradually reassert the male head of household's authority and was supported by male 
Trade Unionist campaigns for a 'family wage’ (Humphries 1981, Muncie 1984). However, in 
Britain youth were not identified explicitly in such laws and the youth debate was not so clearly 
articulated as in Germany.
With the shift of young people's jobs towards the distributive trades from the turn of the century, 
in Britain, the main problem identified was that of 'Boy Labour'. This was where young men 
were employed until they became entitled to adult wages at which point they were replaced 
by someone younger. Hence, it was feared that young men were too ready to enter 'dead end' 
jobs with no future. However, despite discussion of the problem, no legislation followed. 
Intervention in the youth labour market was prompted only by rising youth unemployment during 
the inter-war period when youth were targeted for special temporary employment measures, 
some of which involved additional training and forcing them to take the jobs which were 
available (Rees and Rees 1982). These schemes were only temporary, since with the coming 
of the Second World War unemployment disappeared and new priorities emerged.
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Apprenticeship training was subject to sporadic reform in Britain, the most comprehensive 
attempt to regulate it being in the 1960s (Roberts 1984). However, it was never comprehensive 
and even those crafts and industries which were covered by formal training declined in the later 
decades of the twentieth century. It is evident that in Britain intervention in youth took place only 
when there was some crisis; comprehensive protective legislation for this age group as in 
Germany, was lacking.
In Germany, by contrast, a number of Imperial Laws at the end of the nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century identified youth in particular as a category to be protected. Laws in 1871 
and 1896 regulated youth wages, their hours of work, holidays, conditions of employment and 
their health and this was already building upon an established tradition of regulating conditions 
for young workers. Great emphasis was placed upon vocational training and the model was of 
the young apprentice as a disciplined and diligent young worker, who would accept authority, 
and become a good, conforming citizen, who would later draw a pension. Hence, 
apprenticeships were introduced within a number of new industrial trades. It was argued that 
young people should receive vocational counseling and the Chambers of Commerce and the 
various craft Guilds took a keen interest in the inculcation of appropriate work discipline in 
young workers. Most important in these reforms was the role of the 'Continuation schools’, 
began on a part time, voluntary basis for young people after they had left compulsory full-time 
education at 14, but were later made a formal part of the education/training system which 
continued to the age of 17 or 18. Legislation passed in the early 1920s also regulated the 
conditions of work for young people and standardized apprenticeship training (Linton 1991).
In much of eastern Europe full industrialization took place under communism where it was 
prioritized as the 'most important political task'. After World War Two, East-Central Europe 
(between western Ukraine and Bratislava) consisted of backward, mainly rural countries, in 
which industrial production constituted only a small share of the national product. Furthermore, 
these countries had faced terrible devastation from War. Industrialization was introduced under 
communism following the Soviet model, with the nationalization of the means of production and 
co-ordination according to a centralised national economic plan. Youth played a particularly 
important part in this socialist reconstruction and were mobilized in the Youth Brigade 
movement, being brought in as 'volunteers’ to work on the construction of roads, railways, 
factories and dams - the creation of an industrial infrastructure. As industry developed, so this 
unskilled volunteer labour force became unnecessary, but the Brigade movement continued, 
usually through sending young people to work in agriculture because this was thought of as an 
important component of a socialist education during summer (Daskalov 1991). For example in 
the period 1957-1962, two and a half million young people from schools, colleges and 
administrative jobs worked as volunteer labour for two months of the year in Bulgaria.
Young people also formed an important part of the normal labour force being heavily 
represented in industry. Women participated in this socialist industrialization as well as men so
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that by the 1960s they were nearly half the labour force (Semov et al.1986). Industrialization 
continued to draw young people from the countryside to the towns under socialism, with three 
quarters of migrants being below 30 years old and nearly two-thirds of these being women 
(Beltcheva and Bozhikov 1981). This was welcomed as “a revolutionary change - thousands of 
young people changed their class affiliations" from peasants to the more progressive working 
class {Semov 1972:50), but from the 1970s there was growing anxiety about the de-population 
of the villages. The urbanization and industrialization of eastern Europe represented a major 
social change achieved through centralized control over a very short period of time but it 
created a new situation of large concentrations of young people who had to be regulated in 
new ways, as we shall see later.
Hence young people formed an important part of the industrial labour force in all parts of 
Europe. In western Europe intervention to regulate their working conditions was prompted by a 
fear of social disorder which young people could cause and a desire to produce a conforming 
citizen, whilst in communist countries there was a more deliberate attempt to mould young 
people into the ideal socialist citizen in order to build a new society.
b. Constructing Youth through Education Reforms
Modernization was associated in all countries with the introduction of mass education as a 
compulsory duty up to a minimum age. From the nineteenth century onwards (earlier in the 
Austrian Empire), full-time compulsory education was introduced in many countries of western 
Europe for all people. It thus extended the period of 'childhood' dependency, often in opposition 
to the needs of working class families who needed the extra income from these children. 
However, oral histories indicate that resistence took the form of working whilst truanting, which 
was common and that young people continued to work before and after school (Humphries 
1981). Bells, timetables and regimentation were all modeled on the factory system and 
intended to produce docile and employable workers (Johnson 1976). These reforms were not 
universally welcomed, especially amongst the unskilled working class, and resistance included 
riots, truanting and school strikes.
For the middle class, however, education became increasingly important for granting access to 
jobs and maintaining social status. Hence, the Grammar schools and boarding schools were 
increasingly put under pressure to provide the correct type of socialization for these class 
positions. An extended period of schooling beyond the minimum age was thought necessary 
to provide this for male youth. From the end of the nineteenth century the role of education as 
a civilizing mission for the working classes, to socialize young people into their proper stations 
in life and to compensate for the inadequate instruction it was supposed that they had 
received in their own homes, became more widespread and accepted. Furthermore, the 
pedagogic discourse became more influential with the development of the teaching profession 
and influential in this was the work of the US author, John Dewey, who argued for education as 
being crucial for the development of the individual.
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In Germany, the work of Georg Kerschenstelner helped to spread a model of 'civic education' 
combined with vocational education for working youth (Linton 1991). Kerschensteiner in an 
influential essay argued that to become new model citizens, young people needed to be taught 
civic duty and to be encouraged to work for the common good instead of selfish goals. These 
Ideas were instituted through 'Continuation Schools' which were part-time post-compulsory 
educational institutions absorbing about 9 hours per week of the young persons time up to the 
age of 17. Building on an already established tradition of voluntary schooling, these became 
widespread after 1900 and were later instituted in law. They were divided according to craft 
Guilds and large firms took an interest in these continuation schools, seeing them as vehicles 
for education of the model young worker. They also learned about the laws governing the 
employment of young people, business and booking-keeping skills, history and knowledge of 
their trade.
For young women In the early part of the nineteenth century there was little formal education 
(Dyhouse 1981). Middle class women mostly were taught the feminine arts to prepare them for 
marriage such as embroidery, playing the piano and a little conversation to make them good 
companions for their husbands. However, they were also expected to know the skills of 
housewifery, since most„ middle class families could not afford sufficient servants to keep 
them in genteel leisure. Too much learning, it was feared, would lead to sickness. In the late 
nineteenth century , however, a number of reforms of women's education took place with 
special schools for girls offering more formal education and women's colleges were established 
in Oxford and Cambridge (although women were not allowed to obtain a degree) (Dyhouse 
1981). For working class girls there was an explicit emphasis on training for domestic service a 
subject of particular interest for the middle and upper class patrons of these schools. Youth 
work and compulsory education for girls was directed towards producing good mothers and to 
address the problem of poor health and nutrition resulting in high mortality amongst the working 
class (Linton 1991).
Many of these interventions can be traced to the changing ideology of the family - that it was a 
cosy domestic unit, separated from the fierce world of the market place, a place of comfort and 
leisure maintained by women (Davidoff, L'Esperance and Newby 1976). This cloistered view of 
domesticity was reflected in principles of town planning and building design and reinforced 
through philanthropic charities and through legislation which assumed that women and children 
belonged at home. This vision of domesticity helped to create the idea of children and women 
as weak and helpless dependents and the adolescent girl was part of this world whereas the 
adolescent boy needed to be encouraged to venture out. Magazines for Victorian young men 
and women reflected these different gender stereo-types and the Boys own magazine - full of 
adventure stories - began its life in the 1850's in Britain. •
In general, the spread of universal education marked an important moment in the 
standardization and institutionalization of age-grading. But this happened in different ways for
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young men and women, for different social classes and in different countries. Thus divisions of 
sex and class were likewise institutionalized.
In South Eastern Europe modernization in education had an additional meaning - it served as a 
means for national self-determination. Intellectuals valued education as the means for 
inculcating a national consciousness and therefore it always held a special and revered place. 
Although the first law making education compulsory from ages 7 to 11 (raised to 14 in 1921) 
was issued in 1892 in Bulgaria, in practice non-attendance was high, reaching 75 per cent 
among village girls (Yoncheva 1943). Whilst the early pedagogical ideas emphasized equal 
access to education by girls (Karavelov 1876) and although women teachers and writers 
practiced and propagated this idea, female education still lagged behind that for boys and was 
focused mainly on agriculture, cooking and sewing. Secondary and Higher education was 
almost non-existent and those who wanted to extend their education usually had to do so in one 
of the main centres of learning, often in a different country and usually in a different language. 
Illiteracy was widespread before the communist takeovers.
From the time of the communist rule however, mass education was seen as a priority and there 
were rapid changes. General education was made compulsory for everyone and access to 
higher education was offered to everyone for the first time, with full state support until a person 
had finished his or her education. This resulted in a dramatic changes in the education of the 
population which went from being semi-literate to full participation rates and Higher Educational 
participation of similar levels to western Europe. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter
3, but at this stage we should note that rapid mass education helped in the further classification 
and age-grading of youth and and ist segregation in society. From being the subordinated 
household workers of the pre-industrial period youth became a privileged group whose main 
duty was to study. The youth phase became general for the first time in this region.
c. Constructing Youth through the Criminal Justice System
Another source of anxiety in industrializing and urbanizing countries was that unregulated, 
unskilled young people in cities would turn to crime and through this period various attempts 
were made to deal with the problem of youth crime. Reforms of the criminal justice system 
likewise imposed a more 'sheltered' concept of adolescence upon working class young 
people. In Britain, up until the mid 19th century children were traditionally treated not much 
differently to adults in the eyes of the law after the age of 7 (Muncie 1984). Campaigns by 
Mary Carpenter and others fought for a definition of children and young people as less 
criminally responsible than adults. Rather than being subject to hanging, imprisonment or 
deportation, they should be 'improved1 though training and assistance in separate institutions 
removed from the contaminating influence of their families. The Youthful Offenders Act of 1854 
and later the 1908 Children’s Act introduced reformatories for young people and later on, the 
first Borstal. It is doubtful whether in practice, this 'treatment' model, which served to 
pathologize working class behavior and legitimize intervention in their lives, was ultimately
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more humane. However, it did introduce the idea of childhood and adolescence as periods in 
which young people could be ‘cured’ of delinquency and therefore helped to legitimate them as 
a target for intervention.
A further form of intervention which served to define young people during the nineteenth 
century, was that surrounding sexuality and the age of consent. Much of the middle class 
campaigning had involved going into the slums and 'saving' 'fallen' women and working class 
children from a life of vice. The very high rates of prostitution and particularly child prostitution, 
reflected the sexual vulnerability of girls and women at the time, this being one of the main 
careers open to working class women after they had been pushed out of the factories by 
'protective' legislation (Waikowitz 1980). Whilst for boys it was their street life and gang life 
which caused concern (Pearson 1983), for girls it was their sexual misdemeanors which 
needed reforming. Hence, legislation aimed to control sexual contact and these campaigns 
involved the redefinition of women and young children as innocent victims of male abuse and 
sought to protect them from this in the law (Jeffreys 1985). As young people came to be 
defined as a special group, so the regulation and control of adolescent sexuality came to 
be a major preoccupation in textbooks on youth, health and education during this period. 
Masturbation in young men was thought to cause particularly severe problems including 
physical weakness and mental ill-health. It was believed that girls needed to be protected 
from their own bodies, particularly after the onset of the menarche, otherwise they would 
become subject to illnesses such as hysteria or 'chlorosis' which described a wide range of 
symptoms (Gorham 1982). Hence, this too had the effect of raising the age of sexual 
responsibility, extending childhood and formalizing age-status transitions through state 
intervention.
From the late nineteenth century, concern with moral purity, as evinced in a variety of 
campaigns meant that children were on the one hand treated as victims in need of protection 
and on the other were also guilty of immorality themselves. This ambiguous status justified their 
segregation in special institutions. This was linked to the rise of the institution more generally as 
an instrument of 'scientific' reform (Scull 1977, Foucault 1975). Hence orphanages, prisons, 
schools and reformatories all had much in common in their organization and their custodians 
developed into professional specialists for the care and treatment of differentially classified 
social problems. In the twentieth century, such 'treatment' was elevated to the status of a 
'science'. Working class delinquents were defined as having personality disorders which were 
in need to correction and treatment. This work, claiming a 'scientific' legitimacy, was influential 
in the creation and training of the teaching and probation professions. The treatment took the 
form of correcting the supposed inadequate socialization and parenting, which the young 
delinquent had received at home.
In Germany children and youth were also treated differently in the law and from 1876 a law 
made it possible to take children away from parents where they were in danger of 'complete
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moral collapse' (Linton 1991). Young delinquents were dealt with in separate juvenile courts 
and instead of punishment they could opt for Welfare Education and reform. Young people 
under 18 were not thought to be criminally responsible in any case although in England this 
was and still is set at the age of 10. Thus in Germany, the juvenile justice system, as other 
areas of state intervention, served to single out youth as a special category for protection to a 
much greater extent than in England.
In Bulgaria the age of criminal responsibility was not defined until 1896 when it was set at age
10 and the first correctional home was built in 1917 funded by voluntary donations (Khinova 
1969). The first specialized law for juvenile offenders was issued in 1943 - nearly one century 
after that in Britain - and although the age of criminal responsibility was raised to 12 it was still 
possible to execute a child from age 10 onwards. The legal code of the communist state raised 
the minimum age of criminal responsibility to age 13 in 1951 and 14 in 1956. Since 1968 the 
death penalty was made applicable only to young people from age of 20 - except for those 
serving in the army. Until 1944 the only penalty for young people was incarceration, but after 
that new measures for improvement and re-socialization were introduced.
Thus there has been a tendency towards treating young people more leniently in the criminal 
justice system and as a category separate from adults. The duration of this category in terms of 
chronological age has tended to be extended since the legislation was first introduced. 
Generally those defined as junior in the law are thought less responsible for their actions and 
more capable of being reformed. This was associated with modernization as is clear from the 
different times that similar legislation was introduced in the more advanced North Western 
European countries and the more backward South Eastern.
The constructors of youth: the youth movements
Many of these reforms took place as a result of campaigns by reformers at the end of the 
nineteenth and beginnings of the twentieth centuries urging more state legislation to regulate 
social life after the disruptions caused by industrialization. Of particular importance were the 
various youth movements which occurred all over Europe. These were mostly lead by middle 
class people who sought to impose a disciplined and dutiful middle class model of youth not just 
upon the youth from their own class, but particularly upon the working youth, whose discipline 
and morality were seen as a major problem. Working class youth worked long hours in poor 
conditions and in places which urbanized rapidly, they often lived away from home. They had 
access to a street life, they had little education and they eagerly absorbed popular culture in the 
form of cheap novels, music halls and pubs. Middle class reformers were concerned that they 
could easily drift into a life of crime, casual sex and drink. Unlike the pre-industrial period, they 
were not subject to patriarchal authority or the traditional youth associations and so their 
behavior was not regulated. Through these campaigns, a middle class view of youth was 
imposed upon the working class (Springhall 1977, Gillis 1981).
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The development of the youth saving campaign in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century in North West Europe was linked with scientific ideas about eugenics which were 
gaining currency at this time - the idea that the race of the nation was deteriorating on account 
of immorally and indiscriminate breeding and the 'stock' needed to be improved and saved. 
This also linked the youth movements to nationalism: youth were seen as the seed corn of the 
future. Therefore by winning and improving the youth a more glorious national future seemed 
assured. Thus, youth movements in both Britain and Germany embodied a number of racist 
assumptions. In Bulgaria youth movements were linked with national revival and their main 
focus was on nationalism. Therefore, the construction of 'youth' was linked with ideologies of 
nationalism and the nation state. Religion also played an important role. Let us now look at 
some examples.
The first movement to be set up in Britain was that of the Boys Brigade organized by William 
Smith in 1883 which sought to replace the earlier settlement and improvement schemes in 
working class neighborhoods with military-style drill and regimentation, although its main 
membership was lower middle class rather than working class {Blanch 1979). The Boy 
Scouts were set up by General Baden-Powell in 1908 inspired by his experiences in the Boer 
War. This was reflected in the militarism of its aims and organization which were to inculcate 
ideals of Empire and nationalism. Others however, set up less militaristic alternatives: Leslie 
Paul's Woodcraft Folk and John Hargreaves Kibbo Kift kindred were examples of these. 
Although the movements was supposed to be classless, the bare knees and extended 
boyishness that it involved as well as the secret rituals and sexual segregation were 
characteristic of upper class conceptions of adolescence (Gillis 1981). Other youth 
movements included the Church Lads Brigade, the YMCA, the Jewish Lads Brigade, the 
Catholic Lads Brigade amongst others, with varying mixtures of militarism and religion.
For girls the ideals of militarism and preparedness were not thought to be appropriate. 
Although they still needed to be educated and reformed, It was to different ends. Youth work 
with girls was originally stimulated by a desire to protect girls from the corrupting effects of 
factory language and morals and this was the basis upon which the 'Snow Drop Bands' were 
formed and these were popular around 1889-1890. For the working class girls, there was also 
a fear that financial independence would encourage sexual precocity and so these childhood 
extending movements were all the more important. Other clubs for girls were designed to 
preserve the morals of working class girls and help them in turn to improve the morality of men. 
The Girls Friendly Society was set up by the Anglican church in 1885 and boasted 821 
branches within a few years. It existed on upper class patronage, and like many of the schools 
were intended to improve the quality of domestic servants and to purify women with notions of 
chastity and subservient femininity. As Dyhouse (1981) points out, it is paradoxical that 
organized leisure for middle class girls was concerned to protect their delicate constitutions and 
not cause undue intellectual strain, whereas for working class girls it was thought necessary in
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order to channel off their surplus energy! Sport and exercise was not supposed to encourage 
girls to become rough and uncouth 'hoydens' (Gorham 1982).
In Germany there developed a group of what Linton (1991) calls 'youth savers' from the end of 
the nineteenth century. These helped to develop the discourse of 'youth' which later became the 
legitimation for intervention through pamphlets, booklets, books and conferences. These 
conferences were often attended by several thousand people including teachers, businessmen, 
people from the municipalities and others who had an interest in youth. These recommended a 
progressive pedagogic approach to looking after the interests of young people during what was 
defined as their 'storm and stress' period. On account what was thought to be the delicate and 
unstable condition of adolescence, they argued, associations were needed to provide moral 
support and guidance for young people. Like the reformers in England, the Germany youth 
savers were middle class and were dismayed at the condition of urban working class youth. 
However, they were more systematic in analyzing the situation of youth and in targeting them 
explicitly than was the case in Britain. These youth savers of the nineteenth century tried to 
grapple with what they saw as the problems of modernity - the disruption of traditional 
community relations and the problems of working with mass production in alienating conditions. 
As in England, it was the working class youth in urban areas, which were the targets of reform.
In Germany, the tradition of youth fraternities continued into the nineteenth century although 
now they were romantic and somewhat nostalgic evocations of the 'brotherhood' of the earlier 
period by young men at Universities. From the end of the nineteenth century a number of more 
general youth organisations were founded leading to the creation of a general council for 
Federated youth. These were founded around a range of issues - churches and professions 
began their own youth groups and others were issue oriented concerned with nudism or against 
alcohol. These had a mainly middle class constituency. The best known of these early youth 
movements was the 'WandervogeP promoting an outdoor life during leisure hours. They relied 
upon a romantic rejection of industrial development and encouraged trips to the countryside, 
summer camps and their own uniforms, songs and rituals (Becker 1946). Such early 
organisations may have served to sustain the idea of youth as a singular and rather idealistic 
stage of personal development and certainly youth appear to have had a high profile as an 
issue of public concern in Central Europe.
From the late nineteenth century more mass organisations developed. The Evangelical Church 
in Germany was instrumental in setting up hostels for the young people in cities but also in 
providing youth clubs, lectures, songs and libraries. By 1912 they had 143,000 members (Linton 
1991). The Catholic Church too provided Catholic education for the members of its youth club 
as well as providing encouragement for self-control, budgeting and personal hygiene. These 
religious movements were more or less anti-socialist in orientation but despite the repressive 
laws against them the Socialist youth organisations were amongst the most successful for 
urban working youth. They operated under the guise of 'Worker Gymnast' associations before
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1904 and also formed bicycle and singing clubs. There were a variety of sports groups and 
from 1911 a more explicitly military Young Germany League was founded with the aim of 
providing nationalistic training and military exercises. With significant state assistance, this 
became the largest youth organisations with 750,000 members by the outbreak of the First 
World War. Its orientation was also explicitly anti-socialist and used the continuation schools as 
their recruiting ground. Youth sports organisations also formed part of the Czech national revival 
as represented through the Sokol organisations to be found in every town and creating the 
prototype of mass synchronized exercises in sports stadiums which was later adopted by the 
communist and National Socialist governments. From the twentieth century onwards, youth 
groups began to be more and more state supported in Central Europe and were seen as an 
element of nation state building.
During the late nineteenth century, much of the non-institutional work with young people was 
undertaken by volunteers in North Western Europe, but during the early twentieth century 
they increasingly began to develop as specialist professionals: what Kett (1977) calls the 
'architects of adolescence'. A discourse of helping and ‘cultivating’ youth began to emerge along 
with a more formalized idea of age-status transitions based upon eligibility for membership.
Organized youth movements in eastern European countries such as Bulgaria mostly took the 
form of recruitment by adult organisations or directly by the state. Both spontaneous protest and 
formal organizations were highly politicized covering the whole range of the political spectrum: 
nationalistic and fascist; communist and agrarian. There were youth sections of the numerous 
liberal, conservative, Christian and Catholic parties. Even youth tourist, gymnastics, 
educational, abstainers' organizations were politically polarized. The state made many attempts 
to form a mass youth organization under its control and in 1934 a youth movement was 
established on the model of the Hitler Youth. During the War in 1943 the state renewed its 
efforts to impose this organization on all youth and many autonomous youth organizations were 
proclaimed its members. Although youth movements raised general political issues rather than 
presenting youth interests on the political scene, they encouraged public discussion about this 
'problem' group.
Through this politicization of youth associations, youth came to be seen not just as people who 
were troubled or troubling, in need of help and protection, but also as the bearers of the future, 
the transformers of society. Therefore they were selected as a group with a particularly 
important role to play. This reached its apotheosis in the communist and fascist movements 
which emerged in central and eastern Europe.
Youth as transformers of society: fascism and communism
We have already described the way in which youth came to be seen as important instruments 
of nationalist movements. However, it was under totalitarian regimes of communism and
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fascism that youth were identified most fully as agents of change for the whole of society. It 
was in societies where these regimes held power, that youth were targeted most fully as objects 
of intervention. In Germany, from the early 1920s youth movements started to become more 
political in character as the main political parties founded their own youth wings and an element 
in youth politics came to be aligned with either the extreme right or the extreme left, who fought 
pitched battles in the street. National Socialists started to organize a youth wing which was later 
called the 'Hitler Youth’ -and which carried on the youth movement tradition of organization by 
and for the young and set up a national organizational structure and organized national rallies 
as a way of collecting funds (Becker 1946). When Hitler finally assumed power in 1933 and 
consolidated the Third Reich based on an ideology of anti-Semitism, racial superiority and 
aggressive nationalism the Hitler Youth was divided into age cohorts and women were 
organized into the 'Bund Deutscher Mädchen' (BDM). The 'Jungvolk' were aged 10-14 and the 
Hitler Youth aged 14-18. After that young people were recruited into the SS or the army. Since 
the National Socialist party held absolute power, the Hitler Youth could absorb all the other 
youth organisations, whose leaders were forced to conform or terrorized into submission or 
even sent away to concentration camps if they refused to comply. The membership swelled 
from 107,956 in 1932 to 3,577565 in 1938 (Koch 1975).
This creation and consolidation of the Hitler Youth happened because youth were seen as an 
important and essential part of the fascist mission. They were the rising new generation of the 
future and inculcating the right ideals was a priority through both education and indoctrination 
(Koch 1975). The Hitler Youth was institutionalized with its own full time officers - there was 
strong moral pressure for everyone to join and a program of activities was constructed, 
designed to weaken parental influence and inculcate total commitment to the National Socialist 
state. At the same time, young people were given great powers, encouraged to inform on their 
parents and teachers and to effect a fascist transformation in schools and Universities from 
below (Koch 1975). German youth were elevated as a privileged group and protective 
legislation in the workplace was passed although in fact, much of the new legislation to protect 
and promote youth was never enacted because of the continuing pressures of war. Instead 
young men were supposed to sacrifice themselves for the Fatherland: younger and younger 
people were used in war effort, first of all in welfare and social campaigns and later in active 
service. The result was that those too young too smoke, but deemed old enough to fight, were 
allocated a sweet instead of a cigarette ration (Koch 1975). Despite the great efforts to 
indoctrinate young people and to make the organization replace other influences on their lives 
such as school or family, much of the propaganda material was ignored and there was even 
some resistance to it. Some youth retreated into youth sub-cultures based upon swing or jazz 
music even though these were condemned as 'subversive’ in much the same way as was to 
happen in communist systems later (Polster 1989) (see Chapter 5).
Hence, through the Hitler Youth, young people were identified strongly as a group and as 
agents of transformation to a new era. The same trend can be observed in communist
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countries where youth organizations were supposed to help create the ‘new socialist 
person'(Pilkington 1994). Young people were to be nurtured, controlled, cared for and brought 
into the Communist Party. In return they were to show their gratitude with loyalty and 
obedience. Political activity was channeled through the only authorized channel - the Young 
Communist League, sometimes known as Komsomol.
The so-called 'Komsomol' was first established in revolutionary Russia. Although the Bolsheviks 
had no youth organization before the revolution, the Komsomol was created in 1918 with the 
intention of recruiting only the select 'vanguard' of youth (Riordan 1989a). It was supposed to 
be independent from the Party, but under Civil War conditions it was taken over and controlled 
by the Party and was unable to ever again become independent. The leaders were nominated 
by the Party and were Party members. Until the mid 1920s Komsomol was small and had to 
compete with other youth groups such as the scouts or the YMCA, but from then on other 
organisations were proscribed and Komsomol became the only organization for youth. It then 
started to have a mass membership and aimed to represent all youth - at its height it had 40 
million members in the Soviet Union. It served to define age-status, because 'youth' were all 
those who belonged to the Young Communist League (14 -28 in Bulgaria, but up to age 30 
elsewhere). The Komsomol was therefore a key institution in understanding the social 
construction of youth under communism.
Youth under communism: constructing the new socialist person
The creation of youth as a category under communism followed a different ideological pattern 
than in western Europe. Rather than identifying youth as a problematic life-stage, the 
communist state ideology interpreted 'youth' as collective agent of social transformation. From 
the time of the 'socialist revolutions' in eastern Europe, youth were officially constructed as 'the 
builders of the bright communist society' and this served to legitimize party intervention in 
adolescent life. Therefore the purpose of control over young people was not on account of their 
deviation from 'normal' life, as in western Europe, but in their responsibility for the realization of 
the communist ideal. At the same time the Party was the supreme power and the 'leading force 
of communist construction'. Since the Party had the benefit of being armed with the knowledge 
of how social development should take place, it could offer the best strategies which youth 
would be called upon to put into practice. This attitude explains the peculiarities of the 
Communist Party youth policy - monitoring young people rather than meeting their needs. The 
policies were aimed at the incorporation of young people into society and were subject to 
conflicting pressures, between protection on the one side and indoctrination on the other. The 
main goal of Communist Party youth policy was ideological education and welfare provision was 
only a secondary consideration, intended to bolster this goal. Thus, young people were provided 
with free education and guaranteed jobs, cheap leisure and social security in return for 
submitting to the study of school programmes designed by the Party and to work which carried 
out the plan of the Party. The principle - Party care for faithful youth - embodied the paternalistic
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nature of authority in which youth were presented as being in the fore of social change but were 
in fact completely subordinated to this authority.
From the beginning of the establishment of the communist regimes in countries such as 
Bulgaria after the Second World War, Komsomol was the only official youth organization 
(Kitanov 1981). Its aim was to incorporate youth into communism through enlightenment and 
instruction. The new Soviet Party rules in 1986 stated that the Komsomol was „the active 
assistant and reserve of the Party. It is to help the Party educate young people in a communist 
spirit, involve them in the practical building of the new society, and shape a generation of all­
round developed people ready to work and defend the homeland“ (quoted in Riordan 1989a). 
The Komsomol was the last stage of a graded hierarchy of organizations which sorted and 
graded young people according to age. The first organization - called 'Octobrists' in the Soviet 
Union but given other names elsewhere were for children 6-10 and this was followed by the 
'Young Pioneers' for those aged 10-14 and then the Komsomol up to age 28 (or 30 in some 
countries). In the Soviet Union 65 per cent of young people were members by 1987 whilst in 
Bulgaria between 80 and 90 per cent of the young population joined. However, many joined for 
instrumental reasons - because they needed a Komsomol reference in order to get into Higher 
Education for example - or because Komsomol provided leisure and sports facilities. Therefore 
membership was much higher among students than among young workers (Pilkington 1994).
Later on, following the spread of youth cultural activities in the 1960s and 1970s (described in 
Chapter 5), there were fears among the leadership in Bulgaria that young people may have 
different tastes and interests to those of the older generation who had fought in the Second 
World War. There were calls for organizational reform of the Komsomol with attempts to better 
represent young people’s interests through more youth representatives in public organizations 
(Mitev 1988). One result was a building programme for stadiums, swimming pools and so on, 
all ostensibly aimed at the benefit of young people. This material aid deflected attention from the 
lack of real autonomy of the youth organization. By the end of the 1970s, however, there was a 
reversal of this trend once more and rights, resources and power were taken over by different 
state organizations, although this was followed by further instructions from General Secretary 
Zhivkov for reforms. (Peneva 1982). However, Komsomol activists continued to operate in their 
established way, which meant obedience to the hierarchy. Although the Party raised called for 
more trust in youth, in practice they considered every gathering of young people outside 
secondary education without parents or teachers present suspicious, even when Komsomol 
activists were there. For example students were seen as potential dissidents and all their 
meetings had to be supervised. Therefore, although there were repeated calls for greater 
autonomy of the Komsomol, none were very successful.
The Komsomol had a number of explicit functions. First, the 'socio-economic function of 
Komsomol' was to help the schools in the educational process and to help enterprises in the 
fulfillment of the national economic plan. Secondly, there was the political function of
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Komsomol. However, the definition of the political function of Komsomol - to incorporate youth 
into the realization of the Party's decisions - presupposed that the right conclusion had already 
been reached and therefore that further discussion by young people within the organization was 
unnecessary. Thirdly, the Komsomol also had an ideological function, to educate young people 
in socialist principles, and this was carried out through a system of lectures. The measurement 
of success was purely quantitative and was counted in terms of the numbers of organized 
lectures and the numbers of young people attending them. Despite these pretensions, most of 
the Komsomol activities in which young people really participated were things such as 
organizing courses for learning to drive, amateur arts or organizing dances - what were in fact 
fairly 'light' leisure activities. Since the Komsomol had a monopoly on such facilities for young 
people, most people participated.
The Komsomol proved unable to reform itself radically to reflect the changing interests of young 
people. It remained primarily a 'transmission belt' for Party policy rather than a vehicle for 
representing young people's interests, and so by the 1980s it was growing increasingly out of 
touch with young people's real Interests and aspirations. However, the institutionalized 
hypocrisy whereby people learned to pretend to conform, concealed much of this disconnection 
between real aspirations and the Komsomol representation of youth. From the 1970s and 
1980s the growth of 'non formal' groups described in chapter 5 posed a challenge to the 
Komsomol. These ranged from sub-cultures to semi-organized groups for ecology or music 
which eschewed formal organization but nevertheless had informal leaders who enjoyed more 
credibility than the Komsomol leadership. One response in the 1980s was to attempt to absorb 
such groups by offering official space, but in general the Komsomol was unable to 
accommodate the changing aspirations of young people to the extent that in 1980s Mikhail 
Gorbachev was able to describe it as „marching down one side of the street while young people 
are walking down the other in the opposite direction" (quoted in Riordan 1989a: 16)
The job of constructing youth : the growth of youth professions
The different issues associated with youth have resulted in the growth of different kinds of 
agencies - and with the professional agents defined through them. These different professional 
groups then define their own ’knowledge base1 or area of expertise - that is, the treatment of the 
social problem which has been identified. Whilst many of these may share models of youth 
which we explored in chapter 1, they also interpret this according to ideas developed within 
their own organizational structures. Many of the theories outlined in Chapter 1 also form the 
basis for professional intervention, forming part of the 'expertise' of that profession. The 
relationship between ideas or theories of youth and ways in which they are dealt with by 
professionals is closely related.
Professional work with young people (outside of education) takes a number of forms. For 
example, youth work usually involves intervention in the 'free time' or leisure time' of young
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people outside of school, training or work but also social work and work with young people 
suffering various social and physical problems. In communist countries this was heavily 
politicized, although in both parts of Europe participation in these kinds of youth services was 
usually voluntary and such services depend to a large extent upon voluntary staff as well (in 
communist societies participation was not compulsory but unlike in the West, was near 
universal because of the more extensive control and surveillance of the young population). The 
second main form of intervention was in dealing with youth who deviated in some way from the 
accepted norm, either by breaking the law or through various kinds of disruptive or anti-social 
behaviour, which meant that they could not be accommodated within normal schools and 
institutions or because they are victims of some sort - as orphans, or having been removed from 
their families. These are more likely to fall under the aegis of social work, probation work or the 
criminal justice system for minors which is mostly distinct from that designed for adults. Whilst 
lower class young people are likely to find themselves the objects of intervention by such 
agencies, middle class young people find themselves objects of a different kind of professional 
gaze: their parents are likely to turn to the help of a range of professional counselors and 
experts - psychologists, doctors, psychiatrists, psychotherapists and so on for help in regulating 
and understanding young people's problems (Aggleton 1987). This means that there are also 
an array of professionals in the private or semi-private sector who specialize in the problems of 
people in this age category. In diverse parts of Europe we can see the problems of youth being 
allocated rather differently between professional groups. In the communist half of Europe, 
youth professionals did not claim to be neutral or detached in their approaches, but rather were 
committed to politically mobilizing youth as an element of their professional purpose.
Whilst in western European societies, the purpose of intervention was to bring 'deviant' youth 
back to the 'norm', in communist societies the emphasis was quite a different one: the purpose 
of intervention was to assist youth in the realization of the norm. The project of youth in social 
transformation and building a 'bright new future' meant that rather than being saved and 
normalized, youth had to be educated and monitored to achieve this goal. Deviation did not 
officially exist in any case, although there were very large numbers of children and young 
people in institutions and a view of how they should be dealt with existed based upon official 
ideology. No strong discourse of professionalism developed around it. In Britain and Germany 
we can see the contrast between 'weak' and ‘strong’ models of youth intervention and in 
communist societies, the strongest models of all.
Who were the youth professionals under communism? The professionalism and professional 
training of youth workers was a field of discussion in the East just as it was in the West. 
However, the main tension was between the need for a necessary knowledge base and the 
requirements for the so-called autonomy of the organization. Youth workers were synonymous 
with Komsomol officers and this was a politically as well as professionally charged role. By the 
1980s Komsomol was numerically a mighty organization with 40 million members in the Soviet 
Union, 350,000 full time officers, 49 colleges, 33 museums, seven propaganda trains and 3
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publishing houses among other assets (Riordan 1989a). In Moscow alone there were 2,700 
professional Komsomol workers, more than in any of the Ministries. These could be 
characterized as the 'youth professionals' of the former system. Whilst Komsomol workers 
sought to safe-guard their professional status by erecting entrance barriers, this contradicted 
the idea that Komsomol should be an organization run by and for young people themselves. 
Thus Komsomol workers aspired to professional status not so much through qualifications but 
by emphasizing the 'organizational abilities' of officers but this was concealed the politicized 
nature of appointments and by the widespread practice of nepotism. Because the Komsomol 
could be an important stepping stone to a political career and therefore social mobility, the 
people who aspired to be youth professionals were seldom motivated by any concern for young 
people. Indeed many of them had little interest in either their members (as long as members 
attended appropriate meetings) or in the slogans they were promulgating. However, a high 
Komsomol position was also a nomenklatura position which brought with it access to special 
hospitals, shops, holiday facilities, tax-free additional income and chauffeur driven limousines 
.which were not available to ordinary people. The organizational abilities and ambitions of 
these youth leaders is evidenced in the fact that many of them are now senior political leaders 
under the reformed post-communist governments.
Although posts in the Komsomol were elected, in practice all positions had a nominee and there 
were no more candidates than there were positions (Riordan 1989a). This undermined faith in 
the democratic potential of the Komsomol. One survey about attitudes towards elections for 
Komsomol posts gives an indication of the alienation of most members from their organization 
and the lack of real autonomy which it represented (Mitev 1979) saying „The election results 
have been decided beforehand by the director of the school so we only have to vote (to confirm 
them)" (ibid.:60). Since the Party had the decisive say over all levels of the organization - from 
the election of the lowest unpaid secretary in the local unit to the highest officers - the workers in 
the organization directed their attentions upwards. They developed an attitude of arrogance and 
social distance towards ordinary Komsomol members since these had little relevance to the real 
priorities of the Komsomol. This meant that Komsomol officers were increasingly out of touch 
with the mood and preoccupations of young people on the ground (ibid.).
Young people in turn became alienated from the youth professionals and from the organization 
itself. A survey by the Bulgarian Youth Institute in 1978 of 10,000 Komsomol members aged 
14-28 found that members thought the organization ought to be providing leisure facilities rather 
than having any broader political or representational goals (Mitev 1979). The growing 
polarization between the Komsomol membership and the leaders of the organization meant that 
for many young people participating in the survey, the Komsomol leadership and the 
organization itself were synonymous and they did not feel that it represented their interests at 
all. When criticism was invited of the Komsomol in the Soviet Union under glasnost, the letters 
of protest were harsh and uncompromising. One writer complained of the „Komsomol leader in 
his black limousine and three-piece suit who turns up at subbotniks (voluntary work days) just to
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declaim about the public spiritedness of youth... It is time to speak the unpalatable truth to 
Komsomol bureaucrats, lackeys and time-servers, all those for whom the Komsomol is a step 
on life's self-propelled escalator... you can’t carry on like that!" (quoted in Riordan 1989a: 29)
The Party elite paid special attention to the recruitment of women among Komsomol cadres, but 
in practice, women tended to be found amongst the lower ranks of the organization whilst the 
higher offices were dominated by men. At the lower levels of the organization women were the 
majority. For example, in the junior ’Pioneer’ organizations, women comprised 90 per cent of all 
paid staff but there were few among the higher ranking political cadres and even within these 
cadres women were more over-represented in the lower posts rather than in the Central 
Committee (Ivanov 1981).
It is easy in hindsight to see the progressive organizational failures and creeping sclerosis of the 
Komsomol organization. The policies it enacted - whatever its official organization - tended to 
be based upon prohibitions rather than stimuli, on sanctions rather than encouragement. The 
Komsomol suffered from over-centralization, sometimes resulting in absurd regulations being 
passed down to the local units. As Mitev (1988) has pointed out, they played the role of the 
persecutors of young people rather than their defenders. As a result it lost the real support of 
young people who increasingly only pretended to conform to its requirements.
Thus the Komsomol had elaborated a pervasive mechanism of surveillance and control over 
young people which was intended to supervise their activities outside of formal institutions of 
work, training or school. This was based upon theories of transformation to communism 
including the reconstruction of personality. The Komsomol had an important position in the 
construction of the New Socialist Person, but it was clear that by the 1980s it had become rigid 
and insensitive to the real needs and aspirations of young people. Non-conformity and criticism 
was expressed in social surveys but also through espousal of new youth cultures and later sub­
cultures (which we explore in Chapter 5).
With the fall of communism many youth organizations disappeared. The ‘modern’ idea of youth 
as missionaries for a brave new world evaporated. The majority of young people, tired of 
compulsory activism, refused to join any organizations. In some regions the Komsomol 
continues to exist as an organization, although in places like the Czech Republic, Poland or 
Hungary, the continuation of the Young Communist League would be unthinkable and the new 
youth organisations - de-centralized and far more modest in scope - are groping for a new role 
(Stafseng 1992). In Bulgaria the youth organization has been reconstituted as the ’Bulgarian 
Democratic Youth’. This followed one month after the transformation of the Communist Party 
into the Bulgarian Socialist Party in January 1990. Although they had a representative in 
Parliament and have been active in the 1990 elections in support of the Socialists, the new 
leaders claimed that this was a ’purely social’ organization and had nothing in common with the 
dissolved Komsomol. During the course of her research in 1992, one of the authors (Sijka
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Kovatcheva) found that in one of the Universities in Plovdiv no section of the Bulgarian 
Democratic Youth existed and in other Universities where it did supposedly exist, no member of 
the organization could be found apart from its leader. However, some students regretted the 
passing of some of the activities of Komsomol which had actually helped students in their 
studies. In the absence of the official youth organization there has been the réintroduction of 
west European youth organizations, including Boy Scouts, YMCA and various religious 
movements which have been active in recruiting young people. In Russia 40,000 new youth 
associations were founded in 1991 which included ecological, patriotic, historical and charitable 
activities. It is claimed that 30-40 per cent of youth took part in such organizations and 13 per 
cent are members (Sviridon 1994). However, in many places nothing equivalent has replaced 
the Communist Youth Leagues. The collapse of the official youth organization is indicative of 
the disappearance of youth as a category for official intervention in the new post-communist 
reality. At present there is mainly a vacuum which is being filled by commercial youth culture 
(no longer condemned) or economic activities. The highly ordered and controlled progression 
through age-status and transitions which the Communist Youth organizations supervised, has 
been replaced by a diversity of different groups and in many places by nothing at all.
The collapse of the formal youth organization has meant the disappearance of much of the 
provision for young people in eastern Europe. What were youth camps are now private hotels; 
what were recreational facilities for young people now charge admission and run for profit (if 
they have not simply closed down). Whilst in western Europe new connections between youth 
work and other aspects of welfare for young people are being developed, in post-communist 
countries these links disappeared along with the official youth organizations. Post-communist 
modernization has not necessarily been always progressive and it will take some time to rebuild 
a conception of youth which allows for any kind of humane intervention or provision. At present, 
due to the crisis of youth research, this seems unlikely to happen. The mass modern concept 
of youth under communism is replaced by privatized and fragmented alternatives.
In western Europe, the statutory youth service, like other 'caring professions' developed out of 
nineteenth century philanthropy and the movement by reformers to re-mould and remoralize 
the working class (especially the rough working class) in an image of middle class, imperial 
efficiency. The concern was to turn out good soldiers and conforming citizens and to create 
and sustain appropriate gender roles for the two sexes. In some countries youth work was 
more concerned with moral education being most likely to be undertaken by one of the religious 
organizations or denominations. Through extended education during leisure time it was hoped 
to guide young people - particularly those in working class and industrial areas where social 
control was believed to be weaker - into more conforming roles. In the twentieth century this 
developed into a concern with 'character building' 'leadership' and 'service' and later into 
models of education or welfare for young people. However, the changes which took place in 
the post second world war period, which we have described in previous chapters, with the 
development of commercial entertainment, along with youth culture and sub-cultures meant that
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many youth services were no longer in touch with young people's preoccupations. Young 
people preferred to join unorganized groups.
Here it is interesting to compare Britain and Germany as western European countries because 
in Britain the youth service had some difficulty in establishing itself professionally, whereas 
Germany represents the example of the country with the most organized youth provision 
(Stafseng 1992). This was on account of the 'strong' model of youth developed there as 
discussed in Chapter 1.
In Britain, there was an attempt to put youth work on a professional footing in the 1944 
Education Act, which included provision for a youth service, but this was never fully 
implemented. The Albermarle Report in 1960, argued for a large scale investment in youth 
services as a way of tempting young people away from commercial entertainment and into 
what were perceived to be more educationally improving pursuits. In the wake of 'moral panics’ 
about deviant youth sub-cultures, the youth and education services were envisaged as 
instruments for imposing what were seen as 'better quality' leisure interests. However, given 
the 'weak’ model of youth intervention, there was a real shortage of trained personnel to run 
the Youth Centres and most of the staff remain volunteers. For every full time youth worker 
there was 1,000 part-time or volunteer workers working in a variety of voluntary organizations 
such as the YMCA, the Guides and Scouts and the uniformed junior branches of the Armed 
Forces (Jeffs and Smith 1987, 1990, Smith 1988).
Just as youth services were supposed to integrate working class youth into dominant middle 
class culture, so there were attempts to integrate ethnic minority youth Into dominant white 
culture (Davies 1986). The Hunt Committee Report 'Immigrants and the Youth Service ' in 1967 
argued for the integration of young ethnic people into mainstream youth service in order to 
promote racial harmony and a 'national culture'. 'Integration' therefore meant creating a 
class-less, race-less and gender-less youth through the absorption of working class into middle 
class culture, and black into white culture and so separate provision for girls was swept away. 
From the Albermarle Report onwards there were attempts to create a neutral professional 
language based upon principles of education and developmental psychology; Carl Rogers' 
notion of counseling to achieve 'self actualization' was influential in the 1960's. The youth 
worker was to be a counselor helping young people through the 'storm and stress' of 
adolescence. By the late 1960s youth work had become attached to more community-oriented 
'social education’ and was seen as a branch of the local Education Services with 'unattached' 
youth workers working away from institutions.
During the 1970's the impetus towards expansion continued with attempts to set up a more 
independent and professionalised youth service but these were largely unsuccessful (Tucker
1994). New directions within youth work had developed, including the recognition of the 
separate needs of different groups of youth - Afro-Caribbean and Asian, girls and disabled
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youth (Imam, Khan, Lashley and Montgomery 1995). More radical paradigms of feminist and 
anti-racist philosophies began to gain currency within the youth service which rejected the 
orthodox 'middle class' norm which had been criticized in earlier youth work. This reflected the 
influence of ‘critical discourses’ of youth described by Christine Griffin (1993) and in Chapter 1. 
Instead of 'saving' youth for dominant society, they were to be 'empowered' (Banks 1996). This 
reflected more post and late modern tendencies towards individualization and recognizing 
difference rather than a standardized model of youth and attempting to ‘lead from behind' rather 
than impose solutions from above (Morely 1995). However, this postmodern direction also fitted 
conveniently with the 'market model’ of youth which started to prevail, one whereby problems 
were individualized and privatized (Barry 1996). By the 1980s, the political atmosphere of the 
New Right tended to militate against the further development of a youth work profession. Cuts 
in services and the dismantling of Local Educational Authorities which had been the home of the 
Youth Services, eroded the resource base and resulted in many projects being cut or 
jeopardized. The contracting-out and privatization of services along with the fragmentation of 
the.welfare state generally, lead to increasing specialization of different youth workers and their 
division through a range of different projects which would come and go. Nevertheless Jeffs 
and Smith (1994) detected an ‘authoritarian drift’ as projects associated with young people 
became more and more coercive and intended for their surveillance and control at the same 
time as they became more decentralized and fragmented. One example of this was the 
proposals for ‘curfews' for young people to keep them off the streets in Britain, following 
discussions in the USA (Jeffs and Smith 1996).
Some nevertheless argued for a continuation of ‘modern’ styles of youth intervention. David 
Marsland (1993) argues that in the absence of clear paths to adulthood, young people are faced 
with a set of conflicting demands from a range of institutions and that the youth services should 
provide a framework to help them through life transitions. He argues that this should be based 
upon a clear concept of youth as a knowledge base rather than a range of critical perspectives.
Girls were traditionally perceived as posing less of a threat to the social order, being less likely 
to get into trouble on the streets, less involved in crime and more controlled by the family and 
home. Consequently, the majority of provision was male oriented. Over the post-war period the 
liberal model of youth provision favored promoting 'equality' and integration of the sexes by 
providing a service for girls and boys together. However, these co-educatlonal principles 
conceal the inequality still lurking behind youth provisions. Indeed, feminist youth workers have 
argued that inequality has actually increased as a result since girls are subordinated underneath 
the apparently neutral idea of 'youth'. Within youth clubs activities such as pool, darts, and team 
games often marginalize girls as boys take over and dominate. Most of the staff are men. It 
was estimated that five times as much In resources was spent on boys as opposed to girls 
(Nava 1984). Feminist youth workers nevertheless tried to create the space to work with 
working class girls separately and explore issues of sexuality, gender and so on, often with 
rewarding results (Spence 1996).
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In Germany, youth work is better established and provisioned than in England. The Ministry of 
Education, Health, Women, Family and Youth organizes reports every two years which bring 
together experts in the field to explain the latest social trends and theories and which puts 
forward recommendations for new directions in the Youth Services. This is partly a product of 
the range of well established youth organizations or associations which have existed since 
the early twentieth century and are now incorporated as partners in welfare provision. 
There are several categories of youth associations: firstly the Protestant and Catholic churches' 
youth organizations; secondly the youth wings of the political parties; thirdly, those of some 
of the Trades Unions and Professional Associations and finally the 'independent1 youth 
organizations such as the 'Pathfinders' (rather like Boy Scouts), the Red Cross, Sports 
organizations and so on. These organizations and the Local Community Departments mean 
that youth welfare is targeted as a special issue, rather than being spread around different 
departments within the Local Authority such as Social Work and Education.
Following the post-war reconstruction, youth services were reconstituted in the new German 
Republic. During the 1950s and particularly the 1960s a new conception of youth began to 
emerge - 'teenagers' were discovered as a 'problem' as the new youth cultures and mass media 
made it possible for young people to conspicuously assert their own priorities and develop their 
own distinctive styles. Political security and growing affluence encouraged this new 
generational experience. As a result, youth work began to change from the mid-1960s. It was 
identified in the 1960s educational reforms as a 'fourth learning field' alongside the Family, 
Education and Training and therefore had a central place within policies for young people. In 
the Structure Plan of 1970 and the Educational Plan of 1973, youth work was identified as an 
important area of education. This meant a new remit for youth workers. They were no longer 
providers of leisure space working within one of the associations, they now needed a new 
knowledge-base and training in education. Youth work became something more generalized, 
based upon general models of adolescence. Youth work also had an important place in 
regional plans in dealing with 'problem groups' such as those taking drugs, those who were 
homeless, the children of foreign workers and so on. Increasingly, they were seen as serving 
not just the needs of organized youth, but those of the community more generally and 
were required to work more and more outside of established youth centres.
In response to the new cultural autonomy of young people, youth work had to adapt or find 
itself ignored by young people. Consequently, youth centres started to develop an 'open door' 
policy with unstructured use of space by young people for their own ends. An additional role 
taken on by youth workers was to provide relaxation and counseling for young people who are 
seen in Germany to be increasingly pressured by the education and training system into 
performing and passing examinations. In addition to these pressures, the fear of unemployment 
was added in the 1970's and so youth workers saw themselves as providing support to young 
people suffering from increasing stress and unable to bring their problems home to parents
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who also put them under pressure to achieve and improve themselves (Bönisch and Schefeld 
1985, Bundesministier für Jugend, Familie, Frauen und Geshundheit, 1980).
In both countries, about one third of young people join youth clubs or some other organization, 
whilst the most popular form of membership is of Sports Clubs in all countries (Biorcio et al. 
1995). Many more may attend the discotheques and activities provided in youth centres. As 
in Britain there has been an increasing recognition that most youth work is male oriented 
and separate facilities and times need to be arranged around young women in order to meet 
their needs. Following feminist campaigning, the need for gender-specific organizations 
began to be recognized in Germany from the 1970s and was complemented by the provision 
of women-only cafes, bookshops and so on all inspired by feminist campaigns. Anti-racist 
youth work or that dealing with ethnic minorities is not well developed in Central European 
countries where ‘integration’ remains the main model. This is because citizenship is based upon 
ethnicity - therefore it was necessary only to integrate the ethnic Germans arriving from the East 
- and the rest were considered temporary visitors. This division is changing somewhat now with 
greater civil and political recognition of the guest workers and their children.
During the 1980s the youth services have debated many similar issues to those in Britain with 
marxist, feminist and anti-racists critical discourses becoming more important. Sociological 
analysis of 'individualization' and 'de-standardized biographies' (see Chapter 1) has lead to a 
move away from the further professionalization of youth work and the institutionalization of 
youth services and towards more flexible services reflecting more flexible life-styles. It is now 
argued that services should be de-centralized and more open to participation from the 
community with statutory youth services working in partnership with other community groups 
and even the private sector. There has been particularly a reaction against psychiatric and 
therapeutic intervention and recommendations instead for 'social pedagogics' which opens up 
critical discussion rather than recommending technocratic solutions. In the 1980s and 1990s 
there is greater recognition of the position of girls and ethnic minority youth and concern about 
how best to meet their needs. The idea of empowerment or giving young people more 
responsibility and opportunities for participation is also raised (see Bundesministier für Jugend, 
Familie, Frauen und Gesundheit 1980, 1990). In 1991 a new Youth Welfare Law was passed 
which emphasized an integral approach to youth problems and in particular the all-round 
support for youth including such things as housing (Gaiser and Munchmeier 1994). The 
statutory position of youth work with the voluntary and Local Authority sectors mean that youth 
workers are recognized and established as a professional group to a much greater extent than 
in Britain.
Ideas of postmodern diversity, the recognition of 'individualization' and the increasing rights of 
young people in society have required new approaches to youth work. The provision of a range 
of facilitates to recognize the needs of different groups - girls, ethnic minorities and so on have
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lead to the breakdown of the idea of a 'national' youth with homogenous interests means the 
recognition of work with individuals and communities towards ‘empowerment’.
It would seem that services for young people on both sides of Europe are groping towards new 
definitions, ones that will encompass the increasingly complex and reversible nature of age- 
status transitions, ones that could take into account their new roles within the family, within 
education and training and within the labour market. The increasingly amorphous nature of 
youth makes it difficult to build any comprehensive model of intervention and those states which 
tried, have patently failed to succeed in the 1990s.
Conclusion
We have illustrated how the process of modernization created a category of ‘youth’ as a mass 
phenomenon and various institutions and professions associated with it. Historians and 
sociologists such as Muncie (1984) and Gillis (1981) have tended to stress the 'invention of 
adolescence’ as a universal phenomenon through the nineteenth century, particularly the 
imposition of middle class adolescence upon other social classes (Muncie 1984:41) . It is 
evident that this model cannot be applied without some modification to young women. By 
contrast, we have tried to show that youth was not a new phenomenon - it was a product of the 
North Western European family pattern. What changed during the course of industrialization 
and modernization was the construction of youth as a more precisely age-graded social 
category and their incorporation into expanding state and nation state-building systems. This 
corresponds with the development of theories intended to explain the idea of ‘youth’ or 
‘adolescence’ explored in Chapter 1.
However, our argument is that youth was a product of 'modernity', in particular of the creation of 
state systems through which age became bureaucratically calibrated. Without a comprehensive 
state, such precise definitions of age would not have been possible. With the creation of a 
nation-state it became necessary to order and regulate the lives of its citizens through age. In 
this way, youth was constructed as a social category, one destined for educational, legislative 
and other interventions. In addition, new scientific studies were developed to analyze this new 
category and this provided the professional ideology for the new youth professionals. In those 
capitalists societies which developed earlier, this was done thorough pressure from voluntary 
organisations and individuals who constituted an active 'civil society'. In states which developed 
later under authoritarian control, this construction of youth took place more obviously as a 
product of state policy. Under both fascist and communist states, youth held a key position as 
agents of the transformation of society and in these societies they were strongly identified as a 
social and political category.
Just as youth were constructed as a social group and a mass phenomenon, through 
modernization, so sex differences were also institutionalized as were differences of class. The 
politicization of youth organisations at various points in history made them into a national cause,
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bearers of the new future. Even in societies where this was not so strongly the case, such as 
Britain, the improvement of youth services was often carried out along nationalist and eugenic 
principles. However, the post-modernizing tendencies of the last few decades have tended to 
erode the differences between the sexes, replaced classes with more complex, often non­
material sources of differentiation (such sexuality, (dis) ability etc.) and blurred the stages of 
youth so that it is not clear where it begins or ends.
By the 1990s, institutions and organizations in all countries of Europe were facing the 
consequences of the social changes affecting youth which we have described in this book: 
increasing differentiation amongst young people, the extension of youth to both younger and 
older age groups and the individualization of young people. There have been various 
responses, but the rights of young people have been more generally recognized along with the 
need to negotiate with them rather than only impose solutions. New paradigms of intervention 
involving the facilitation of self organized groups and the attempt to ‘empower’ young people 
have emerged as a result. However, the privatization and fragmentation of the welfare state 
means that it is even less likely that any consistent idea of youth or youth policies will emerge, 
except perhaps at the pan-European level.
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Chapter 3
Transitions in Education, Training and Work
One of the most significant institutions to structure age in modern societies is that of education. 
Universal education systems, evolving with modernization since the nineteenth century, have 
absorbed widening groups of young people and sorted them according to pedagogically defined 
stages. In the early schools, classes could contain a range of children of different ages, but the 
systematization of education in the twentieth century was associated with age differentiation 
and the development of pedagogical theories to explain and legitimize age grading. This helped 
to construct standardized age status transitions associated first with different levels of the 
school system, then with finishing school and entering work and following that with different 
layers of training and Higher Education. However, whilst the initial tendencies were towards 
standardizing age-status transitions, a combination of educational reforms, rising unemployment 
and extended training since the 1970s has tended to remove young people from full-time 
employment and turn them into trainees or students instead. To put it at its most stark; whilst in 
1945 80per cent of 14 year olds in Europe went straight into employment from school, at 
present 80per cent of 14-17 year olds are still in education (Coleman and Husen 1985). This 
has then had the effect of lengthening and then de-standardizing age-status transitions. It is no 
longer so clear at what age a person finishes education or training or at what age the begin 
work.
The increasingly complex division of labour in modern industrial societies and the need for ever- 
changing skills has necessitated longer periods of preparation for work and retraining or re­
education throughout life. The changing needs of the economy pose constant challenges for 
education systems which in turn interact with selection processes to filter young people into the 
occupational hierarchy. Comparisons between welfare capitalist countries where education was 
generally state controlled or at least managed but employment is allocated through a 
competitive market mechanism, with communist countries where 'central planning' was 
intended to ensure the close functional fit between labour demand and labour supply are 
particularly interesting in this context. In neither system are the consequences of planning 
completely predictable, and the aspirations and actions of the recipients of the system do not 
always fit the models imposed.
Modernization brought with it an increasingly complex division of labour with positions filled (at 
least in principle) through universalistic, achievement oriented criteria. Education was supposed 
to furnish these criteria and since the Second World War education throughout Europe has 
been informed by an educational discourse built upon the principle of meritocracy: that those 
with ability should be able to benefit from education to rise to the highest levels and with this 
form of selection (as opposed to one of privilege or wealth) better and more efficient societies 
could be built. This provides legitimation for social systems in both communist and capitalist
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systems. However, in all systems, education operates as a form of social selection which 
advantages those who are already privileged, who already have an educational advantage, or 
with the means to buy or manipulate access to it. This has been an impetus for reforming 
education systems through which there have been attempts in different countries to make the 
selection process as appear to be meritocratic and to give access to those from working class 
or minority backgrounds who might otherwise be disadvantaged. A further discourse developed 
around how to compensate for social disadvantages and tap the pool of talent which was 
believed to be lying undiscovered amongst the educationally disadvantaged (Griffin 1993). As a 
result, credentials have become increasingly important as a method of selection and 
competition for educational places increased. These which are seen not so much as ends in 
themselves but as means to ends - as a way of acquiring access to the right job and the right 
social strata. Thus studying is often undertaken less to acquire knowledge than to secure the 
qualification at the end of it  This causes stress and anxiety for young people as well as the so 
called 'diploma disease' whereby higher and higher qualifications are required to do the same 
job. This increased credentialism also creates higher expectations. Once qualified, the graduate 
may be unwilling to undertake more menial work - they want a good job which they feel they 
deserve after their studies. The achievement orientation translated into educatoional certification 
therefore creates long term, tensions and unfulfilled expectations.
Competitive meritocratic systems create losers as well as winners. What about those with no 
possibility of acquiring a good qualification? Some are prepared for positions in the labour 
market with lower qualifications (some education systems foster considerable correspondence 
with labour market positions whereas others do not). However, those at the bottom of the 
educational ladder tend to drop out before the race has started. In a credentialist labour market 
they are increasingly disadvantaged. Furthermore, knowing that they have little to gain from 
education (apart from being branded as 'failures') they tend to have the most dissatisfied 
attitude towards it, to be reluctant to conform to school disciplines and to leave at the earliest 
possible opportunity. This group may not even accept the value of the skills and values 
institutionalized through education. The young people in this educational 'subclass', forming 
about 10-20per cent of all educational systems, are usually disadvantaged in other ways too, 
and are more likely to find themselves unemployed or on training schemes when they leave.
Educational systems also reflect other forms of inequality. Because they reinforce the dominant 
hegemonic ideology associated with any given national culture, this tends to disadvantage 
those minority groups which are not members of the dominant culture (Gellner 1983). Thus, for 
example, migrant groups and minorities who do not speak the majority language are likely to be 
disadvantaged, particularly if prevailing ideologies present them as less educationally able or 
more deviant than other children. Young people from minority groups suffering educational 
disadvantage and coming from families which are themselves from the lower levels of the 
labour market, are further disadvantaged by the lack of relevant cultural capital necessary for 
educational success and by negative educational 'labeling' by teachers and others (Stocke
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1995, Bhattacharyya and Gabriel 1997). However, It is also the case that some ethnic groups 
do better in school than the host population and so we have to be careful to distinguish between 
different groups. Increasingly there is pressure towards having separate educational provision 
for minorities in their own language and with their own religion. Additionally, schooling systems 
tend to reinforce the gender divisions existing in any given society through either an overt or a 
‘hidden’ curriculum (Deem 1978, 1980). Communist countries even tried to counter this by 
explicitly encouraging sex equality. Indeed, women have been some of the main beneficiaries 
of educational expansion in the post-war period, a paradox which we address later in the 
chapter.
The effect of progressive educational reforms has been to extend the period of youth. Most 
reforms have extended the number of years of schooling or training: the tendency is to prolong 
these further with each set of reforms. The length of education and training varies between 
different countries, although the trend Is the same in both western and eastern Europe: longer 
periods in schooling and a variety of training and vocational schemes have prolonged the 
transition from school to work. In eastern and central Europe this trend, already existing under 
communism, has been reinforced further by the transition towards a more market-oriented 
economy because of rising youth unemployment. In Southern Europe, such reforms have taken 
place somewhat later, but the trend is in the same direction (Chisholm and Bergeret 1991). In 
the late twentieth century such developments have produced a situation where there is more 
vocational rhetoric and more training courses, but education is also linked less directly to the 
labour market. The outcome of education and training is uncertain, unemployment is a risk and 
the proliferation of routes and opportunities through education and training has resulted in a 
very complex and rather open-ended situation for young people. Being a young person in 
Europe at the close of the twentieth century increasingly means being a student or a trainee of 
some description. It also means facing the risk of unemployment, underemployment and 
possibly having to change one's occupation - or certainly one's job - a number of times 
throughout a career. It means having to organize one's own pension and sickness payments. 
One consequence has been the individualization of biographies as young people are forced to 
make decisions about their lives at each juncture, to choose between different options and to 
take responsibility for their decisions. Even constructing a life through a curriculum vitae 
becomes a skill taught on youth training schemes and professional agencies even offer such 
services. Failure appears therefore to be a consequence of lack of sufficient training or 
individual diligence rather than structural inequality {Evans and Heinz 1994, Roberts 1995).
In the remainder of this chapter we begin by considering in more detail some of the 
developments in education in different European contexts, comparing East and West Europe. 
We then consider the way in which the relationship between education and the labour market is 
managed and the extent and nature of state involvement in this process. Education systems 
are specific to national cultures and we are not able to describe all of them here, so we shall
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point to some general features with examples from particular countries. Finally we consider the 
implications for stratification.
Secondary education: the continued expansion
In all industrial countries, educational expansion was seen as important both for creating an 
internationally competitive industry through a better socialized and trained labour force. It was 
also regarded as important for creating a unified national culture and well-disciplined citizens, 
aware of the importance of punctuality, respect for authority and who would accept their position 
within a complex division of labour (Bowles and Gintis 1976, Johnson 1976, Gellner 1983). 
However, the process was uneven. In Southern European countries there remain high rates of 
illiteracy and considerable educational disadvantage in rural areas (Pavelka and Stefanov 
1985). After the Second World War, education was expanded still further in most industrialized 
countries, since it was seen as important for the post-war reconstruction: the new world order 
would be built with a more highly educated and technologically sophisticated population - one 
chosen through rational means of educational selection. This period therefore saw the passing 
of important legislation. The discourse of 'youth', developing out of the discourses of preparatory 
education and training, was an important development in this because it created a period during 
which children were prepared for work and for later life through their education, their leisure and 
sometimes through their work-based induction: it was an 'apprenticeship' to life (Cohen 1997).
In many eastern and central European countries it was only under communism that rapid 
industrial development took place, and with it, the expansion of universal compulsory education. 
The elimination of illiteracy was one of the first tasks of the communist regime. Thus, in some 
countries there was an educational transformation inside one generation (although the statistics 
are not always reliable as they do not very accurately represent the educational disadvantages 
of minority groups and tend to exaggerate the 'success' of the system). This was accompanied 
by a dramatic shift in the population from rural to industrial and urban areas and from a largely 
non-educated to a mainly educated population. For example, in Bulgaria, the numbers of 
students in secondary education grew fourfold between 1939 and 1969 (Semov 1972). In 
Poland, there was a similar dramatic transformation: in 1960 45.2per cent of the population had 
not completed elementary education, but by 1984 this had fallen to 8.7per cent (Kurzynowski 
1990). Such rapid improvements in education, however, lead to dramatically rising expectations, 
which the socialist labour allocation mechanisms were not able to meet, as we shall see later. 
However, the patterns of educational mobility in the former communist countries reflected less 
the communist system of education than the way in which each country industrialized. Studies 
carried out during the period found more similarities with western countries such as the 
Netherlands than might be expected and considerable variation within Socialist states (Peschar 
et. al. 1990). Czechoslovakia and the former East Germany, for example, already had 
developed educational systems before communists took over.
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Educational selection also affects patterns of labour market recruitment. In many parts of 
Europe the secondary school system is itself selective, with different tiers. This is used to sort 
young people in to clear tracks with differentiation according to ability, leading to different kinds 
of schools and different kinds of examinations. The top layer prepares people exclusively for 
University entrance through some kind of nationally recognized qualification. In England, 
universal access to grammar schools was granted with the 1944 Education Act, based upon 
academic ability rather than ability to pay and attempts were made to put such selection at age
11 on a 'scientific' basis through IQ testing (which was later dropped). In Germany, France and 
much of Central Europe, the grammar schools, gymnasiums or lyceums provide such an 
academic education for an elite. In England, those who were selected as less academically able 
went to 'secondary moderns’ and left at the minimum age and went into employment in some 
more practical trade or job. Elsewhere, a layer of more specialized, higher level school existed 
between the elite grammar and lower level basic schools which offered certificates for starting 
training or work in clerical or technical trades (for example the ’Realschule1 in Germany or the 
'Secondary professional' schools in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are examples of 
this). These different school systems grade young people in terms of age-status transitions and 
points of entry into the labour market.
From the 1970s non-selective comprehensive schools came to predominate over the selective 
system of education in many regions, but these tended to also reflect rather than abolish 
educational selection which was also perpetuated through the use of different examinations In 
Britain at any rate there was a return to selective education once more in the 1980s and de­
centralization of budgets and powers to schools as part of a sub-contracted welfare state. From 
the 1980s Britain followed much of continental Europe in introducing more standardized 
educational attainment targets associated with specific age groups. State control of the 
curriculum was of course most highly developed in the communist countries where subjects and 
examinations were centrally prescribed.
Private or non-state alternatives exist only in some countries. In Britain, for example, private and 
independent schools were always an important element in elite education and enjoyed 
something of a revival in the 1980s under encouragement from a Conservative government. In 
other countries, such as Germany, they are almost non-existent. In the Netherlands, however, 
private schooling was far more common as a way of incorporating different denominational 
schools. Even where there is a private sector, it is usually state subsidized through grants, 
scholarships or tax relief and private schools tend to prepare students for the nationally 
recognized, state controlled examinations just as public sector schools do. Hence, in these 
respects private schools are extensions of state schooling system.
Some countries - such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland - have evolved elabourate inter­
connections between school and the labour market at the post-secondary level through 
continuing part-time education once a young person has begun work and nearly universal
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apprenticeships which involve some extended education. Sometimes called the 'dual system' 
this extends the acheivement-oriented, credentialist system into training after school as well and 
can be seen following from the ‘continuation schools’ discussed in Chapter 2. We could term 
this indeed the ‘Central European Model’ of education and training because similar systems 
exist in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic as well.
The communist countries of central and eastern Europe favoured comprehensive 'polytechnical' 
schools up to the age of 14 or 15 after which pupils were selected into a three tier system. 
These schools encouraged links between young people and workplace teams and pupils were 
encouraged to spend days at agricultural collectives or industries from an early age. From there 
they could go to a general secondary school where a broad curriculum was pursued and could 
lead towards a University entrance exam. Others would go to a specialist secondary 
professional school which would prepare them for some profession - such as health care or 
library work. These courses could last 2 to 4 years and could also prepare people for University 
entrance. The remainder of the age cohort would attend vocational schools linked more directly 
to work for an additional 2 years. They would normally work some days of the week in the 
workplace and some days at school with their work placement time increasing throughout the 
course. Such arrangements were very often linked to enterprises who would provide money 
and resources for the school along with work placements. For the enterprises this was a source 
of cheap labour and generally speaking there were more jobs offered than people to fill them. 
People were not expected to change jobs very much and were trained for one main profession. 
However, there were some variations in this throughout eastern and central Europe, and the 
role of general secondary schools could be very different in different countries and regions. In 
Bulgaria the general secondary schools were the route into Higher Education and accepted the 
majority of pupils. In the more under-developed Asiatic regions they were the least privileged 
educational streams (professional and vocational secondary schools were more expensive to 
develop and in some regions were simply neglected) whereas In the Northern regions of the 
former Soviet Union these were more elite schools seen as preparing people for Higher 
Education. In practice therefore, the quality and length of schooling varied widely across the 
territories of the former Soviet block. In the Central European countries, following germanic 
traditions, the main divisions were between the schools preparing people for Universities 
(sometimes called gymnasium or lyceums) taking only about one quarter of pupils, the middle 
level technical schools taking roughly another quarter and the more common vocational schools 
which were the lowest tier of the educational system and absorbed about half of the school 
pupils, training them directly for the predominant manual jobs in heavy industries.
Schools were linked directly to the needs of a centrally planned economy and this was more 
strongly emphasized in the early years of communism, where in Poland, for example, the labour 
office put out labour contracts for each school leaver and their destination was controlled. By 
the 1980s however, the labour contract system had been abolished and young people were 
more free to choose their own training (Roberts et al. 1995). The jobs for which people were
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prepared were those of an economy based upon heavy industry, armaments and collectivized 
agriculture. In Russia, since unemployment was illegal, young people had to find a job within 3 
months of leaving school and the majority were simply allocated employment rather than 
choosing it. However, a growing minority were able to choose their own work placement, a 
trend that occurred during the 1980s and which continues now.
These patterns of transition were associated with the fact that young people in the eastern bloc 
countries completed all their transitions at an earlier stage than people in many western 
countries and this was linked to earlier family transitions which we discuss in the next chapter 
(Dennis 1985, Bertram 1992, Schober 1992). However, there was also great variation within 
welfare capitalist countries of western Europe. On account of the lack of development of the 
training system and the relatively short duration of the first degree (the three or four year 
‘Bachelor’ degree), the age-status transitions of young people in Britain tended to be relatively 
accelerated compared with those elsewhere in Europe - they could be through with their 
education and training and potentially into the labour market by 16 or in the case of Higher 
Education graduates, by the time they were 21. Under the Central European model, education 
and training continues until at least 17 or 18, albeit part-time and in most parts of Europe Higher 
degrees take a minimum of five years. Therefore age-status transitions tend to be more 
protracted. There are also differences between social groups with those lower down the social 
ladder making more accelerated transitions than those higher up because of the length of time 
before entering the labour market and earning sufficient income to become economically 
independent. This was also the case in communist systems.
In addition to the expansion of basic compulsory and secondary schooling, there was also an 
expansion of further and supplementary education throughout Europe, particularly after the 
Second World War. In Britain, the Further Educational Colleges, designed initially to provide off- 
the-job training for apprentices and other vocational qualifications, expanded and started to 
broaden their range of options to include general vocational courses and studying for academic 
qualifications (Gleeson 1987). The pace of change in this respect has been very rapid with a 
marked rise in the number of young western Europeans staying beyond compulsory education 
in school or training in the 1980s. Thus, whereas in 1987 35per cent had pursued some post- 
compulsory education or training, by 1990 this had risen to 42per cent (Chisholm and Bergeret 
1991:44). There were considerable variations between countries with about one third of 
students in the UK and one quarter of students in Italy still being found in vocational training a 
year after leaving school, as against 90per cent in Ireland and over 80per cent in Denmark 
(Eurostat 1992:97). In Germany, too, the variety of part-time and full-time vocational schools 
became increasingly popular over the post-war period, also offering a vocational as well as an 
academic path to University and in Bulgaria, various kinds of extension schools were provided 
by the communist regime so that people could combine work and study to improve their 
qualifications. In most Soviet-style socialist societies, young people could study at week-end 
and evening courses to improve their qualifications, and post-secondary professional schooling
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became more common up to the end of the 1980s. Indeed, this was a very important part of the 
communist education system. In Bulgaria more specialist evening courses were offered in 
subjects such as engineering and economics and one third of those doing extended study in 
Hungary and Poland were studying in this way (Adamski and Grootings 1989). Educational 
expanstion had the effect of stratifying young people by age within different stages and levels of 
the education system. However, at a later stage, age distinctions were more eroded because 
people could move in and out of education, they could do it part time or full-time at different 
points of their career.
In the communist half of Europe attempts to introduce equal opportunities in Education were far 
more extensive and could be rigorously imposed from the top down. Based upon an egalitarian 
ideology, these regimes explicitly tried to widen the access of working class and disadvantaged 
children through giving those from worker’s and peasant backgrounds greater opportunities 
through positive discrimination. In some countries there was also a quota for women. However, 
despite the official ideology of egalitarianism, a parallel system of privileges evolved which 
tended to undermine this. For example, in Bulgaria, a small elite set of foreign language and 
other specialized schools were founded which offered better education for a small number. The 
system of giving greater access to the sons and daughters of workers or to the children and 
grandchildren of 'active participants in the anti-fascist struggle’ or the 'heroes of socialist labour’ 
could be manipulated to give privileged access to the children of the political elite. This had a 
demoralizing effect on other children who had to work harder to gain a place in such a system 
and emphasized the lack of rights of teachers in the selection process. Parents in the political 
elite 'nomenklatura' families were able to pull strings and to exert additional influence to secure 
their children a place in Higher Education. In addition a system of bribery developed which 
further unofficially undermined the official egalitarian goals of communist education.
The problem in these former communist countries was that the educational expansion also 
raised the aspirations of pupils, so that an education and a professional job were much more 
highly prized than a manual job: this was exactly the opposite value to that promulgated in 
official propaganda in which workers were seen as the most important people. The economy, 
which was geared towards heavy industrial rather than service work, could not accommodate 
so many educated professionals, and so the problem became one of 'mis match' between the 
needs of the economy and the aspirations of individuals. This phenomenon was noted as early 
as the 1960s by the Russian sociologist Shubkin and reinforced by others studying this field 
since (Adamski and Grootings 1989). Surveys in Poland for example, found that the highest 
status profession was that of University Professor, followed by a director of a large industrial 
enterprise and then a physician (Worotynska 1985). These were all professions from the 
educational-administrative elite, a rather small strata in these countries. Furthermore, by the 
1980s the ’baby boom' created a new wave of young people seeking jobs. In conditions of full 
employment the only alternative was to ’over-employ’ people or to put them in trades which they 
did not want. Since the inefficiencies of the planned economy resulted in a permanent labour
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shortage, this was not difficult to do. A further factor was that the lyceums, gymnasiums and 
general secondary schools which prepared people for Higher Education did not prepare them 
very well for other levels of the occupational hierarchy. There were pressures to further 
vocationalize this academic level of education, especially since in countries such as Romania 
and Bulgaria and many parts of the Soviet Union most people attended the general secondary 
'grammar' school and the more vocational schools were much less developed than in Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. As new technologies were introduced into employment, so new 
forms of education were required. The response was to try to organize more vocationally 
oriented education and to extend the length of schooling. However, the results did not work as 
well as the reformers had hoped and the vocational stages of education were in practice greatly 
limited and not well targeted. One reason why the reforms did not work as the planners had 
hoped was that they failed to take into account young people's own preferences so that only 
one third of young people training in a given profession had any desire to work in that profession 
and only one fifth of those who had left school were happy with the preparation they had 
received there (Kutev 1983). In socialist societies, graduates expected to find a job which 
matches both their educational level and their professional training: sociology graduates 
expected to become sociologists and librarianship graduates to work in libraries. This 
precipitated.a 'legitimation crisis' which was more serious in communist countries where the 
ultimate fulfillment was supposed to be through participation in work, than in capitalist countries 
where 'mis match' could be more easily blamed upon the vagaries of the labour market.
In western European countries there were a range of further reforms in an attempt to modernize 
the educational systems from the 1960s onwards. A discourse developed around the fear that 
young people would enter 'dead end' jobs with no training and prospects. Furthermore, it was 
believed that earning a wage and enjoying a youth consumer culture would tempt young people 
away from education and training duties with their deferred gratification (Roberts 1984, 1985, 
Griffin 1993). Educational reforms aimed to raise the educational aspirations of pupils and thus 
to encourage them to seek better jobs with training and long-term prospects. This discourse 
was also prevalent in Germany (Gaiser et al. 1985). The result was that access to University 
was widened and the training and apprenticeship system in Germany expanded still further with 
a 'second educational route’ created to enable people to work their way up to Higher Education 
through vocational and other routes as well as the conventional academic school one (Wallace
1994). In Britain ‘Access’ and other courses offering alternative entrance to Higher Education 
had the same effect.
In both western and eastern Europe, educational expansion has been accompanied by rising 
aspirations. A combination of economic recession and the decreasing supply of training and 
work places, along with educational expansion meant there was more demand for education 
and increased competition for each place. This can be exemplified in Germany where there was 
an increasing tendency for young people to go into the higher tiers of the school system rather 
than the lower and more vocational tiers. Hence the numbers in grammar school (gymnasiums)
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increased from 20.5per cent to 31.1 per cent between 1960 and 1991 whereas those in the 
lowest tier schools fell from 64per cent to 33per cent in the same period (Bundesministier für 
Bildung und Wissenschaft 1992/3). One consequence of such trends in all countries has been 
that of 'certificate inflation' with larger numbers getting more qualifications. Thus, in Britain 
between 90per cent and 93per cent of young people left school with a qualification in 1988/9 as 
compared with 44per cent in 1970/1 (Social Trends 1992). The number and type of 
qualifications proliferated to such an extent that in more laissez faire Britain there was some 
confusion as to what they meant and an attempt to consolidate them into different bands or 
levels through a general national qualification system.
The situation in post-communist societies reflects these trends in a more extreme form. 
Whereas previously, people were trained for specific professions in accordance with centrally 
determined needs, they are no longer guaranteed jobs after their training and many of the links 
between education and enterprises have collapsed, especially at a local level. The response 
has been an increased demand for new skills - languages, computing, business studies - which 
schools have sought to provide, even though they have great difficulty attracting teachers with 
these competencies on low state salaries. Schools which have done this successfully are in 
great demand and in Poland some even work shifts to accommodate all the pupils. There is 
also an increased demand for longer and more general education so that 2 year courses have 
extended to 3 years and so on. More people want to attend the grammar schools rather than 
the vocational and apprenticeship schools as in the past and more want to go to Universities. 
Local Education Authorities in Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics have responded by trying 
to cut back vocational education and expand the more general education, especially at the 
higher levels. In Gdansk for example, in 1992 Grammar schools have increased their intake 
from 18per cent to 28per cent of young people over the previous three years, technical schools 
have increased from 20per cent to 24per cent whilst apprenticeship schools declined from 
62per cent to 48per cent (Roberts et al. 1995).
Some of this demand cannot be met by state provision and is met instead by a developing 
private sector. Private schools provide training in business, languages, information technology 
but there are also private grammar schools. Parental donations are also needed to keep state 
schools going and it was common even under communism for schools to accept 'voluntary 
contributions' from parents. This helped to pay for equipment and it meant that schools where 
parents were relatively wealthy could be very well equipped. However, those with poorer 
parents could become demoralized and shabby, especially when schools have also lost 
sponsorship from enterprises. The system of bribes, private tuition and voluntary donations 
continues in a more formalized way through the introduction of fees. Thus, the 'market model' of 
education includes encouragement towards privatization which is seen as one way of meeting 
demands which the state cannot fulfill.
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However, the education system was not changed in its main features. With little money to 
implement widespread reforms, the post-communist governments were forced to work within 
existing parameters. The first priority was seen as the need to change the orientation of 
education towards the needs of the pupil rather than towards the needs of the planned 
economy and this was done by decentralizing responsibility to the local level, trying to offer 
greater choice in schooling and schools and to give the directors of schools more scope to 
introduce their own initiatives and respond to market demand (Roberts et al. 1995). Extra funds 
were found through schemes schemes such as opening the school canteen as a facility for the 
general public. However, this also created tensions with teachers salaries falling still further 
behind that of other workers (from an already low level) and teachers being forced to take 
additional jobs to supplement them. These jobs often take the form of private tuition - a practice 
already prevalent before the fall of communism. There have been several waves of teacher's 
strikes in Bulgaria and Poland to protest against this situation.
Hence secondary education throughout Europe was expanded following the Second World War 
and started to assume a more important place in the filtering and selection of young people for 
the labour market. However, this also had other consequences including the extension of youth, 
raised aspirations and the increasing competition for places. Next we consider the implications 
for other levels of the educational system.
The increasing demand for Higher Education
One major impact of these reforms in western Europe was on Higher Education, which 
expanded substantially from the 1960s. In general the numbers in Higher Education in Europe 
rose by 30per cent between 1983 and 1993 and this continues a longer term trend (Eurostat
1995). In Britain, for example, the ratio of those in University went from 1 in 20 in 1955, to 1 in 
10 in 1967 and is now closer to 1 in 3 (Halsey et al. 1988, Social Trends 1996) and in Germany, 
where all those who pass the relevant school leaving examination are eligible to go to 
University, the numbers going into Higher Education increased sixfold between 1960 and 1994 
(Bundesministier für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie 1995/6). There has 
also been an increased number of people taking secondary degrees and post-tertiary 
professional training, thus extending the time taken in education.
Table 3.1. illustrates the numbers of people in Higher Education as a ratio of the population 
generally. In all countries there has been quite a dramatic climb even over 10 years, although in 
western Europe, this climb has been steeper than in eastern Europe (in Poland there was even 
a slight drop during the period of martial law). Differences between eastern and western Europe 
had therefore widened during the 1980s.
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Table 3.1. Higher Education per 100 000 inhabitants in 1980 and 1989/90
Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1992
In most educational systems in Europe, the basic degree takes five rather than three years as in 
Britain, but students can take even longer to finish their degree so that they have to fit other 
aspects of their life around Higher Education. For example they may take a paid job either part- 
time or full time for a while to make ends meet. In Britain too, young people frequently have to 
take paid employment in order to finance their studies as the value of student grants has been 
eroded. As the many routes through education and training have proliferated, so it becomes 
possible to take indirect paths through Higher Education, for example by people undertaking an 
apprenticeship before going to college or by working their way up through vocational courses 
until they are able to enter Higher Education. In a world where the outcomes is of education 
uncertain, this can be a form of insurance against possible future unemployment (Bynner and 
Roberts 1991). Students take longer to complete their education and average age of finishing a 
degree in Germany is now 28 years, whilst in Denmark many do not even begin their degrees 
until they are in their thirties, preferring to work for a few years first. This means that people can 
be in their thirties before they finish Higher Education and this has been the trend throughout 
the countries of Northern Europe. The educational reforms of the 1960s and 1970s in Britain 
and Germany helped to set up alternative Higher Education institutions where professional 
training could be combined with Higher Education studies. In this way the distinction between 
finishing education and starting working life is blurred. In Britain, although education has been 
extended, most people still finish their degrees in their early twenties. Yet even in Britain the 
increasing numbers of 'mature' students being admitted to Higher Education which has started 
to erode these age-status transitions at least for some groups of the population.
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These trends have turned Higher Education from being an elite pursuit into a form of mass 
education. In many continental Universities there are up to 50,000 students, although 
Universities in the UK tend to be much smaller. In many countries it is up to the student 
themselves to ensure that they attend the necessary seminars and have the right number of 
courses, and drop out rates can be very high - for example in Spain they are estimated at 80per 
cent (Planas 1985). As more people obtain degrees, so these are used increasingly as a 
filtering mechanism for the labour market and class of degree, subject of degree, which 
institution the degree was obtained from and so on, become more important (Ainly 1994). It is 
less the content of the degree which is therefore important so much as the access this provides 
to other opportunities.
In the communist-dominated half of Europe, the very success of the schooling system meant 
that there was an increasing demand for Higher Education from all social groups. However, the 
numbers wanting to enter Higher Education were far higher than those who actually able to get 
in - in Russia for example, one survey estimated that between 60per cent and 85per cent of 
young people aspired to Higher Education (Babushinka 1985). Higher Education became one of 
the routes to mobility and a career in the Communist Party, although people also valued 
education for its own sake (Stefanov 1983). A University level education did not lead to the 
highest paid jobs, which were manual ones, but parents in the 'intelligentsia' were nevertheless 
put a very high value on University education and would go to great efforts to secure their 
children a place there either formally or informally through manipulating connections or by 
offering bribes.
In the communist-dominated half of Europe, the education system was designed explicitly to 
equalize opportunities for young people from different social strata. One way in which this was 
carried out was by offering more points to the children from worker's or peasant's families. In 
Czechoslovakia the sons and daughters of the middle class were so effectively discriminated 
against, that a generation was almost missing from Universities from these classes (Mateju and 
Rohakova 1993). In Bulgaria 'workers faculties' were introduced which were intended to 
compensate those from more disadvantaged backgrounds by offering a 'short cut' into Higher 
Education without passing the normal entrance examinations. These were intended as 
transitional, compensatory devices to compensate for the disadvantages „that fascism put over 
talented boys and girls from poor backgrounds" (Znepolski 1959: 127), but they continued in a 
modified form until 1989 as a means by which nomenklatura children could obtain a higher 
degree without going through the normal competition.
The numbers of those in Higher Education grew not only in full time but also in part-time 
courses. In Bulgaria, as in other countries this was particularly important for women who 
accounted for 58 per cent of young people in this category in 1990/1 and also helped those who 
were married or from poorer families. In Britain the inception of the Open University, providing 
opportunities for part-time study at home opened similar opportunities for working people and
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for women. From its foundation in 1972 it has swelled to become the largest University in 
Britain. The former Polytechnics and Colleges also offered a variety of evening degrees which 
could be taken part-time or as part of in-service training (Ainly 1994).
In western Europe this rising popularity of Higher Education was matched by a rising demand 
for young graduates on the labour market, although not all of them are able to get jobs 
commensurate with their qualifications: the degree holding taxi-driver is as much a feature of 
late capitalist Europe as the executive or the politician with a doctorate. A degree became a 
requirement for entry into many professions although the subject of the degree did not matter 
and few expected to continue working in the subject of their degree. In eastern European 
countries where full employment was guaranteed, everybody had a job, but not necessarily the 
job they wanted. Many had to go into jobs which were lower than that for which they were 
qualified, producing a frustrated and disgruntled layer of people who later helped to fuel the 
transformations of 1989 and afterwards.
In the post-communist situation the status of a Higher Education degree has changed. Initially, 
Higher Education graduates were particularly vulnerable to unemployment and many were 
forced to take low status jobs - such as waitress or cleaner - in order to make ends meet 
(Kovatcheva 1995). At first therefore there was a decline in applications for Higher Education in 
some countries. The declining status of University and research personnel vis-a-vis the new 
rising economic elites makes obtaining a degree a less attractive option and the lack of 
economic rewards associated with Higher Education continued in the post-communist era. 
Hence, in Kovatcheva's (1995) study one graduate expressed her disappointment with the fact 
that as a journalist she was still earning less money than a cleaning lady. In Bulgaria the 
number of applicants to Higher Education has declined by 15per cent between 1992 and 
1989/90 with growth only in applications for economics or medical schools (Ministry of 
Education and Science, Bulgaria, 1992) One important reason for this is the decline in student 
living standards. Whereas before 1989, 50per cent of students had received state grants and 
the rest were sponsored by a state organization in return for work after their graduation, with the 
changes all such contracts had since been canceled (World Bank 1991). Student grants no 
longer kept up with the high inflation and it became more difficult to buy books as price 
liberalization put these out of the reach of most students. The main problem was the very large 
difference between what was needed to maintain Higher Education and what the state budget 
granted. One way of compensating for this shortfall was to charge fees for courses.
The post-communist labour market does not offer opportunities for specialized graduates - for 
example in ecology or English literature because many of the research academies and 
institutes have closed down or been reduced in personnel.’ However, in the longer term the 
prospects for the more educated are better than those for the less educated. Evidence suggests 
that the situation of University graduates in the employment market is improving - in Bulgaria 
they constituted 41per cent of the unemployed in 1990 but by June 1992 they had declined to
1 H S — Wallace and Kovatcheva /  Changing Times, Changing Lives —  79
22per cent (Sapio Resarch Centre 1992). As in western Europe, undertaking a degree was a 
way of postponing entry into an uncertain labour market and increasing ones human capital, 
even though it was not clear how valuable an asset this might be in the future. The result was 
that from the mid 1990s there was an increased demand for places in Higher Education and 
the numbers of students expanded (Roberts et al. 1995).
Some of the newer disciplines such as Business Studies and Economics are very popular and 
new Business schools and colleges have started to open. Graduates with foreign languages, 
computing or survey skills (from such disciplines as sociology) are able to get jobs in marketing 
where these are available and opinion polling has become a growth industry benefiting low paid, 
moonlighting professors. Private enterprise is meeting some of these demands with 
commercially funded schools opening and ordinary universities are compensating for the cuts in 
state financing by charging fees to students who do not receive scholarships as the competition 
for places increases and new part-time degrees have been introduced to meet this demand. In 
all post-communist countries more of the costs have been passed back to the consumers of 
education with astonishing speed. However, as the number of places in Higher Education has 
risen, the quality has not always risen correspondingly, with some qualifications granted on a 
rather dubious basis and educational standards generally lower with less selection.
Rising unemployment and the expansion of training
Rising unemployment from the 1970s onwards at first caused shock and disbelief in the 
prosperous North Western European countries which had enjoyed a long period of growth and 
full-employment, although It was a more familiar situation for the poorer southern countries of 
Europe. Young people were particularly badly affected in all regions. Table 3.2 indicates the 
percentage of the under 25s which were out of work in different western European countries. It 
is evident that there are wide variations, but that in countries such as Spain, Italy and France 
there is a substantial problem of youth unemployment and it has also increased dramatically in 
Sweden. In Germany and Austria, where there was traditionally very little youth unemployment, 
it is starting to climb too. In each country young men are more likely to be unemployed than 
young women. This may be because young women do not register, or once they are married 
are counted as 'housewives’. However, it could also reflect the fact that the new service 
industries favour the employment of women and the jobs which have disappeared are often the 
'traditional' industrial male jobs.
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Table 3.2 Percentage of under 25s unemployed in Western European Countries. Males 
and Females compared, 1996
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In Post-communist countries unemployment has become a recent and very dramatic problem, 
since these are economies with little previous experience of unemployment and little ability to 
cope with the phenomenon. The rapid fall in output and loss of export markets following the 
collapse of communism and the former communist trading arrangements lead to a rapid rise in 
unemployment with young people being particularly vulnerable. In Poland 30per cent of those 
under 25 were out of work in 1992, along with 20per cent of those in Hungary. In Romania half 
of those registering as unemployed were under 30 and this figure was 45per cent in Bulgaria. In 
the former Czechoslovakia, with the lowest unemployment, it was still the case that there were 
more than twice as many young unemployed as other groups (Eurostat 1993b). Long term 
unemployment is increasing in these countries and it is the unskilled and women who are the 
most likely to be unemployed. There are therefore features common to western European 
countries.
By the early 1980s it was clear in western European countries that the problem was not going to 
disappear and that beginning workers were structurally disadvantaged in the labour market. In 
Britain this meant that traditional apprenticeship and employment opportunities disappeared and 
everywhere new skills and styles of work were required. The institutional response was to 
create measures especially aimed at young people: they were therefore 'targeted' for 
intervention. Those countries such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland, where extensive 
training schemes already existed, expanded them still more to absorb a new wave of young 
workers. Those countries where training had previously been limited, (such as Britain, France
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and Italy) more schemes were introduced. The schemes took a number of different forms 
which addressed either labour demand (adjusting the labour market) or labour supply (adjusting 
young people) and which are summarized below:
Demand-side schemes
1. Schemes to encourage employers to retain workers by paying them, for example, not to 
make redundancies. Examples of this are the various kinds of temporary work subsidy 
schemes that prevailed in the UK during the 1970s when unemployment was first a problem 
and were intended to balance the cyclical irregularities of labour demand. Another example is 
the 'Warteschleife' schemes used in Eastern Germany after unification as a way of avoiding 
mass redundancies.
2. Schemes to encourage employers to employ more young workers - for example through a 
special payment for each employee, or as in Germany, by levying a payroll tax for not 
employing sufficient young workers (Koditz 1985).
3. The expansion of existing training places by employers. In Germany employers themselves 
expanded training places in response to the recession (Rose and Winangek 1990).
4. Extending the age of compulsory education. This was carried out in Britain in 1972 when the 
school leaving age was raised from 15 to 16. Although ostensibly for educational reasons, this 
reform was delayed until the onset of youth unemployment and conveniently reduces the size of 
the potential labour force - particularly amongst those likely to become unemployed, such as 
early school leavers. In some parts of Germany an additional school year was added.
Supply-side schemes
5. Training schemes inside the workplace funded fully or partially by state agencies. An 
example of this would be British Youth Training which paid an allowance to young people and 
placed them with employers. Employers got a free trainee worker, although under later versions 
of this scheme they had to contribute something towards the cost. This was used after 1992 in 
the Czech Republic where it was called the 'assistants and practicants' scheme.
6. Training schemes outside the workplace in special centres or workshops. Such schemes are 
often designed for those who are 'hard to employ' and provide specialist work training in a 
setting designed usually to simulate a work setting in some way. These exist in most western 
European countries.
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7. Job creation schemes involving various kinds of socially useful work. There are examples 
from many countries. These are usually jobs such as clearing cemeteries (schemes such as 
this exist both in the Czech Republic and Britain) or decorating churches. They are usually jobs 
which would not have been undertaken by normal municipal or other services. They are often 
organized by charitable organizations.
8. College courses for the young unemployed. Examples of this would be various German 
schemes for adding an additional vocational preparation year to the existing school-work 
transition. In Britain these were implemented too.
9. Grants to encourage small businesses and self-employment. Examples of this would be the 
schemes developed in the eastern regions of Germany or the Enterprise Allowance scheme in 
the UK. Similar schemes have been introduced into the Czech Republic and Poland but lack of 
resources and expertise means their impact has been limited.
10. Job Clubs for the unemployed to meet and overcome the demoralization associated with 
isolation and the many failed applications which unemployment brings. Job Clubs may offer 
facilities like a telephone or typewriters and may encourage skills such as how to write a letter of 
application or a personal resume. In the UK, participation in Job Clubs can be,a compulsory 
requirement for those claiming benefits.
11. Reduction of young people's wages in order to make them cheap to employ. This has taken 
place in Britain through a variety of schemes as well as by dismantling wage protection and is 
currently being implemented in France.
12. Giving credits or vouchers to young people for education and training as was done in the 
UK.
Examples of all these can be found in many different countries. They resemble one another 
insofar as they involve some targeted intervention by the state. However, the problem with 
linking training to measures to deal with unemployment is that the training becomes devalued; 
training schemes start to acquire a bad reputation as 'warehouses' for the unemployed and 
commitment to such schemes falls. They also come under criticism for being open to 
exploitation by employers who are able to get a cheap (or free) young worker and do not always 
provide good training for them. There has been much discussion of these schemes in Britain 
and of the discourse of ‘new vocationalism' generally (Finn 1987, Hollands 1981, Cockburn 
1987). Individualization here meant that young people were responsible for managing their own 
training and employment with increasingly uncertain outcomes. Creations of 'portfolios’ of skills 
and curriculum vitaes for all levels reinforced the idea of skills being something which the 
individual had to find and to carry around with them. Inventing CVs became a skill in itself.
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In some post-communist countries the response has been to introduce 'intervention' schemes of 
various kinds based upon western experience and often using western aid from such sources 
as the ILO or the Know-How fund (Cranston 1992, Fabian 1991, Demcak 1991). In East 
Germany, the most developed and widely implemented intervention schemes exist because 
they could be funded from West Germany. In addition, new special measures were introduced 
which were designed to make vocational training less dependent upon large industries and to 
encourage the growth of the small business sector. In the former Czechoslovakia an active 
labour market policy was pursued which resulted in a decrease in the number of young people 
out of work and meant they were no longer seen as the most problematical group. However, in 
most post-communist countries, the dramatic rise in youth unemployment is not met by any 
initiatives or training schemes, and in spite of an enthusiasm for such solutions in principle, the 
hard pressed Labour Offices have been too concerned with trying to administer newly created 
unemployment benefits systems with very limited resources to be able to deal with any new 
intervention schemes. Although the rate of unemployment is not as high in the former Soviet 
Union, there is much hidden unemployment as people are registered at a place of work in order 
to be eligible for pensions and official benefits but in fact there is no work and they are sent 
home with no or partial pay and may even be working somewhere else such as in the informal 
economy.
Another problem in the post-communist youth labour market is that young people are trained for 
the wrong jobs, since training and education was linked to the old heavy in industries instead of 
the providing much needed new skills in service industries and information technology. The 
disappearance of traditional jobs and training places for young people that began as industries 
started to rationalize particularly affected the apprenticeship schools, home of approximately 
half the young people in Poland, Hungary and Czech and Slovak Republics. These training 
places had previously been tied to local enterprises and provided trainees for them, but now 
they have to find placements with private enterprises instead. In Poland those schools which 
failed to attract placements, and therefore pupils, were allowed to go bankrupt, whereas others 
in areas such as catering' and distribution found themselves increasingly popular. This 
application of market criteria was a way of introducing some reform in the educational system. 
New market pressures forced schools to respond creatively in order to survive, since funds 
were scarce and reform was needed. Schools were accustomed to negotiating with employers 
for placements and fulfilling the needs of the local economy so many of them were able to find 
alternative placements for their students and some forced the students to find placements for 
themselves (Roberts et al. 1995). This flexibility is partly a response to a situation where there is 
an awareness that everything must change.
The expansion of training has therefore helped .to prolong and extend the youth phase in most 
countries and the introduction of intervention schemes have contributed towards this. These 
changes have broken down the old patterns of secure, staged transition, created by 
modernization, especially in the post-Communist countries, and replaced this with a more risky
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and uncertain situation where training and education is more indefinite. This also reflects 
changes In the labour market to which we now turn.
New Trends in the Labour Market
Modernization helped to concentrate workers into mass industries and to divide the labour 
market according to different segments and levels of skill. The mass production model found in 
both industry and in services has been termed ‘fordist’ after the alleged inventor of the 
production line (Amin 1994). In East Europe fordism was even more evident. In western 
Europe, young people have different ports of entry depending upon factors such as their age, 
their qualifications, their gender, their ethnicity and where they live (Ashton and Maguire 1986). 
Some sectors of the labour market are reserved exclusively for young workers whereas in 
others they may be competing with married women or migrant workers. In this competition they 
are likely to be disadvantaged. Whilst some jobs may offer internal promotion and access to 
extended careers in others there are only lower level jobs in the 'secondary labour market' 
which are likely to be low paid and casualized with frequent lay offs and redundancies. Thus the 
labour market Is not an open competition with buyers and sellers of labour but Is socially 
structured. However, the situation of clear layers of young people with different kinds of career 
described by Ashton and Maguire (1977) or Paul Willis (1977) is likewise a thing of the past as 
labour market destinations are more uncertain and subject to frequent change.
The nature of work has itself been changing in recent years according to some sociologists 
(Lash and Urry 1987). The restructuring of the 1970s killed off some of the traditional 
manufacturing industries and with them have gone traditional male jobs and crafts. The 
globalization of economies, particularly the opening of frontiers for capital and industry in 
Europe has had profound effects. Thus it is no longer necessary for all functions of the firm to 
be located in one place - manufacturing of cars can take place in Spain whereas the 
headquarters of the industry could be in Munich. The high social protection which characterizes 
many European labour markets raises the cost of labour. The post-communist countries have 
the advantage of lower wages in the competition for industry, but social protection is also high. 
Industries can move around in search of cheaper premises, often following regional subsidies, 
and some have moved out of Europe altogether into the third world countries which now 
produce the steel and ships which used to be made in core industrial regions such as Britain. 
The possibility of importing cheap fuel from eastern Europe, keeps low-paid Polish miners in 
work but means that mines can be closed in Britain and hence there is an international re­
division of labour, even within Europe. This can mean rapid changes in skills and labour 
demand. This has been linked to changing styles of work sometimes termed 'post fordism' with 
a retreat from large-scale manufacturing and services and a movement towards 'flexibility' - that 
is, short term, temporary and part-time work, often on a contract basis, often described as 'post- 
fordism1. Although the extent of this is variable across Europe, this has replaced the expectation 
of a job for life and a person can expect to have to re-enter training or education and change 
career at several points in a life-time, which also blurs the character of age-status transitions.
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The disappearance of full-time jobs for young people has been accompanied by the growth of 
part-time and casual jobs. A typical example is the growth of young people’s employment in 
Burger bars (“MacJobs") where pay is low, turnover is high and the workers are as disposable 
as the products. Furthermore, the expansion in education along with the simultaneous erosion 
of grants and stipends has meant that many young people work their way through college or 
training schemes by doing extra casual jobs. The formal labour market has shrunk, but the 
casual and informal one has grown. Students and trainees work in retail and catering jobs, in 
seasonal agricultural jobs and in temporary holiday relief both whilst at school and afterwards 
(Wallace 1987, Finn 1987, Griffin 1985). Unemployment has added to this with large numbers of 
young unemployed in Southern Europe existing on casual seasonal employment. According to 
Coles (1995) a whole parallel labour market in some inner city areas absorbs many of those 
who are not in training, not in education and not in work, offering alternative, semi-criminal 
careers. The rewards from this can be much higher than those from low paid ‘shit schemes and 
govvy jobs’ (Coffield et al. 1986).
The development of a market for labour in post-communist countries increasingly resembles the 
situation in western Europe. The most disadvantaged are the unqualified, the children of ethnic 
minorities, migrants and women. These groups find themselves at the bottom of the market. 
Young people are also more vulnerable than other groups. This has helped to fuel an increasing 
demand for education and has increased the relative disadvantage of minority groups. The 
nature of jobs has changed too in post-communist countries. For example, Koklyagina reports 
from Russia that young people are more likely to enter the services and catering sectors than 
heavy industries (Koklyagina 1992). Those with language and computing skills are likely to be in 
great demand, as salaries and fringe benefits become increasingly differentiated within labour 
markets. However, it is not necessarily the most highly skilled jobs which attract the highest 
salaries any more. In a recent survey in Poland a petrol pump attendant was earning more than 
a University professor (Roberts et al. 1995).
In post-communist countries too the 'shadow labour market1 for working students is important 
since there are fewer grants than there are students and their value has fallen. As in western 
Europe, the informal economy provides some compensation with opportunities for trading 
goods, for acting as salespeople, for selling small wares and services having increased. In 
areas of high unemployment, informal economic activity is the only way of earning a living; in 
agricultural areas there is the possibility of work on family farms. For example, informal activities 
were extensively practiced in parts of Poland where goods could be bought from the eastern 
borders and either sold at a profit within Poland or further west at a profit. Young people would 
finance their holidays in western Europe by bringing tradeable items with them, sometimes 
bought from Russian and Ukrainian traders who are not able to travel further west. Young 
people are able to pass easily backwards and forwards to the EU countries without visas from 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics and some use this to work temporarily 
abroad, earn money and bring it back or learn a language.
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These developments have changed the life conditions of young people in post-communist 
countries. Their transition period has become more protracted and the outcomes more 
uncertain: whereas in the past training lead to a work placement, now it no longer does so. A 
study by Bertram (1992) which has replicated the same questions to young people since 1972, 
found that young people have become more career oriented and more concerned with the 
prestige of the career they pursued. On the other hand they had lost some of their concern with 
doing socially useful work and had become more materialist and individualized in their goals. 
Titma (n.d.) found that in the former Soviet Union there had been changes in work values some 
years before perestroika and that material rewards and job security had already started to 
become important values. However, he also found continuity in the desire to do socially useful 
work and to see work as a source of prestige and creativity. In fact young people are adapting 
more flexibly and readily to changing labour markets than are other groups. They are more 
open to learning new skills and they are more mobile.
In western Europe, according to some surveys, a 'post material' attitude is developing among 
young people in the affluent countries. In Germany successive surveys have found the 
development of attitudes associated with self-fulfillment outside of work rather than career 
success (Zinnecker and Fuchs 1981). In Spain too, the response to the lack of employment 
opportunities was to eschew a conventional work ethic and see casual work as an advantage 
(Chisholm and Bergeret 1991). However, such trends should not be exaggerated. Other 
surveys in Britain found that young people on the whole wanted to work even when few jobs 
were available (Banks et al. 1992).
Stratification
In all countries the transition from school through education, training and into work is stratified, 
but these patterns of stratification are changing too with developments in industry and in 
education itself. Furthermore, by casting a look across the European continent we can see 
more dramatic and structural forms of stratification than when we are looking at any one 
country. Next we consider some of the issues which stratify young people in the transition from 
school to work: educational and social background, gender and ethnicity. Although these are 
not the only forms of stratification, they are the best documented.
a Educational level and social background
In western Europe social background has been a predictor of post school careers with those 
from higher social backgrounds being more likely to have children who enter the higher levels of 
the labour market offering more extended careers (Ashton and Field 1976). Education played a 
mediating role and whilst it offered some opportunities for social mobility, educational success 
often reflected the social background of the person (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). However, 
the extent to which this happen varied between different countries. In Germany the existence of 
an educational-administrative elite was associated with a strong tendency to encourage their 
children educationally and therefore to reproduce itself (Müller and Karle 1993). Indeed some
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have argued that the school system actually prepares young people for specific sections of the 
labour market either through codes of behaviour transmitted by the system itself (Bowles and 
Gintis 1976) or through the sub-cultures created within the school or training scheme which 
encourage self selection (Willis 1977, Bates and Riseborough 1993). However, Jones (1987) 
has indicated that processes of social reproduction can be quite complicated because it is some 
time before young people reach their final class destination. Their first jobs on leaving school 
may not be the final one. The increasing competition and selection function exercised by the 
school mean that a high achieving 'track' with those destined for higher education, and probably 
higher careers can be identified. These are an increasingly privileged group who not only have 
better jobs in the long term, but better life styles and access to material resources in the short 
term too.
Working class school leavers used to be identified by the fact that they mostly left school at the 
minimum age and went into work. They selected themselves by dropping out of the educational 
race at an early stage, but had the advantage of higher incomes and access to consumer 
culture in the short term. This is no longer the case. The collapse of the youth labour market 
since the 1970s means that those from working class background go not into work but into 
unemployment or into schemes or college courses. They are now the most disadvantaged in 
access to employment. Their incomes are low or non existent with more limited access to 
leisure and cultural resources. Their situation has deteriorated relative to other groups of young 
people and are described in one study as having 'no career' (Bynner and Roberts 1991). About 
10-20per cent of these constitute the 'educational subclass' who are alienated from school, 
disadvantaged in work and in training and likely to be unemployed. They are also increasingly 
likely to be the homeless, the runaways and those falling into lives of crime (Coles 1995).
There are however, a large group of young people between these two extremes who go into 
employment through various training and educational courses. These are a less easily definable 
group. The numbers in these different categories is variable between different countries - there 
are more for example in the 'no career' group in Britain than in Germany. What is clear is that 
the different strata of young people are defined by not just social background but also 
interaction with training and education systems. Amongst young people in extended transition, 
social strata are defined by these training and educational schemes rather than by the labour 
market which they do not enter until later.
In communist countries too, stratification according to social background was important 
although those from working class backgrounds were more likely to be socially mobile on 
account of the policies of positive discrimination. Nevertheless there was more similarity with 
western countries in terms of social reproduction than we might expect and variations could be 
better explained by the way in which a country industrialized than by the fact that it was 
capitalist or communist according to Mateju (1990) and Andorka (1990). Although those with 
the best education did not necessarily receive the best rewards under communism, there was a
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strong tendency for the education elite to reproduce itself and where parents could not pass on 
property to their children, securing a good education for them was a prime value. The early 
educational expansion under socialism in countries like Bulgaria lead to dramatic patterns of 
mobility. By the 1970s roughly one third of those in Higher Education came from educated 
families, 37per cent from fathers educated only to secondary level, 23per cent with fathers 
educated only to primary level and 3.7per cent with even less education (Stefanov 1981, 
Dimitrov K. 1986). In the post-communist situation, new forms of stratification have been 
emerging in these societies with the creation of a new economic elite - some of whom were also 
members of the previous elite (Mateju 1993). What is emerging is that the twin pressures of 
increasing demand for education at all levels and declining state funding means that there is an 
increasing number of people in Higher Education on the one hand (the shortfall in state funded 
places being met by the private and part-time degree sector) and growing illiteracy and a 
decline in educational standards on the other.
Young people become increasingly dependent upon the state or upon parents during this long 
transition, a subject which is further addressed in the next chapter (Jones and Wallace 1992). 
Thus social background has a new dimension, because it is increasingly the financial resources 
of the parents and the extent to which they are able or willing to support young people which will 
determine the resources of the young person. With education in post-communist countries 
being increasingly privatized, it is often the parents ability to support young people which is 
important. Certainly in more home-centred societies such as exist in central and eastern Europe 
(see chapter 4) those households with more highly educated parents were also more likely to 
have access to a range of consumer goods and were able to offer their children additional 
advantages such as travel abroad. In western Europe too, the competitive advantages of young 
people who have to stay in an ever-extending education and training system could depend 
increasingly upon the degree of support and financial subsidy they receive from parents.
However, other forms of stratification are also emerging as important and regional differences 
within Europe are important, The difference between the Southern European and Northern 
European countries is striking in terms of opportunities for young people and linked to this is an 
urban/rural divide which does not exist in urbanized counties such as Britain or the Netherlands. 
Where the urban/rural divide does exist however, there can be great contrasts between the 
limited life opportunities of those in rural areas and those in urban areas with better access to 
educational and cultural facilities and more diversified labour markets. Rural deprivation 
continues to be a factor in the post-communist countries where rapid urbanization stripped the 
countryside of young people (Bridger 1989). The concentration of educational facilities in major 
cities mean that young people have to move in order to be educationally mobile. The migration 
of young people to urban centres such as Moscow also takes place because of the increased 
cultural resources there. However, in parts of Northern Europe rural areas can be quite 
prosperous and with good communications facilities need not be disadvantaged.
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Other kinds of regional difference include the variation between labour markets. In a local labour 
market dominated by mining for example a different set of values would be transmitted to young 
people than one dominated by the electronics industries or financial services. The horizons of 
most young people are set by the prospects of the local labour market which also tends to 
create its own set of cultural values. An Anglo-German study for example found that there were 
wide disparities in young people's prospects between expanding and contracting labour markets 
within each country. In Germany such disparities where smoothed out to some extent by the 
existence of an elaborated training system whereas in Britain young people relied more directly 
on the labour market {Bynner and Roberts 1991, Evans and Heinz 1994). Prospects in local 
labour markets affected the likelihood of staying at school and the likelihood of entering a 
scheme rather than a job directly. Similar disparities between local opportunities were found in 
Poland (Roberts et al. 1995). The lack of comprehensive 'intervention' schemes and the 
geographical reorientation of the labour markets (those near the western borders start to 
become advantaged rather than disadvantaged as in the past) mean that there is increasing 
diversification between labour markets for young people.
In this section we have tried to indicate that whilst the traditional factors such as social 
background continue to affect young people's prospects, the significance of social background 
may be changing with the effects of extended transition. The most disadvantaged are no longer 
those who enter the labour market at the minimum age, but rather those with no jobs or on poor 
quality training schemes. Other factors are also important in the reproduction of social 
advantage or disadvantage and to these we now turn.
b. Gender differences
The educational reforms which we have been describing affected young women particularly. In 
the European Union the number of young women in in Higher Education rose from 45per cent 
in 1983 to 49per cent in 1993 and this reflects a much longer trend whereby young women are 
catching up with and even over-taking young men in the higher levels of the education system. 
In central and eastern Europe too, young women were some of the main beneficiaries of the 
reforms. In Bulgaria, for example, a very traditional patriarchal ideology had prevailed before 
the war which meant that girls were not likely to continue in education beyond the minimum age 
and formed the majority of the illiterate population or those with only elementary education in 
1946. By 1956 they had caught up with men in secondary education and by 1965 they formed 
the majority in Higher Education and more than half of those with a degree are now women 
(Semov 1972). Table 3.3 indicates the relative position of women within different educational 
systems and it can be seen that in some communist countries they have overtaken men. In 
general the percentage of women in Higher Education in West European countries is between 
40 and 50 per cent whereas in communist countries it is frequently over 50per cent. In all 
countries, except for the former Soviet Union, the trend is for the number of women in Higher 
Education to increase compared to men.
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Table 3.3 Percentage of Women in Higher Education
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Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1992
Some people argue that this illustrates that gender differences are dissolving in the late 
twentieth century (Zinnecker 1990). However, closer inspection reveals that women are 
concentrated in particular educational sectors in all countries, which tends to lead to lower paid 
jobs and 'feminized' professions. According to Krüger (1989, 1990) they spend a longer time in 
education only to get worse jobs. In Germany the multi-route educational and training system 
tended to encourage young men to raise their aspirations as they moved through it at each 
stage, whereas It had the opposite effect on young women who were 'cooled out' by the long 
period of training (Wallace 1994).
Once they leave education women still go into gender segregated sections of the labour market 
and this is evident in the training they receive. In those countries where training is highly 
structured, women are more often found within those sections of the training system which lead 
them to feminized careers routes. In Germany, for example, there are institutionalised lines of 
gender segregation in the professions that are pursued by women and those pursued by men, 
with some two thirds of girls concentrated in retail, clerical and hairdressing training: whilst 
males were far more dispersed through a variety of trades, these were nevertheless more 
recognizable as 'craft' and technical training (Bundesministier für Jugend, Familie, Frauen und 
Gesundheit 1986). Furthermore, whereas 73per cent went to on to do additional second stage 
training, only 27per cent of females did. The schemes associated with girls are the ones most 
likely to last two rather than three years, leading to lower status, lower paid jobs (Mayer, Krüger, 
Rabe-Kleberg and Schütte 1983). Even in terms of apprenticeship pay, girls fared
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comparatively worse, getting only one half to one third of the pay in male-dominated 
occupations.
In Britain, the more laissez faire approach to training nevertheless resulted in gender 
segregation. Training schemes were shaped by the character of the local labour market and by 
those who administer the schemes to a much greater extent than in Germany. Consequently, 
young women were found concentrated in schemes linked to traditional areas of female 
employment - mainly in 3 occupational training areas whereas young men were spread across 
7 occupational training areas. Thus, whilst the training group 'Installation, Maintenance and 
Repair was 96per cent male, that of 'Community, Health and Social Services' was 86per cent 
female (Cockburn 1987). Sexist ideologies infused the training system, even where girls 
resisted it, so that even when they were introduced into non-traditional training they ended up 
doing female tasks - such as sewing the seat covers in car maintenance classes (Cockburn 
1987, Stafford 1991). The off-the-job training often emphasized female comportment and 
presentation for young women. Youth training thus tended to reinforce gender ideologies rather 
than to undermine them.
Why was there this persistent pattern? Previously, women were not expected to have full-time 
careers in the labour market and a job was just something temporary, but this generation of 
young women do expect to spend most of their lives in the labour market. Young women suffer 
bias when they receive advice in looking for jobs and in their treatment from employers and 
trainers: a 'good job for a girl' is seen as service work and money is not thought to be so 
important for them because they are mainly concerned with getting married (Sharpe 1976). 
Furthermore, girls are socialized into family roles which tend to lower their aspirations for 
careers even where women no longer expect to give up work for a family. It is difficult for 
women who reject such gender stereo-types to maintain their stance (Stafford 1991). Female 
jobs tend to reflect the characteristics of family roles and the stereotypes of femininity and tend 
to be lower status and lower paid. More recent feminist work tends to emphasize the way which 
different kinds of work and training continually creates femininity rather than reflecting it (Adkins
1995)
In communist countries another pattern prevailed because women worked full time and gender 
equality was one of the proclaimed goals of socialist society. Women had to do the same jobs 
as men - often involving heavy manual work - and their production quotas were the same. It is 
evident from Table 3.3 that women benefited particularly from educational reforms, being the 
majority in Higher Education in some countries. Young women in Poland were more likely to 
attend the general secondary schools (the equivalent of 'grammar' schools) than to the 
secondary professional, vocational or apprenticeship schools with the result that they were 
more likely to have a general education that equipped them for University (Roberts et al. 1995). 
But although boys and girls covered the same curriculum at school, young women nevertheless 
entered 'feminized' sections of the labour force - paradoxically some of these feminized
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professions, such as medicine, were masculine ones in the western Europe. Even in East 
Germany, where gender equality was the highest, in 1987 women entered just 16 of the 
possible 259 professions (Nickel 1990). Childcare provision paradoxically helped to keep 
women in lower status jobs in the professional hierarchy because taking time off to look after 
children (up to three years) could discourage employers from employing women. In most 
communist countries women earned only 70per cent of men's wages (Corrin 1992) and some 
evidence suggest that it was very difficult for women to break into men's jobs. In rural areas of 
Russia for example, women found it almost impossible to get into those agricultural trades with 
technical training with the result that very few of them ever became the tractor drivers which 
symbolized gender equality under socialism (Bridger 1989). Thus, although women had to do 
heavy manual jobs, this did not improve their general situation vis-a-vis men in the workplace.
Since marketization, women have suffered the highest unemployment in most post-communist 
societies (Einhorn 1992). Enterprises have cut child care facilities and the right to long maternity 
leave mean that employers are less willing to employ women (in Poland they have even 
sometimes made women sign an agreement that they would not have children whilst in their 
employment). They are in the feminized sectors and as income differentials widen, women are 
left further behind with the lowest wages and the worst employment prospects (Bertram 1993, 
Meier, Schmid and Winzen 1992). The possibilities for independence for young women have 
been weakened, especially in the former East Germany where there was the most support for 
women and the highest numbers of single parents. However, there are some brighter prospects 
too. Women, especially young women, are the best educated and since a general education is 
a more useful qualification on the labour market that training in a vocational trade or an 
apprenticeship, it could be that the long term prospects for some women are not so bleak. It is 
likely that new divisions will emerge for women in different labour markets and family situations.
It is thus evident that whilst women were some of the main beneficiaries of educational reforms, 
particularly in former communist countries, they do not necessarily benefit from this in the labour 
market. This tendency has been reinforced with the move towards market economies in post­
communist countries.
c. Ethnic minorities
Ethnic minority status takes different forms in the different parts of Europe and the extent of their 
disadvantage in both the short and the long term is variable. In Britain, those from ethnic 
minorities were disadvantaged in the labour market because they suffered disadvantage in the 
education system and because they are likely to live in parts of Britain hit by industrial decline 
and rising unemployment. Some ethnic minorities have a higher risk of becoming unemployed 
than others with Afro-Caribean and Guyanese suffering 11 per cent unemployment in Britain as 
against 7per cent of white people, 9per cent of Indians and 17per cent of Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
minority groups in Britain in 1990 (Social Trends 1992). Some research has indicated that even 
when they have higher qualifications, those from ethnic minorities find it harder to get jobs than
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their white counterparts (Roberts, Duggan and Noble 1982, Wrench and Lee 1983). The 
experience of job search amongst ethnic minority youth is affected by the direct discrimination 
they receive from employers and from indirect discrimination - the fact that their face does not fit 
the employer's stereotype of a conventional worker and the fact that the firm may rely on word- 
of-mouth recruitment through its existing staff (Jenkins and Troyna 1983). They are also more 
likely to use the statutory services in their search for jobs. Jenkins and Troyna (1983) point out 
that this means there is no necessary connection between qualifications and jobs and between 
qualifications and insulation from downward mobility in the case of Afro-Caribbean and Asian 
youth. Although training schemes were designed to compensate to some extent for this 
disadvantage they have the effect of labeling ethnic minority youth as a problem category and 
therefore further stigmatizing them (Solomos 1988)
In other countries it is the children of migrant workers who find themselves in the bottom layer of 
the educational system. In Germany for example, they were amongst those who were found 
only in lowest level secondary schools (Hauptschule), who leave without educational 
certificates, who are less likely to find apprenticeship places and who drop out of the 
educational system. They are more likely to be over-represented in special schools for the 
handicapped and disadvantaged children. It is estimated that 65per cent in this group had no 
training and this is a particularly disadvantage in the German labour market where access to 
professions was through training schemes (Bendit 1985, Bendit et al. 1993). Although the 
official policy has been 'integration and normalization' (see Bundesministier für Jugend, Familie, 
Frauen und Gesundheit 1990) and various intervention and educational schemes have been 
introduced to address the problem, Bendit (1985) argues that there is a reproduction of 
disadvantage from one generation to another through the official training and education system. 
A comparison of the educational qualifications of minority youth with all Germans shows that 
whist in general 24per cent of German pupils gained the University entrance exam in 1988, only 
9per cent of those from ethnic minority youth did so and whereas only 8.4per cent of Germans 
left school unqualified, this was the case for 21 per cent of children from ethnic minority groups 
(Bendit et al. 1993). Various special measures and intervention schemes have been introduced 
since the 1970s to target ethnic minority youth but they still remain disadvantaged in the labour 
market overall. In France the young people of arab origin are most likely to be unemployed and 
unqualified.
Roma children are the most educationally disadvantaged group in most central and eastern 
European countries. Many of their children do not attend school at all. In Bulgaria it is estimated 
that 60per cent are illiterate. Roma children are also the most disadvantaged during the current 
transition from communism with high rates of crime, drug use, prostitution and infant mortality 
and with unemployment now between 50per cent and 90per cent in some Roma suburbs of 
Sofia. The post-Communist contraction of state and labour market has affected them most 
severely.
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Ethnic groups are also disadvantaged in other countries since they are often the first to be fired 
when jobs disappear. In all countries, fear of migration and increasing labour market 
protectionism, means that policies are introduced to advantage native workers over foreigners 
(Wallace and Palyanitsya 1996). However, illegal and unregulated labour markets are 
widespread throughout the region and it is in these sectors that foreign and ethnic minorities find 
jobs.
Therefore some groups of ethnic and minority young people are likely to be disadvantaged in 
the new divisions of labour in Europe. In countries where ethnic minorities have existed for a 
long time, they are among those most likely to be educationally disadvantaged and 
unemployed. The children of new migrants are at least temporarily in the same position. 
Furthermore they are likely to find themselves victims of a rising tide of xenophobia which has 
swept across Europe in recent years and which we explore in Chapter 6.
Conclusions
The review of education and training in eastern and western Europe has revealed some 
common features. In both sides of Europe the development of education and training systems 
have helped to generate age-status categories which corresponded to other life transitions and 
this was part of the process of modernization. The growth of bureaucratic national education 
systems, be it under communism or capitalism, created defined phases of full-time education, 
training for work, extended education and finally, work. Under communist authorities 
developments took place later than in western Europe and with far more Government 
intervention, but the results were more dramatic. However, in recent years, a combination of 
educational and labour market changes has extended the transitional period and started to 
break down the distinction between defined life phases of work, education and training. This 
had already started to occur in western Europe from the 1970s as youth unemployment, the 
introduction of various vocational training courses along with the increased demand for Higher 
and longer educational courses made the youth transition phase much longer and more open 
ended. It started to become a process which one could step in and out of, changing 
professions and training over an extended 'post adolescence' disconnected from other life 
transitions such as marriage or childbirth or leaving home. In communist countries where age- 
status was more controlled and more uniform such changes are taking place with greater 
rapidity. Now unemployment, intervention schemes and a variety of new educational and 
professional opportunities have created a less structured and more insecure youth phase. The 
timing of life transitions still depends upon these levels in the educational-labour market 
hierarchy with those nearer the bottom have more accelerated llfe-transitions and those towards 
the top more prolonged ones.
Despite the enshrinement of competitive, meritocratic values, social origins still play an 
important part in educational selection, although these are overlaid by other divisions of 
ethnicity, gender and region. New groups of young people are emerging which are either
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advantaged or disadvantaged by the expanding education system - at the top are the 'students' 
with better lives and prospects (although this depends upon the extent of parental support) and 
at the bottom are the educational subclass who are most likely to be unemployed or perform 
unqualified jobs. Ethnic minorities are over-represented in the latter group. Young women have 
a paradoxical position as being increasingly better qualified, but nevertheless disadvantaged in 
the labour market. There are a number of other kinds of disadvantage and difference which we 
have not dealt with here: sexuality, disability, those leaving care and so on. These 'absent 
voices’ have not been included in the dominant discourse on youth in Europe and hence we 
lack adequate statistics and information about them.
Hence whilst modernization brought fordism, selective educational systems and a segmented 
labour market, which through co-ordinated welfare policies helped to structure the age-status 
transitions in a fairly uniform way (although there were differences according to class, sex and 
country), post-modernizing tendencies have undermined this. Youth age-status transitions have 
become confused and uncertain following changes in the labour market which have removed 
secure employment and changes in educational and training systems which have increasingly 
individualized their paths into work. Increasing differentiation of young workers along a number 
of axes (e.g.. sex, (dis)ability, region, religion, ethnicity etc.) means that standardized solutions 
are increasingly inappropriate.
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Chapter 4
Family Transitions
The age-status transitions of young people are defined crucially by their position within the 
family. Families were constructed by modernisation and within state systems in different 
ways in western and eastern Europe and within each of these regions, family organisation 
differs between ethnic and cultural groups. In centrally planned economies this state 
intervention was very deliberate and very extensive which means that the traditional cultural 
distinctions between northern and southern communist Europe that we described in Chapter 
2 were eroded. Nevertheless families in each area of Europe develop their own sets of 
relationships within and outside of the state and their own styles of intergenerational 
relations. Whereas in some contexts - such as in some stages of capitalism and all post-war 
communist states - age-status transitions are tightly structured and predictable as factors of 
social life, they are now becoming more unstructured, unpredictable and diverse.
There is a tendency for young people to pursue increasingly independent life-styles both 
within the parental home and outside of it and this is associated with 'growing up’ earlier as 
we discussed in Chapter 1 (Chisholm et al. 1995). The tension between the search for social 
and cultural autonomy on the part of young people and the requirements made of them by 
other family members, especially parents, for whom they are subordinate family members, 
are an integral part of our contemporary notions of youth. It is also the source of conflict in 
the family. In post-communist countries where strong support for children by parents was 
always strong, this tension likewise exists. However, such trends must be set against the 
increasing economic dependence of young people upon the family as their ‘transitional’ paths 
are extended. The tendency towards social and cultural differentiation amongst young 
people is thus counter-balanced against material constraints. The lengthening transition from 
education to employment and rising unemployment mean that young people have less 
resources of their own upon which to draw. Furthermore, their increasing desire for 
independent accommodation which results from this search for individual autonomy are not 
met by the existing housing markets. Those who are the casualties of this process include 
the rising numbers of homeless and marginalized youth throughout the European region 
(Hutson and Liddiard 1994).
Young women often feel these shifts in patterns of family transition most acutely and whose 
needs and experiences are more likely to be at odds with existing structures of family and 
youth support. They are often more protected and controlled by parents and other family 
members on account of perceived sexual and other dangers. This tension may be 
particularly acute in southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece where 
traditional family expectations may conflict with increasing demands for independence 
(Leccardi 1995, Deliyannis-Kouimtzi and Ziogou 1995). Gender is therefore a crucial issue in 
these inter-generational negotiations and changes. Important ethnic differences in family
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relationships occur within societies and regions too as work by Brannen et al. (1994) 
illustrates.
Changes in family transitions have been subject to the following trends which will be further 
described in this chapter:
* the fall in family size
* the postponement of marriage and childbearing
* the increase in single person and non-family households
* the rise in non-marital partnerships such as cohabitation
* the rise in divorce
* the increasing tendency towards non-marital childbearing
* the increasing tendency of young people to leave home for reasons other than marriage
* the tendency for women to see employment as a destiny for themselves throughout life
* the increasing autonomy of young people within the parental household
These are all factors which affect young people's biographies and inter-generational 
relations. However, we should see family transitions as a series of separate processes, 
which may or may not be connected and in the following pages of this chapter we shall 
address each in turn:
1. Families: the transition from family of origin to family of destination
2. Households: the transition from household of origin (usually but not always the parental 
one) to establishment of an independent household
3. Housing: the transition from home of origin to independent housing.
These transitions are connected together in popular ideology of the family and thirty years 
ago were connected together in practice as well. However, they are increasingly becoming 
disconnected both from each other and from other life transitions discussed in other chapters 
as the economic situation of young people deteriorates, their transitions are extended and 
uncertainty becomes a feature of this and other aspects of their lives. These have 
implications for the relationships of young people with parents both inside and outside the 
parental home which are addressed in the final section of the chapter. Firstly, however, we 
need to consider some of the variations in family life in different parts of Europe.
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Family transitions: ideology and practice
The Idea of ‘the family’ is heavily overlaid with idealised normative models in each society. 
Each European society has an ideal of how people should meet, fall in love, get married, find 
a home and have children, gradually moving away from parental dependency. However, this 
is not so often realisable in practice and is variable between different groups and different 
points in time.
In north western Europe the dominant model of the 1950s and 1960s for example, was for a 
man to be a breadwinner and to support a dependent wife and children at home. Such an 
idealised household would not include additional generations and it was assumed that on 
getting married (by their early 20s preferably) young people would ‘leave the nest’ and start 
families of their own. The proper way to found such a family was to enter a stable 
heterosexual couple relationship then have an engagement, a wedding and a 'housewarming' 
celebration. There were standardised ritual markers for each of these transitions and gifts 
from relatives and friends could help to offset the cost of setting up home. The regulation of 
sexuality was likewise part of this normative transition process: how, when and with whom it 
is appropriate to have sex was determined by the right and proper way to organise family 
life. These sets of transitions were therefore connected together and also connected with 
related transitions in the labour market - from education to work for example.
In the agricultural areas of Southern Europe more ‘traditional’ patterns of family life and inter- 
generational relations survived into the post-war period. In these regions, parents hold 
greater authority and the lives of children -especially girls- was heavily regulated. The 
modernisation of the last few decades, especially following integration into the European 
Union has lead to new styles of family relations and a search for autonomy by young people. 
Pais (1995) argues that we can see this in terms of James Coleman’s (1990) model of 
evolution between different kinds of inter-generational relations. In the first phase, that of 
rural peasant society, he argues, young people were integrated into the rural economy and 
children were seen in terms of their potential as workers for the household. The financial 
investment in children or in their education was minimal. Such was the pattern in rural 
Portugal in the past, and which still exists to some extent in the present. The second phase 
was characterised by the family exchanging wages for consumer goods in an industrialised 
economy. The child ceases to be a worker and the family starts to see the child in terms of 
an investment for the future and long-term source of social mobility. There is strong Incentive 
to invest in the education of children. This is the situation with newly upwardly mobile, urban, 
middle class families in Portugal. The third phase, the post-industrial society, is one where 
families are unsure whether education will lead to a better career or not. The economic and 
social functions of the family are transferred to other institutions. This is the case with the 
more established urban classes in Portugal.
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Although James Coleman’s model is an evolutionary one, we can see that the different styles 
of inter-generational relations can co-exist within a modern European society such as 
Portugal, but also within older industrial countries. Within northern industrial countries there 
are elements of traditional family expectations as well. Amongst ethnic minority groups in 
Northern Europe, especially those who migrated from the Middle East or from Muslim 
countries, there was a tendency to hold more ‘traditional’ ideals of parental authority and 
youthful subordination and respect, particularly with regard to the control of adolescent girls’ 
behaviour. This was the case even in urbanised middle class families, which held views of 
parental authority similar to those in more traditional parts of Europe (Brannen et al. 1994). 
Amongst British Asians, for example, family solidarity is still especially valued and can also 
be seen as a source of support for young people (Brah 1986). However, the inter-penetration 
of ‘traditional’ familial values with that of the individualistic late-modern society can best be 
illustrated in the case of communist and post-communist East-Central Europe. There the 
collapse of modern institutions and their replacement by post-modern chaos is most 
dramatic.
In socialist societies the ideology of the harmonious family existed too. The official ideology 
proclaimed that the state cared for the family better than in profit-driven capitalist economies, 
but the reality was that families were forced together in order to find self-help strategies for 
economic survival. This produced in practice very close-knit, multi-generational families. 
The modern socialist economy was based upon rationalist, universalistic criteria and yet at 
the same time family relations pervaded the whole state structure: families ties were used for 
social mobility and also as a form of punishment by the state. For instance, the children of 
dissidents and political defectors were often denied access to University or housing. The 
widely propagated rights to free medical services, education, employment and social security 
were in reality obtained through a family stratified system of allocation which was very 
unequal (Mitev 1988, Watson 1993). Parents strove to secure the best possible education, 
housing or other resources for their children and many things were obtained through family 
connections(Mozny 1994). Families would put their names down for flats which they would 
not themselves live in but which may become available to their children in twenty years time. 
The family also provided an important source of privacy, comfort and creativity in a situation 
where public life was totally regulated and controlled. Hence, the ideology of the family was 
an important subject of propaganda, but also as a source of affective solidarity. In particular 
inter-generational ties of mutual support and co-operation were emphasized: parents should 
care for and financially support children and grandchildren; children should depend upon 
parents and in turn support their own children in a long-term form of inter-generational 
deferred reciprocity.
The communist states did not necessarily have a consistent policy on the family. In societies 
which self-consciously aimed to transform and rebuild social relationships, the family was 
included as an object of deliberate intervention. After early revolutionary attempts to abolish 
the family in the Soviet Union, policies moved instead towards supporting it (Juviler 1992). In
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the post-Second World War period, there was a tendency towards more pro-family policies 
included the provision of maternity and paternity leave, later with pay, child benefits, 
maternity grants and so on, reflecting an awareness of the limitations of poor quality and 
over-crowded public child care provision. By the 1980s an elaborate set of family allowances 
had developed in many countries leading to something of a ‘baby boom’. However, easy 
access to divorce and abortion along with the full-time employment of women remained an 
important feature of soviet-style socialist states, proclaimed as a way of liberating women. 
With the limited availability of other contraceptive methods in many countries, marriage would 
often take place when the young woman became pregnant and subsequent to that abortion 
would be used to limit family size (Harchev and Mazkovskij 1978, Davin 1992).
The East-Central European countries which became communist only after the second world 
war likewise emphasised the liberation of women through their participation in the full-time 
workforce and this was in stark contrast to the peasant and semi-feudal societies which they 
replaced. Whilst the material position of women within the family may have been improved, in 
fact this never lead to the liberation of women because relations inside the family - and 
particularly gender relations - remained very conservative (Watson 1993). Women did most 
of the housework and childcare, often under very difficult circumstances (Corrin 1992, 
Kurzynowski 1990). There were also considerable variations within the former Soviet bloc, 
with the Central Asian republics retaining a more ‘clan’ style of organisation with early 
marriage and large families whereas In the Baltic States marriage was delayed and families 
small (Malysheva 1992). Roma all over East-Central Europe traditionally had large numbers 
of children and were organised around more extended families and clan-type groups. There 
were also differences between urban and rural populations and between different ethnic 
minority groups. For example in Bulgaria the Islamic communities of the Rhodopa mountains 
live in extended rather than nuclear families and preserve strong patriarchal relations with 
sanctions against divorce (Churenev 1984). Hence, although there was a certain conformity 
introduced by communism, gender relations were far from being homogenous.
In centrally planned economies it was possible to attempt to regulate fertility and 
demographic trends through active policy interventions. Romania represents the most 
extreme example of pro-natalism having abolished abortion, contraception and introduced 
compulsory fertility testing of women. There was a tax on women without children and on 
childless couples over 30. The result was large numbers of illegal abortions, many 
abandoned and handicapped children and many undernourished and poverty-stricken 
households with too many mouths to feed (Davin 1992). However, other states also 
introduced pro-natalist policies in milder forms through family support policies. For example, 
in the 1980s in Bulgaria, a falling birth rate prompted such a pro-natalist campaign 
(Spasovska 1980). A decree by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, backed up 
by an impressive list of official organisations announced loans for young people setting up 
households, increased child benefits to parents and the extension of paid leave for women
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with children to two years on the minimum wage. In addition they could take unpaid leave for 
another year with no fear of losing their jobs.
Under communist modernization, age-status transitions were strongly standardized in the 
post-war period. Related to the age of finishing education, of beginning work and gaining 
access to housing, marriage and childbirth took place in more predictable ways than in 
western Europe. However, this was not necessarily related to the age of leaving home nor 
that of ceasing to be dependent upon relatives as we shall see later. The important point to 
make here however, is that on account of the imposition of a model of the family based upon 
state policy and the affective importance of the family for survival in ‘unofficial’ society a 
particular model of inter-generational relations was widespread. Familial solidarity and help 
between generations was very strong.
With the end of communism, the ideology of the family continued to be important because it 
was still necessary for mutual self-help, particularly in child care and financial support for 
young people (Wallace 1995). However, the reaction against readily available abortion in 
some countries (such as Poland and East Germany) and the abolition of workplace crèches 
along with heavy criticism of the protected labour market position of mothers is indicative of 
new trend. Now there is a tendency to see to more role-differentiated family of man as a 
breadwinner with a dependent wife and children as being more attractive. This is reinforced 
in advertising where women are portrayed as housewives and glamorous consumers whilst 
men’s role is now to go out and 'hunt' for money in a free market. In some countries the 
Church further reinforces a conservative model of the family and in Poland this has been very 
influential in parliamentary debates as well as social policies (Watson 1993). Furthermore, 
some of the new post-communist political parties have stressed the return to family values as 
part of their election campaign. Already from the 1980s Gorbachov in the former Soviet Union 
was stressing the need for women to return to their ‘natural role’ in the family as a way of 
curbing rising juvenile delinquency. However, the need for two incomes and the reluctance of 
many women to give up their jobs means that the majority of working age women are still 
employed full-time.
Modernization theory has often focused upon recent trends in family change (Giddens 1991, 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995). Whilst some have emphasized the changing relationships 
within the family - between partners and between parents and children - others have 
emphasized the fragmentation and reconstitution of the family itself. Examples of the first 
tendency have described the movement away from what is termed 'traditional’ family roles 
where the authority of the parents is strong, where rules are strict and where children are 
expected to be obedient and subordinate, towards what is termed the more 'modern' family 
which is characterized by more negotiated rules between parents and children and within 
partnerships, and more flexibility in relations between generations. Relationships are no 
longer so fixed by tradition and seen as ‘essential’. This has been documented by a variety 
of researchers in Europe (du Bois-Reymond et al 1995, Hartmann 1987). The second
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tendency, stronger in the Anglo-American literature emphasizes the way in which the 
traditional two-parent, nuclear 'modern' family of the 1950s and 1960s is being replaced by 
the fragmented 'post modern’ family, one which can have several sets of parents (the product 
of divorce, remarriage, cohabitation and lone-parenthood) from which one chooses close or 
distant relationships, or with whom one can choose to have no relationship at all (Stacey 
1990). The increasing self-awareness of women as key actors both in the labour market and 
in the family contributes to such trends as they no longer uncritically accept family roles 
handed down by tradition and which are difficult to reconcile with their improved educational 
prospects and situation as workers in the labour market.
The ‘modern’ family was based upon possibility of wage labour providing sufficient income for 
young people in order for them to establish an independent household and upon the existence 
of affordable housing. Both of these have become more remote. Whilst the model of the ideal 
family may persist, in practice young people are seeking more diverse ways of entering it and 
many also reject the standard heterosexual couple union as the best and only way to live. Lack 
of jobs and extended education all undermine the way in which such a family was traditionally 
formed. Furthermore, strong traditions of family loyalty both in eastern Europe and parts of 
western Europe ensure that close links are maintained between parents and children even 
where there is the possibility to move away.
Family roles are also constructed through social policies such as social security, wages 
policy, pensions, education and housing (Finch 1989) and in many European countries there 
is even a Ministry for the Family, In countries such as Denmark the need to support young 
people’s independence has been recognised as a goal of social policy, whereas in Britain 
there has been a contradictory approach to this with policies shifting backwards and forwards 
(Jones and Wallace 1992). The ‘family’ of social policies however, often implicitly embodies 
the norms of the policy makers which are also those of the dominant group in any society in 
terms of ethnicity and social origin. The result is that non-standard family forms - for example 
those of ethnic groups such as Afro-Caribbeans in Britain, where the dominant group is 
white, or Roma in East-Central Europe, where the dominant groups are not Roma, or 
Russians in Estonia where the dominant group is currently Estonian - are pathologized as 
‘deviant’. States tend to idealise a particular set of family relations being ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ 
and these also tend to reflect the values of the dominant group (Abbott and Wallace 1992).
Having described the background to these trends towards change in family life, we will now 
describe the different strands of transition in more detail.
The transition from family of origin to family of destination
Just as the transition from full-time education into full time work has become extended, so the 
transition to family of destination has too. The age of getting married generally is rising in 
European countries. Table 4.1 compares the age of marriage in selected eastern and
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western countries. The countries of northern Europe have the highest age of marriage, 
represented in this table by Denmark and the Netherlands. However, the UK, also one of the 
Northern Protestant countries, has a relatively low age of marriage reflecting perhaps the 
relatively accelerated transitions in the UK. There is a consistent 2-3 or more year gap 
between men and women, which may partly reflect traditions military service, but could also 
reflect a very standardised model of age-gender relations in Europe. In some Southern 
European counties, represented here by Greece and Italy, there is a tendency for young men 
to marry later and young women to marry earlier. In the eastern European group of countries 
- Hungary, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, the age of marriage is generally lower than in 
western Europe for both men and women, reflecting the accelerated transitions which had 
existed in communist countries. In this group.of countries, there was generally earlier age of 
entry into the productive economy and marriage was a factor in gaining housing and 
marriage grants. However, there has been a recent tendency for age of marriage to rise. In 
Bulgaria, whereas in the 1958-1968 period most brides were below 19, this is now rare and 
most marriages take place between 20 and 24. Those in higher education have a more 
protracted transition into family life, as is the case in western Europe (Wallace 1995).
Table 4.1 Age at first marriage: eastern and western Europe by sex
Males Females Difference Male- 
Females in years
Czech Republic 23.27 20.69 2.58
Hungary 23.8 21.1 2.7
Bulgaria 25.0 22.0 3
UK 26.4 24.2 2.2
Spain 26.7 24.5 2.2
France 27.0 24.9 2.1
Netherlands 27.2 25.0 2.2
Germany 27.7 25.2 2.5
Greece 27.7 23.4 4.5
Italy 27.9 24.9 3.0
Denmark 29.4 26.8 2.6
Source: Chisholm and Bergeret 1991. Figures are for 1987. Additional sources: Mozny 1994 and Statistical Year 
Books Poland and Hungary 1995.
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Social stratification also has an important influence upon family formation. These patterns of 
transition varied between different social groups according to their pattern of entry into the 
labour market. Those with more middle class occupations marry at a later age than those in 
manual jobs. Hence, in the 1970s in Britain semi- and unskilled workers married some four 
years earlier than the professional and intermediate workers (Social Trends 1986). This can 
be explained by the fact that professional and managerial occupations required a period in 
Higher Education before training, in other words, a more extended transition. There are 
more opportunities for life-style experimentation amongst the University-going middle class 
than other groups. Those at other levels, on the other hand, may need to stay at home until 
they married and for them marriage was an occurrence which could happen sooner rather 
than later (Sarsby 1983).
In fact the idea that getting married was the normal way to leave home dates only from the 
1960s in Britain when the age of marriage dropped so that one in three brides were 
teenagers and marriage became a universal institution, available to all (in the nineteenth 
century by contrast, many women did not marry). In this period, getting married and 
establishing a home were crucially inter-connected as a way of establishing adult 
independence. The tremendous importance attached to this at the time coloured the whole 
period between leaving school and finally getting married. In Leonard’s (1980) study, the 
majority of young people remained at home until then.
Since that time the age of marriage has risen so that only one bride in eight is a teenager. 
However, despite these changing patterns, familial ideology still exerts a powerful hold over 
people's imaginations and their behaviour. In 1984 Wallace found that even though young 
people had children outside marriage, had cohabited, lived in squats and bedsits or were 
unemployed, they still believed that ultimately they were going to make a conventional 
transition into a family of destination including getting married, buying a house and having 
children - even when there seemed no material means of achieving this (Wallace 1987). In 
East-Central European societies there was very strong pressure to marry and marriage was 
nearly universal, as was childbearing (Mozny 1994).
More recently, there has been a growing tendency to cohabit rather than marry. There is also 
evidence that young people are more tolerant about cohabitation than other age groups. 
The British Househoid Panel Survey asked about attitudes to cohabitation and found that the 
older the respondent, the less tolerant they were to this style of living (Social Trends 1996). 
Increasing numbers of young people are also now are living alone or sharing with others in 
non-family households. This has risen from 5per cent to 7per cent between 1982 and 1987 in 
the European Community as a whole and this also reflects a shift away from marriage and 
towards these alternative household forms (Chisholm and Bergeret 1991). However, there 
are considerable variations between countries. Table 4.2 indicates the rate of cohabitation in 
different European countries (data are not available for eastern Europe) and it shows again 
the northern Protestant countries more likely to have this form of household arrangement
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than the southern Catholic ones. It seems that there is a tendency towards the 
individualisation of living arrangements, with more young people living independently and 
more cohabiting in preference to getting married.
Table 4.2 Percentage cohabiting in different European countries 1990
2 0 - 
18 
16- 
14 - 
12 
10 -  
8 - 
6 - 
4 - 
2 -  
0 -
Source: Chisholm and Bergeret, 1991: 26. Drawn from Stastisches Bundesamt, Bevölkerung und Ewerbstätigkeit 
Fachserie 1, Reihei, Wiesbaden 1987; Eurostat 1990, Eurostat Basic Statistics of the European Community 27lh 
edn. 1990 Table 1.3
The age of having a first child has likewise been postponed with people across Europe 
starting their families on average one year later than a decade ago. The usual age of having 
first children is now in the late 20s for women (Eurostat 1996). In some countries, such as 
Germany and Italy there has been an increasing tendency not to have children at all.
Despite the changes described above, those who fail to conform to this pattern are still 
considered to have 'premature' transitions, especially if they get pregnant before they marry, 
have illegitimate children, marry young, have families before they have a house and so on. 
Such behaviour is often attributed to ignorance, or deviance, especially in the case of lower 
class or ethnic minority women. One US social scientist has characterised this as the 
'problem' of the proliferation of the 'underclass' (Murray 1986) He argues that these patterns 
are part of a self-perpetuating 'culture of poverty' in lower class communities and blames this 
at least partly on the sexual incontinence of the young people themselves. For lower class 
young people, pregnancy was often seen (by researchers) as a misfortune, the product of
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insufficient use of contraceptives or ignorance (Schofield 1973). Social class is therefore an 
important factor in the way sexuality is perceived. Amongst middle class young people, 
however, the possibility of sexual experimentation based upon periods away from home at 
college and looser, more unstructured relations between the sexes was seen as part of 
growing up (Aggleton 1987).
As Pheonix (1991) has argued what is now considered ‘too young’ to have children (the teen 
years) was at one time considered the ideal age to have children and many of today’s 
mothers would be considered ‘too old’. However, such ideas of what is ‘too young’ or ‘too 
old', 'too many’ or ‘too few’ children are used in racist ideologies to condemn the family 
practices of ethnic or religious minorities such as Roma and Muslims. In general however, 
teenage pregnancies have been falling rather than rising in most European countries.
Why has there been this tendency to postpone marriage and childbearing? First it seems that 
the extended transition into employment means that other life transitions are correspondingly 
extended. This can be illustrated with the differences between countries and social classes 
which tend to reflect different speeds of transition in other respects. Secondly, rising 
unemployment can in some cases lead to postponed transitions or styles of transition being 
diverted in other ways such as by living together rather than marrying (Wallace 1987, Fagin 
and Little 1984), although, other research suggest that unemployment can encourage young 
people to have children as an alternative form of status(Campbell 1984, Willis 1984b).
A further factor is that marriage is no longer the main way of sanctioning sexual relations. 
The disconnection of sex from marriage can be found in attitudes to pre-marital sexuality 
which have generally become more liberal in every country - indeed, young people have lead 
these trends with more tolerant attitudes towards all Issues to do with sexuality - 
homosexuality, sex and abortion (inglehart 1997). Successive surveys in Bulgaria have 
indicated a tendency towards greater tolerance of sexual relations outside of marriage, 
particularly among the urbanized populations (Mitev 1982). The highly educated are likely to 
hold the most liberal views and to favour more experimental, less ‘traditional’ sexual relations 
(Kjuranov 1987).
The early and universal marriage and childbearing behaviour in socialist states reinforced 
heterosexual conformity. In the Soviet Union gay and lesbian relations were often illegal or 
subject to harassment: homosexuality was regarded as a deviant illness. In many places it is 
still impossible for gay and lesbian people to openly declare themselves although there were 
some underground lesbian and gay movements and these have become more visible 
(Schenk 1993). Many of these have started to ‘come out’ among youth sub-cultures at least 
in Moscow (Pilkington 1996).
Young people are not sheltered from the sexualization of popular culture generally, which is 
no longer tied to other social institutions such as marriage but still very strongly tied to
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romantic heterosexual relations. Some studies have indicated that young women are often 
under considerable pressure to have sex and that sexual coercion or threatened rape, maybe 
a familiar experience for them (Haison 1990). However, in the late modern family, sexuality is 
something increasingly tolerated by parents and a subject of negotiation rather than taboo 
between parents and children (Brannen et al. 1994). Ironically, the increased awareness of 
sexuality leads to an increasing desire to protect young women, especially for parents to 
control them. The threat of AIDS has made many ‘taboo’ subjects common conversation and 
may have reinforced a certain sexual conservatism, although surveys carried out in Bulgaria 
found that young people felt that AIDS was little threat to them (Tonchev and Tomov 1989).
The transition to parenthood and the transition to marriage or cohabitation, like other 
transitions has become increasingly disconnected. Unmarried parenthood had risen in many 
European countries. There is some evidence then that traditional moral norms about 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour have shifted, particularly for the younger generation. 
For example there was greater tolerance of lone-parenthood across a range of different 
countries (Inglehart 1997). It is no longer a tragedy to become pregnant outside of marriage 
and young women to whom this happens no longer have to go into special homes or mental 
institutions, to give up their babies for adoption or to feel obliged to get married, as they 
would have done just a few decades ago.
Table 4.3 indicates the rates of childbirth outside of marriage in the different parts of Europe. 
It can be seen that there are higher rates of this kind of family transition in Northern Europe, 
particularly in the Scandinavian countries, since in Sweden more than half of births take 
place in this way. However, extra-marital childbearing is also related to religion since 
Catholic Lithuania and Poland have lower rates than do the surrounding Protestant countries 
such as Latvia and Estonia. In general there is less extra-marital childbearing in most 
communist countries than in western countries, but even in the former communist countries it 
is rising: the percentage of children born out of wedlock in Bulgaria increased from 3per cent 
in 1945 to 12per cent in 1990 (Kjulanov et al. 1991).
The ‘normal biography’ in East-Central Europe meant that children followed upon marriage. 
Although, the numbers born out of wedlock have risen, this is is considered undesirable in 
most eastern European countries. There are however, exceptions in sub-communities with 
one quarter of non-marital births in Bulgaria occuring in the Roma community where 
cohabitation was also more common (Dinkova et al. 1991). Many mothers in former 
communist countries who had unwanted children or who were not able to support their 
children, put them in a state children’s home. In Bulgaria, this was the case with three 
quarters of the unmarried mothers. Although there are special policies for lone-mothers, living 
conditions were hard and nine out of ten single mothers there had difficulties making ends 
meet (Dinkova etal. 1991).
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There is a general tendency for family size to fall with modernisation. In Bulgaria it fell from an 
average of 6.3 children at the turn of the century to 3.4 before the second world war and 1.73 
now (Statistical Year Book, Bulgaria 1991:36). A similar fall in family size can be found in 
western Europe where the average household size fell from 2.8 to 2.6 people per household 
between 1981 and 1991, and this represents a much longer term trend (Eurostat 1996). This 
is more marked in countries such as Germany and Italy. In post-communist Europe the birth 
rate has fallen very dramatically over the last few years, perhaps on account of the economic 
insecurity there.
4.3 Extra-marital childbearing in eastern and western European countries, 1991 
Percentage of all live births in each country
Source: Socilogicky Aktualny, 1 1993: 22, Czech Academy of Sciences
There are therefore some common trends towards postponed family building, decreasing 
family size and alternative living arrangements throughout Europe, although these are 
stronger in some countries than in others. There seems to be also some shift in the way in 
which family relations and sexuality are seen - towards greater tolerance and flexibility. This 
has affected the transition from family of origin to family of destination and de-coupled sex 
from marriage, marriage from cohabitation and marriage from childbearing.
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The transition from household of origin to an independent household
The transition to a separate household is also increasingly de-coupled from traditional 
transitions into marriage. This is now seen more as a separate transition and a marker of 
independent adulthood irrespective of marital status. There is thus a growing diversity of 
household arrangements and more apparent 'choice' for young people in how they wish to 
conduct their lives (Hartmann 1987) and this may be at least partly because the extended 
‘post adolescent’ transition discourages conventional family formation and encourages 
experimental forms of living.
Most young people in Europe continue to live at home whilst they are in their teenage years. 
Table 4.4 indicates the numbers of 15-24 year olds still living at home in different western 
countries.
Table 4.4 Percentage of Young People living at home in Different western European 
Countries and Perceptions of Accommodation as a Problem, 1990
Source: Chisholm and Bergeret 1991: 23, drawn from Young Europeans survey, 1990
This illustrates the fact that there was great variation in this pattern. Although overall there Is 
a tendency for young people to live longer with their parents on account of their more 
protracted period of economic dependency, we can see that in Italy, Spain and Ireland - the 
Catholic countries of the EU - this was more common than in more northern Protestant 
countries such as Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands or the UK. However, whilst in 
Germany, Britain and Denmark it was seen as desirable for young people to leave home, in
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countries such as Italy this was not necessarily seen as a problem at all (Chisholm and 
Bergeret 1991). This was also often the case in central and eastern European countries 
where young people did not usually think of leaving home unless they were married or 
studying or in military service. In the southern Catholic countries we can see more 'traditional' 
styles of living with more people living with their parents, less living independently and 
cohabitation being less significant than marriage and this was even more the case in Greece. 
In Denmark by contrast, 25per cent of the 15-24 age group lived autonomously in addition to 
large numbers cohabiting rather than married (Chisholm and Bergeret 1991).
However, young people do not necessarily leave home for good. Rather, they come and go 
(Jones 1995, Young 1987). The common pattern was to move backwards and forwards from 
the parental home for a few years during this age-phase. Jones (1995), who has conducted 
the most extensive study of this topic found that the most common reason for young people 
to leave home in Britain was in order to start an educational course, and this was followed by 
starting a new job. Other reasons for leaving home include to move in with a partner or 
simply to find more independence (Ainly 1991). It was more often young women who sought 
this kind of independence, perhaps because they may find family control more constraining. 
Others left home for more negative reasons including physical or sexual abuse, arguments 
with parents or step parents and even being thrown out by parents. According to Jones’ 
study, these accounted for 23per cent of all those who left home aged between 16 and 19 in 
Scotland. Most of those who left home, lived in what she describes as ‘transitional’ 
accommodation - that is hostels, lodgings, shared accommodation with other young people in 
the privately rented sector and so on. This did not represent the final outcome of their 
household trajectory, but was usually temporary. In Germany, Gaiser and Müller (1985) 
likewise found that flats, hostels and shared accommodation was a common pattern for first 
setting up a new household.
But in what sense could it be said that these young people had 'left home'? In such 
accommodation they may return to parents to eat, to do laundry, for the holidays or when 
their course of education finishes. In Germany and Austria one way of accommodating to the 
needs for autonomy among young people is to build them a separate apartment within the 
family dwelling. There are thus an array of transitional arrangements with respect to the 
household status of young people.
Communist modernisation changed the patterns of leaving home in East-Central Europe. The 
early dislocations caused by rapid and forced industrialisation in the Soviet Union created 
very rapid migration to industrial centres with large numbers of young workers living in 
hostels. By the 1970s this was no longer the norm, but it was still the case that those who 
wished to go to specialised trade schools (especially from the countryside) had to leave 
home in order to do so and these constituted 7per cent of young people of the 14-17 year 
old age group (llynsky 1992). Low wages and the necessity of two incomes meant that young 
people could not in practice afford to set up home themselves. They thus relied upon family
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support for getting married and parents were crucial in obtaining favours for their children 
through co-operation and exchange (Raichev 1985). Thus paradoxically young people had 
to get married in order to be eligible for independent state support but in doing so they relied 
more upon their parents than ever. There was very strong parental obligation to support 
children and most parents wanted to help their children as long as they could irrespective of 
their own financial situation (Langazova 1985).
The transition from house of origin to independent housing
The ability to leave home depends upon whether there is housing to go to and young people 
have at all times been considered a low priority in Governmental housing strategy: the 
assumption is that they should live at home. Forming a new household requires entry into 
the housing market of which young people form a very particular part. In much of Europe 
young people’s position within the housing market has deteriorated in the 1980s. The 
increasing emphasis on owner occupation, the de-regulation of rented housing and rising 
rents has much housing out of reach for young people. In addition, the redevelopment of city 
centres has reduced the number of potential homes where low rent accommodation was 
available (Burton et al. 1989). The decline of state or council housing has also affected 
young people adversely. In all countries young people are disadvantaged as first time 
entrants onto the housing market. For example in the UK where there has been an 
increased trend towards owner occupation it is difficult for them to raise money for a 
mortgage without a sufficient income or any collateral. In Germany and other countries 
where rents are linked to length of residence, this disadvantages new entrants into the 
housing market where they have to pay the highest rents. Thus, the number of young people 
who want to find their own home vastly exceeds the numbers who are able to do so (Gaiser 
and Müller 1985).
One effect of these pressures on the youth housing market has been a rise in the number of 
homeless young people over the 1980s. This is particularly evident in the UK, where young 
people attracted particularly to London, are found sleeping in doorways in the city centre or in 
'cardboard cities’. But it seems that the numbers have risen all over Europe (Hutson and 
Liddiard 1995), Evidence from Britain indicates that many of their housing needs are 
concealed by the fact that young people may be living on friends’ floors or in temporary 
accommodation and squats and therefore not count as homeless. The factors leading to 
youth homelessness have been listed by Hutson and Liddiard (1995) as follows:
* Leaving care. Those young people who were the responsibility of children’s homes or state 
welfare services are much more likely to-become homeless. Whilst in the UK these 
constitute only 1per cent of young people, they are one third of the single homeless (Stein 
and Carey 1986)
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* Victims of physical or sexual abuse. A large number of homeless young people are those 
who suffered such abuse. They were estimated to be 17per cent of young single homeless 
in one Scottish study (Killeen 1988).
* Mental illness. Large numbers of the single homeless suffer from some mental illness. 
Policies of care in the community has meant that more of them are discharged from 
Psychiatric hospitals.
* Crime. Those leaving custody are at high risk of becoming homeless and the young 
homeless are more likely to become involved in crime.
* Family breakdown and family problems. In Gill Jones’ study carried out in 1991, 60per cent 
of homeless young people said that the reason they left home was because of family 
arguments.
Carlen (1996) however, explains youth homelessness in terms of the gap between young 
people’s incomes (generally declining) and the price of housing (generally rising) She 
illustrates how inappropriate many of the hostel solutions are to the problem of youth 
homelessness and shows that young people often preferred to fend for themselves. The 
young homeless were not just victims - theirs was also a life-style which met certain needs 
and a desire for independence and autonomy.
Homelessness is often linked to a pattern of moving around transitory accommodation with 
periods of sleeping rough and that most of the young homeless could not return home. 
There are a range of emergency accommodation which will usually only take people for a 
limited duration and not if they are seen to cause too many problems, but the demand for 
places greatly outstrips the supply. In Germany some hostel accommodation is provided for 
homeless young people, although their numbers do not appear to be as high as in Britain, 
and in France there are also efforts to provide reception centers for them (Coles 1995, 
Gaiser and Müller 1985).
Thus, it is evident that not all young people are happy living with families or have families to 
live with. It is possible that were accommodation and incomes more available for them, far 
greater numbers would leave home. What is happening is that as youth are being re-defined 
as a dependent population, so there are large numbers of casualties who have no-one to 
depend upon ir any desire to be dependent.
In former socialist countries it was very difficult for young people to leave home and form a 
new household because of the absence of housing. Three generational families were 
common and young people had to live with parents normally for a few years even after they 
were married. Consequently, in Bulgaria in 1977, 61 per cent of young married couples were 
living with parents and this was typical of other communist countries too. When young people
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left home to study elsewhere they lived in dormitories (about 13per cent) and would return 
home to parents frequently. Others (about 29per cent) rented accommodation (Radulov 
1973). Consequently, most young people lived with parents until the age of 30 or more. 
Getting married was one way to secure independent housing - in a survey in Hungary which 
found that 12per cent of women who married whilst at University did so only in order to stand 
a better chance of getting housing (Kosha 1985).
Although the official policy was to prioritise young families in access to housing, in practice 
this was seldom successful. The difficulties which this involved can be illustrated by the 
experience of lecturers at Sofia University. They would live in a dormitory for at least ten 
years, sharing a room with babies at first and then with growing children. When they at last 
received a flat somewhere in the suburbs and managed to furnish it, their own children would 
marry and live there with them. The flats themselves were often very small with 70per cent of 
flats built after 1980 having only one or two rooms in Bulgarla(in order to maximise the 
number of dwellings being provided). In the former Soviet Union the situation was still worse 
with 'komunalka’ still common - flats where several households shared kitchen and bathroom 
facilities. However, there were other variations between countries. In East Germany for 
example, one of the wealthiest former communist countries, only 20per cent of young families 
shared accommodation with parents.
The introduction of market reforms have not yet produced a full market in housing with flats 
and housing still being obtained through various family strategies for circumventing the 
regulations. In large cities the opportunities for commercial letting have driven up residential 
prices without necessarily substantially improving quality. Many state and co-operative flats 
have been privatized. On the other hand, an illegal market in renting has developed with co­
operative and state or even private flats being sub-let several times over often for exorbitant 
prices, making some of the ex-socialist countries as expensive to live in as the leading 
western cities. In some cases there are reports of intimidation to encourage tenants in 
desirable residential locations to move so that their dwellings can be re-let more profitably. 
East-Central Europeans, most of whom are still on incomes considerably below their western 
counterparts, are priced out of such a market. Most people continue to live in the suburban 
panel-built blocks of flats which stretch for many kilometres around socialist cities. The 
chronic housing shortages which existed before the reforms have since been exacerbated. 
The restitution of some property to its former owners and the impossibility for ordinary people 
to get credit (banks charged 40per cent interest in Poland in 1992) means that flats stand 
empty at the same time as there is a housing shortage because no-one can afford to buy 
them. One traditional solution has been to build one’s own house and there has been a spurt 
in new housebuilding on rural plots, but this would advantage young people only as members 
of larger extended families.
Thus, in many countries, the search for independence amongst young people leads to a desire 
for independent accommodation (Jones 1995). At the same time the amount of suitable
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accommodation available has declined, as has young people’s independent income which 
reduces their scope for finding such independent accommodation. Various alternatives emerge, 
from the use of transitional accommodation to homelessness. However, it is likely that whether 
or not they manage to form a new household, the relationship with parents continues during 
and after the period of transition to a new home and it is to these inter-generational relations that 
we now turn.
Inter-generational relations within the household
Youth is a period of transition between families. Young people can be dependants or 
independent depending upon their economic activity, whether they remain in education and 
whether they have formed households of their own. The erosion in the income of young 
people due to their extended education and training, rising unemployment and the deliberate 
cuts in their incomes and grants which have accompanied this means that young people are 
living with their parents for longer periods of time and are more likely to be financially 
dependent upon them (Jones and Wallace 1992). However, relationships with parents have 
changed. According to the British Social Attitudes survey of 1987 most parents felt that they 
were more liberal with their own children than their parents had been with them (quoted in 
Roll 1990). In a comparative study of the 1950s and 1970s by Allerbeck (1976) in Germany 
there were similar trends reported with parents valuing independence and self-determination 
more, whilst they valued subordination and obedience less than in the past. This change was 
also noted in other studies around western Europe(see Chisholm et al. 1995).
In East-Central Europe there is a strong moral obligation for parents to support children 
throughout their lives. Surveys carried out in communist countries indicated that parents felt 
obliged to provide housing - including an independent home - for children as well as an 
education. Although education was free in communist countries and students could received 
a stipend after their first year, having a student at home was nevertheless a financial burden 
for parents who had to pay for books, clothing and many parents also paid private tuition to 
help their children pass entrance exams. For their part, young people did not pay board 
money to parents, nor do they participate very much in housework and this was consistent in 
surveys carried out both in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere (Mazkovskij 1982). The 
responsibility of children and young people in the household was only to 'study well’. Young 
people expected help from parents through all their major transitions in life (Mitev 1988).
One such transition was the birth of children. With women working full-time, grandparents 
provided crucial resources in the support of young families in this respect. Although the state 
provided public child care, it is estimated that only 30per cent of the costs were met by the 
state (Radulov 1973). Women could take up to three years off to care for children, but only a 
small number took advantage of this and most turned to their parents for help instead so that 
in 1980s in Bulgaria for example, 68per cent of young people used parents on both sides of
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the family for help in baby sitting. For young people studying who had children (there were 
many in this category) grandparents were similarly an important source of help. 
Grandparents started helping with children from the beginning and would take over main 
responsibility for childcare as soon as the mother returned to work. One common practice if 
the grandparents lived in a different dwelling to the young family was for the children to spend 
considerable time and holidays at the grandparents. As well as helping with children, 
grandparents provided other services, such as queuing for goods and doing housework - 
tasks which were essential in the struggle for existence under conditions of chronic shortage. 
Nowadays, family help is still preferable to publicly funded child care centers and many of 
these have been closed in any case as factories have rationalised or been privatized.
In post communist countries the assistance from parents continues to be very important. The 
costs of education have risen with grants being eroded or cut out completely and students 
very often having to pay fees to go to college or University and also for school. The rising 
costs of education mean that young people are even more dependent upon parental support 
in order to continue their studies. Low incomes for young people mean that they are still not 
able to set up independent households (Roberts et al. 1995). However, a major contrast is 
that in some households the parents are no longer better off than the younger generation 
and in some cases the substantial dependence of children upon parents was starting to be 
reversed. As market relations disrupt old patterns of earning, so young people sometimes 
find themselves to be the main earners in families and under these circumstances their 
contribution to household resources could form an important part of household resources, 
particularly in poorer families (Wallace 1995). As the communist social safety net collapses 
and has not yet been replaced by sufficient safeguards for social security, the family remains 
an important resource.
Thus, with the extenuation and de-coupling of transitions for young people, relationships with 
parents can be very important, not only because young people are likely to live with them for 
long periods of time, but also because parents continue to be important even after young 
people have left home altogether. There is a paradoxical tendency for young people to have 
higher demands for autonomy at the same time as they are dependent upon parents for 
longer periods of time. This puts a certain amount of strain upon family relationships which 
can be resolved by allowing more independence within the natal family or may even result in 
the young person leaving. This may be particularly acute in working class homes where 
previously young people left the nest and became financially independent earlier. Ironically, 
social policies which insist that parents should be increasingly responsible for their children's 
behaviour fly in the face of this increasing differentiation within the home and may put further 
strains upon family relationships, with parent complaining that they are unable to control their 
children and increasingly unwilling to do so (Jones and Wallace 1992).
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Conclusions
The chapter has explored some of the Issues of age-status transitions in different social 
contexts. Whilst factors such as entry into work, marriage, sexual relations, childbearing and 
leaving home were all linked together in the 'modern' style of family such as existed in the 
1960s and 1970s, these factors are increasingly becoming de-coupled as transitions take 
place in any order and are reversible. This trend is particularly discernible in the northern 
European Protestant countries, perhaps because of the tradition of individualism in these 
countries and in these countries we can see all kinds of alternative household forms 
becoming more common. In the countries of southern European and in rural areas more 
traditional styles of family life, with connected transitions are more common. In the ex- 
communist countries age -status transitions into marriage, independent household and family 
life were previously strongly regulated on account of the formal planning of the economy, 
although now there is more postponement of transitions and some evidence of 
experimentation in family forms. There is also some variation according to ethnic group - as 
there is in western Europe, although we lack sufficient material to document this adequately.
There is a general tendency for age-status transitions to reflect patterns of transition from 
school to work. As this is delayed, so are transitions into the family and this is most marked 
among those entering Higher Education in each country. Those in Higher Education in all 
countries are more likely to experiment with new styles of residence and family forms. It is 
possible therefore, that the expansion of Higher Education will lead to the increased flexibility 
in family and living arrangements.
In many ways the idealized patterns of starting a family and leaving home were rather similar 
in different parts of Europe with love, marriage and economic independence being aligned. 
However, they were not realizable in many contexts. The relationships between generations 
in the family likewise depends upon such social and economic contexts and in eastern and 
central Europe young people were even more dependent upon parents than in western 
Europe. Nevertheless the lengthening transition in western Europe creates new roles within 
families as dependency is increased. This results in somewhat contradictory situations where 
a young person can be recognized as an independent citizen and yet still be financially 
dependent upon parents. The tendency has been increasingly to recognize the role of 
individual family members.
These family roles are further complicated by what some have called 'post modern' trends. 
The fragmentation of family relationships, the increasing diversity of life-styles and forms of 
living, the movement backwards and forwards between status' instead of the progressional 
movement from one status to another, are all well developed in western Europe and we are 
beginning to see similar trends in East-Central Europe too. With the breakdown of old 
structures of support and control we would expect to see such tendencies accelerating. 
However, the breakdown of traditional structures of support and increasing individualisation
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leaves increasing numbers of young people not only unemployed, but without family support 
(or escaping from family confinement) and in some cases homeless. The ‘post modern' 
welfare state is unable to provide adequate solutions for them and such ‘modern’ solutions as 
confinement to institutions are also increasingly inoperable.
The nature of the transition from one to another household helps to construct gender roles 
and here we have been seeing women’s roles becoming more fluid with women being seen 
as both participants in the labour market as well as being domestic workers in both parts of 
Europe. However, this may also make life more difficult for them as they are required to do 
two lots of work - in the home and in the labour market. This is certainly the case in eastern 
and central Europe where most women continue to work inside and outside the home despite 
a recent ‘backlash’ against their participation in the labour market and cuts in state 
expenditure which means that they increasingly have to find their own ‘private’ solutions for 
childcare.
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Chapter 5
Youth culture, sub-cultures and consumerism1
Youth are defined by distinctive cultures and consumer markets and following post-modern 
tendencies, such cultural factors become increasingly important for understanding social 
groups (Lash 1990). Often sub-cultures are espoused in opposition to mainstream or official 
culture and each generation of young people are able to creatively construct new styles and 
identities, building upon and breaking away from previous styles and fashions. Young people 
have taken advantage of new communications technologies as they have become available - 
record players, cassettes, videos, satellite TV, magazines, computers - in order create and 
communicate their sub-cultures. Even the iron curtain proved unable to seal off young people 
from youth cultures which spread rapidly across East and West Europe creating a common 
cultural identity as ‘young’. Youth cultures and consumer identities have therefore been very 
important in the social construction of youth in different global contexts, but this has often 
taken the form of a ‘post-modern’ antithesis to official attempts by dominant cultures to 
construct youth as an age category.
Capitalist consumer markets have spread youth cultural styles throughout the world so that 
they form part of a 'global culture' and this was further assisted by the crumbling of the iron 
curtain.
This helps to create an idea of ‘youthfulness’ originating in western capitalist countries and 
particularly the USA with ist domination of media culture. For young people in other countries 
the American model of youth can represent a 'dream of modernity’ to which they aspire 
(Leichty 1995). However, it is not necessarily mainstream culture which is communicated. 
For German youth immediately after the Second World War, motorbikes along with rock and 
roll, brought in by the American troops, represented a model of youth which formed the basis 
of city gangs and an alternative to the previous constructions of youth described in Chapter 2 
(Lindner 1985). More recently, hip hop music and break-dancing, a culture associated with 
Hispanic and black youth in run down inner cities became a world-wide phenomenon 
appealing to many different young people (Rose and Ross 1994). Thus, although youth 
culture may originate in one context, it may be re-read and re-interpreted in different ways in 
other contexts.
In this chapter we examine the role of youth culture, sub-cultures and styles in different social 
contexts and the official reactions of dominant regimes towards them. We look at the way 
mass media serve to create and define particular visions of 'youth' but ones which are often 
disembedded from one context and re-embedded elsewhere, sometimes becoming a form of 
political subversion.
’ An earlier version of this chapter appeared in Youth and Society 28 (2):189-214
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Youth and Popular Culture
We make an analytical distinction between youth culture generally, that is, youth as an 
element of the media-conveyed culture of consumption on the one hand and youth sub­
cultures which are more stylistically specific on the other. Although ultimately these two 
categories merge into one another, we begin by analyzing them separately. Young people 
have had a distinctive role to play within consumer culture within which they have been a 
specific market and a source of creative change. From the early development of mass 
consumer culture in the post-war period, youth were identified as a particular target group 
and this was associated with them having a new position as consumers. As early as 1959 
Mark Abrams identified the Teenage Consumer' as a numerically significant section of the 
population with some surplus income as their wages, he claimed had increased at twice the 
rate of that of adults compared with the pre-war period..“their 'discretionary' spending has 
risen by probably 100per cent" (Abrams 1961:9) he concludes. This was linked to the 
changing position of young people within the family as it was no longer necessary to hand 
over all their money to parents and they could spend it on clothes, popular music, magazines 
and commercial entertainment through which they set consumer trends. Young people, 
particularly working class young people who had wages to spend, were thrust into a new and 
conspicuous prominence.
In the USA, where consumer society developed more quickly, sociologists such as Talcott 
Parsons and Eisenstadt (1956) developed general theories of youth. The peer group, 
encouraged by consumer culture and the differentiation of roles within the nuclear family, was 
seen as a form of socialization to adulthood: a way of helping young people make the 
transition from the particularistic values of the family towards the universalistic values of 
wider society. Youth cultures therefore had a 'function' in integrating young people into 
society. However, this functionalist approach tends to assume that this operated in a 
universal way, when as we shall see, it tended to work in different ways for different social 
groups. Furthermore, this approach tended to see youth culture as a way of inculcating 
conformity to society rather than resisting it.
Many saw the development of mass commercial culture as a negative one. The Frankfurt 
School of sociology, for example, through the works of Marcuse (1968) and others, saw 
people being cynically manipulated and duped by mass culture, as having their 'real' needs 
replaced by artificial ones in a vacant and homogenizing addiction to advertising, imported 
American culture and popular music. Young people were supposed to be particularly 
susceptible to this kind media indoctrination. Richard Hoggart (1958) for example, deplored 
the vacuous commercial culture which was replacing the indigenous community traditions 
(as he saw it). More recently this sentiment has been echoed by Seabrook (1982) who 
describes the young unemployed as alienated from any ‘real’ community and excluded from, 
but neverthless fascinated by, the tantalizing pleasures of the consumer culture which 
surrounds them.
120 — Wallace and Kovatcheva /  Changing Times, Changing Lives — I H S
Indeed the Albermarle Report (1960) in Britain argued that efforts should be made to tempt 
young people back into youth clubs in order to pursue more elevated and supervised 
pursuits and there were efforts to round up the 'unattached' (that is, unattached to youth 
clubs) who were thought to represent the greatest problem in this respect. In this 'modern' 
phase, youth cultures were associated with a particular stage of life, that between starting 
work and 'settling down’. Adolescence was seen as a time of freedom and 'fun', an escape 
from adult responsibilities. For Hoggart for example, youth was for working class young 
people a 'brief flowering' before being dragged down by the weight of adult responsibilities 
and family commitments. The emphasis on fun, pleasure and hedonism embodied in youth 
popular culture was encouraged by the development of consumer culture so that this was at 
once a disruptive hedonism and at the same time commercially exploitable. As consumer 
culture later became more generalized in the post war period, so youth was no longer 
confined to a 'brief flowering' but rather the pursuit of pleasure and style came to characterize 
all stages of life.
The post-war period was characterized by the spread of an infrastructure which made new 
forms of participation in mass culture possible. The increase in leisure time and the individual 
ownership of the technology for transmitting cultures offered the opportunity for larger 
markets, but also more individualized participation and choice. To begin with the technology 
associated with music and listening to music was important with radio stations taking 
advantage of in the increased ownership of radio sets, record players and tape recorders, 
followed by the more portable and convenient cassette recorder which allowed the easy 
recording of music. Listening to music has also become the most popular pastime - a 
dramatic change since the early post war period. (Lindner 1985, Damm 1985). This was 
followed by increased possession of other consumer goods - motorbikes, bicycles and cars - 
which enabled greater movement and autonomy outside of the home. From the 1960s, TV 
watching became standard entertainment with the near-universal ownership of TV sets but 
the introduction of cable and satellite TV, videos and the increasing privatization of 
telecommunications, more and more specialist broadcasts could be received. Furthermore, 
young people are increasingly likely to have such technology to themselves in their own 
bedrooms. Since the mid-1980s the increasing use of compact discs and computers allow 
more access to visual as well as aural communication and these technologies allow 
privatized consumption of mass culture by individuals or small groups. The video market too 
has expanded with 60per cent of homes in Britain owning videos and 19per cent having 
home computers by the 1990s (Social Trends 1992). In future, combinations of these 
technologies will make the international transmission of styles and cultures even more 
accessible. This allows the differentiation of young people within the family - they can 
increasingly retreat to their own rooms and own life-styles (Hartmann 1987).
This has lead some to identify a form of 'individualization' in these activities: young people's 
activities and goods are increasingly controlled by them rather than subject to external 
control. There have also been changes in the forms of social activity young people engage in.
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The evidence seems to suggest that more loose, unstructured leisure time, particularly 
parties outside of adult control have become more common (Zinnecker and Fuchs 1981, 
Damm 1985) resulting in greater leisure time independence. There have also been changes 
in the extent of parental control over this period. One indicator of this is that whereas in 1968 
2per cent of males and 1per cent of females had no restrictions on when they should arrive 
home, in 1978 it was 48per cent and 42per cent respectively (Damm 1985). Thus the 
increasing independence of young people is possible through youth and consumer culture.
Participation in youth cultures and this form of unsupervised unstructured leisure, however, is 
not equally enjoyed by everyone. This is a phenomenon associated with urban areas where 
there are places to meet, cultural 'scenes' to colonize and where there are centers of 
communication for fashions to spread. In the rural parts of Europe, such trends are not so 
well developed. Young people have less opportunity to find out about such things and their 
activities are absorbed more into local community events: the fairs and carnivals, the fire 
brigade and red cross, which involve all age groups. The use of young people’s labour in 
agriculture also allows young people less recreational time (Wallace et al. 1994). Young 
women also have less access to leisure, being more likely to have to do housework in all 
countries and being more restricted by parents (Zinnecker and Fuchs 1981, Griffin 1985).
From the 1970s there was a change in the way in which youth popular culture was 
interpreted. Youth culture became less something which was outside and more an integral 
part of popular culture generally. The more recent generation of sociologists, brought up on 
rock music themselves, saw popular music in a more positive light. Frith (1978) for example, 
rejects what he describes as the 'Leavisite' tradition of snobbery towards popular music and 
argues instead for its creative and progressive qualities. It is not, he argues, just a product of 
commercial exploitation, but also a question of the creative output of young people 
themselves, who have access to more cultural forms and modes of expression. Whilst on the 
one hand, it was true that capital was concentrated increasingly in the hands of large 
transnational companies and in order to be successful, music had to be internationally 
appealing - bland, non regional, non political - on the other hand, music became increasingly 
differentiated. Popular music had an important meaning for different sub-cultural groups, as 
we shall describe in more detail later. Willis (1990) has argued that popular music makes an 
'unarticulated' appeal and can appear to be rebelling against what is perceived as 'normal' 
life. Music also makes a space for the creation of small group or individual following of 
particular styles and fashions so that instead of constituting an undifferentiated 'mass culture’ 
or a culture clearly defined by class layers, it became differentiated according to styles and 
taste. This lead sine sociologists to analyze popular music as a cultural phenomenon and a 
succession of studies of punk (Laing 1985), Acid House (Redhead 1990 and 1993), hip hop 
(Ross an Rose 1994) and other styles followed. The study of popular music became genre in 
its own right.
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A shift also occurred in the analysis of young people’s magazines. The early feminist 
analyses of these magazines tended to be very critical of their style and content and the 
'teeny bopper' culture which they promoted, describing it as „one of the most highly 
manufactured forms of available youth culture - it is almost totally packaged" (McRobbie and 
Garber 1976: 220, Sarsby 1983, McRobbie 1978). They described young women as 
graduating from one type of magazine to another in age-specific bands. The magazines gave 
them detailed instructions on clothes and behavior and included advertisements for 
cosmetics and clothes to help them attain these ideals. They were devoted to a more or less 
non-stop narcissistic concern with femininity. By the 1990s however, such magazines were 
devoted less to patronizing instructions on how to be feminine than on how to develop an 
authentic personnel style - from a ‘modern’ emphasis upon age specific conformity to a ‘post­
modern’ emphasis on differentiation. The new magazines are keen to respond quickly to the 
development of new styles and taste amongst young people rather than trying to guide those 
tastes (McRobbie 1991, Lury 1996).
Whereas the earlier studies were concerned with what was produced in the popular media for 
young people - assuming that they were the passive consumers of such output - more recent 
studies emphasize the creativity and selectivity in the way these messages were received. 
In the 1980s a new approach to youth cultures developed, one which instead celebrated the 
variety and opportunity offered by consumer culture. McRobbie’s own auto-critique illustrates 
this as she moved from seeing young women's magazines as examples of commercial 
exploitation, towards looking at the different ways in which young women read or interpreted 
such literature and expressed themselves creatively through it (see McRobbie 1991). Young 
people did not simply passively absorb all the advertisements and media images directed at 
them; instead they selectively interpreted them and re-appropriated elements for their own 
purposes in a re-reading of cultural texts outside the full control of the purveyors of mass 
media (Nava 1992). Paul Willis (1990) exhorted us to look at this as 'grounded aesthetics’ of 
young people’s cultural activity. Far from young people being the passive and defenseless 
victims of commercial media as portrayed by Seabrook, Hoggart and others, they are in fact 
some of the most sophisticated audiences of such messages, being a generation brought up 
in a world of visual signs. The development of new media such as videos, recording and 
publishing technology made it possible to produce or copy materials relatively quickly and 
cheaply, thus making the styles also more accessible through less commercialized media 
such as ‘fanzines’.
One could argue that the influence of mass media culture over popular styles was reversed. 
Hence, although hippie and punk styles may have begun as reactions against commercial 
culture, with the rejection of mainstream materialism by the former and the flaunting of the 
debris of commercial culture such as safety pins and plastic bags in the latter, they were both 
in turn absorbed into main stream styles and even haute couture - Zandra Rhodes for 
example produced diamond studded safety pins and expensive, ‘designer’ ripped jeans 
(Hebdidge 1979, Martin 1983). Now ‘trend spotters' from magazines and fashion houses are
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sent out to mingle in the discoteques and city streets. McRobbie (1991) claims that feminism 
and other counter -cultures also affected women’s magazines as those aimed at young 
women addressed more serious issues and 'alternative' magazines, such as 'Spare Rib', 
gained a wide circulation. The power rather than the powerlessness of the consumer was 
emphasized (Nava 1992).
Moreover, although young women had previously been portrayed as those most 
subordinated to consumer culture, they were now analyzed in terms of the power which this 
brought to them in exercising consumer choice. There are also attempts to reinterpret 
retrospectively, the more conservative mass culture of the past as a way in which different 
femininities were constructed - and resisted. Lesley Johnson (1993) for example, looking 
back to the 1950s sees a number of different dimensions to the construction of femininity in 
popular culture and a number of ways in which women could actively express their identities 
through this. Men's magazines and advertising directed at men has also taken on aspects of 
narcissistic pleasurable consumption as the image of the 'new man' have helped to create 
alternative masculinities, influenced by gay sub-cultures.
This way of looking at youth culture is influenced by 'post modernist' ideas. The extensive 
production - or over production - of images, signs and styles encourages of a re-assembling 
of common identities around different themes. People can develop individual tastes and 
styles based no longer upon social position in the class systems or relation to the means of 
production, but according to these free-floating images, as ’consumer tribes' and symbols can 
be reinterpreted and their reinterpretations reinterpreted in an endless 'pastiche' of 
styles(Lash 1990). Hence for example, rave culture of the 1980s used symbols such as tie- 
dyed garments and 'smiley’ symbols from the 60s youth cultures but re-cycled then in the 
context of new sub-cultures (Redhead 1990 and 1993). Rather than a dominant youth 
culture there are a variety of different ‘scenes', some continuing from original sub-cultures 
(such as rockers, heavy metal), some re-cycled from the past and some using elements of 
other sub-cultures to forge new styles. Youth culture is characterized not by a definitive set of 
characteristics which can be described and catalogued, but by its evanescence and 
ephemerality. A person can dip into many different styles and music as the sub-cultures 
rapidly come and go.
This attention to consumer culture inherent in more post-modern perspectives has resulted in 
the celebration rather than the critique of commercial representation and a fascination with 
advertising and symbolic culture. Attention is diverted from the structural inequalities which 
this conceals. However, access to consumer culture is to a greater or lesser extent 
determined by incomes and incomes are unevenly distributed (Jones and Wallace 1992). 
With very high youth unemployment in many parts of Europe, this is an important factor. 
Another problem is that in analyzing style, culture and representation, young people 
themselves disappear from view. Some cultural sociologists still emphasize the importance of
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understanding the material context from which the styles arose and the actual activities of 
young people rather than only their representations (Willis 1990).
The increasing dependency of young people upon the household and family results in their 
dwindling economic power at the same time as increasing participation in consumer culture is 
possible. This paradoxical situation means that new consumer groups emerge as significant. 
For example rather than working class young people being identified as the significant 
consumers - as in the 1950s and 1960s - these are increasingly unemployed or languishing 
on low incomes or on training schemes. Rather it is the students, mostly middle class, who 
emerge as the most leisure-rich consumer group. They have both greater access to more 
forms of consumption and a greater inclination to take advantage of them being subsidized 
both by state and by parents (Roberts, Campbell and Furlong 1990).
Popular Culture in Eastern Europe
In the communist half of Europe commercial cultures were not allowed to develop as the 
regimes prioritized production over consumption until the 1970s and the inefficient distribution 
system in an economy of perpetual shortages ensured that consumer choice was minimal or 
non-existent. Furthermore the mass media were controlled by the state which broadcast 
television, radio and controlled the output in cinemas and other places of entertainment. 
Despite these limitations, mass culture had an important impact. In communist Bulgaria and 
in Russia youth cultures also developed from the 1950s onwards, encouraged by the 
increase in leisure time, increasing urbanization with concentration of young people in 
geographical spaces and the spread of mass media and access to consumer technology 
such as tape recorders and radios. By the 1960s and 1970s, youth cultures were widespread 
amongst people between ages 14 and 28. Although they were met at first with animosity, by 
the 80s, youth culture began to be seen as a normal part of young people's behavior.
Time budget studies carried out in the 1970s found a considerable rise in the amount of free 
time enjoyed by young people - they did less housework and less paid labour than their 
equivalents in the 1950s (Pateva 1982). This trend was consistent across all groups, 
although girls did more housework than boys and the amount of free time rose with 
educational level. Communist ideology encouraged 'active' - that is socially productive - 
leisure, such as participating in sports or folk-dancing, rather than 'passive' leisure such as 
watching television or listening to music, but young people were more active in the former as 
well as the latter pursuits (Pateva 1982, Mitev 1982).
From the 1960s and 1970s there was what sociologists identified as a „revolution in the mode 
of living" (Mitev 1982). The number of objects for 'cultural use' such as tape recorders, TV 
sets and radios increased sharply between 1962 and 1974 but most of all amongst young 
people. Thus, although young people had the lowest incomes of all groups in communist
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society where access to goods and income was based upon seniority, they nevertheless 
owned a higher share of tape recorders and other media technology (Mitev 1982). It was 
common for young people on getting married to first buy a tape recorder and only thereafter a 
cooker! In Russia young people were ingenious in inventing ways of creating records for 
reproducing music, fashioning their own music instruments and sound systems, all of which 
was carried out in private flats (Riordan 1989a).
Music was particularly popular with young people in communist countries and here it was the 
international styles which were important, even though young people had limited access to them 
(Western music was broadcast for about 5per cent of the time - otherwise they had to listen to it 
from foreign broadcasts if they were able to reach them). Surveys carried out in Estonia by 
Mejnert (1987) found that in 1984 40per cent of young people listened to western music 
everyday and even in 1974 pop music was followed by 96per cent of the young people up to 
age 19 and 77per cent of those up to age 29. Age rather than social status was the 
differentiating factor in musical tastes. Younger age groups also visited discotheques - which 
were restricted in number - and developed localized sub-cultures within them.
Cinema was similarly very important for the spread of mass culture for young people, 
particularly in the 1950s and 1960s when it was the most popular form of entertainment. 
Occasionally it was possible to see western movies, which developed a theme of youth within 
a mass culture. However, the dominant diet was of Soviet 'socialist realist' films which 
addressed social problems in a didactic way and invariably had a happy ending since the 
purpose of cinema was to educate rather than only entertain (Stefanov 1975). (This prompted 
the joke: Is it a good film? No, it's Soviet)
However, participation in youth culture also involved 'symbolic production' through 
developing distinctive styles of hair dressing, dancing and clothing. For young people in 
eastern block countries where consumer choices were non-existent and even basic 
commodities in short supply, obtaining fashionable clothing, such as jeans, was a major 
achievement. Nevertheless they went to great lengths to collect money and procure such 
items. Unlike in western Europe, the planned socialist economies were completely 
unresponsive to youth styles and tastes which were developed outside rather than through 
the official distribution system. In the 1950s, the 'stiliagi' in Moscow developed their own 
‘stylish’ models of dress which differentiated them from what they regarded as the shabby 
banality which surrounded them and was revived in their followers in the 1980s (Pilkington 
1994). Participation in youth culture distinguished urbanized and non-urbanized youth, but 
also different ethnic sub-cultures: dancing and music were important components of the 
cultural activities of Roma youth who developed their own taste in colorful, flamboyant 
clothes and tattoos, outside mainstream society (Georgiev 1978).
The spread of mass youth culture which we have described in Bulgaria was a manifestation 
of the creation of a distinctive collective identify for youth, separating them from other
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sections of society. It created a new mentality in which hedonism was a basic principle. 
Hedonism was alien to the old values, both those of the pre-war non-industrial society and 
those of the post-war society of socialist transformation, when hard labour and personal 
sacrifice were sacralised as leading goals. The studies which documented the transformation 
in culture from the 1960s found distinct generational changes in the way in which people 
spent their time and the value they attached to different activities. This implies that the 
development of a youth culture helped to transform people's life-styles towards a more 
consumer and entertainment dominated values - a distinct contrast to traditional eastern 
European society. This helped to create communication barrier between the older and 
younger generations in societies where this was not supposed to 'officially’ exist. However, 
rather than a generational war, Pilkington (1994) recommends that we see these cultures as 
part of an interlocking set of generational relations, since they coexisted with strong familial 
solidarity.
The authorities were suspicious of every activity which differentiated people from the 
conformity to the officially sanctioned norm. They wished to impose 'ideologically pure' norms 
for young people's dress, behavior, music and artistic pursuits. This control over cultural 
preferences was called 'aesthetic education' and consequently, youth cultures were 
proclaimed an 'ideological diversion'. Rock music in particular was subject to political hostility, 
being explained as ideological indoctrination by imperialistic forces (Sarkitov 1987) and even 
social research on youth was justified in terms of the part it could play in aesthetic 
governance and ideological struggle against western influences (Stefanov 1978). In the most 
extreme instances it was blamed for the revival of fascism. The cultural struggle took the 
form of intolerance to youth styles such as beards, jeans, long hair and short skirts and this 
could be justified not by reference to Marxist theory so much as to gerontocratic conformity 
and intolerance of anything which deviated from it. Young people with long hair or beards 
were stopped and had it cut off on the spot by police officers (although they protested that 
Marx and Engles themselves had sported flowing hair and beards!). The carefully purchased 
and treasured jeans were ripped, badges were torn off and girls wearing short skirts were 
stamped on the thighs with an official seal! Young people's gestures were seen as 'acts of 
sabotage against the state' and for this reason their importance was magnified both by the 
authorities and by young people themselves. In this way, youth cultures became a major 
vehicle for confrontation between the 'older' authorities and the younger, more creative and 
style-conscious generation.
A similar process happened in Russia where music became popular amongst young people 
from the late 1950s and western sub-cultural artifacts, music and information spread rapidly 
amongst young people through informal channels (Riordan 1989b). From the late 1960s the 
Beatles became particularly popular and there is still a memorial to John Lennon in Prague, 
previously a symbol of protest and now a tourist attraction. Rock music had a huge unofficial 
following and very soon Russian groups emerged with their own distinctive approach to rock 
music, Paul Easton (1989) points out that in Russian rock music the lyrics were more
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important than in western music and these expressed joking cynicism and alienation. He 
attributes the popularity of rock music to the fact that during the Brezhnev years there was 
growing alienation of young people from the system and disillusionment with socialist values 
and particularly from Komsomol, the organization which was supposed to represent them. 
Youth culture and music filled a cultural gap, giving the opportunity for creativity and self- 
expression. As in Bulgaria they were first of all resisted by the authorities and then in the 
1980s there were attempts to incorporate the music and the personalities which were by that 
time very famous, by broadcasting the music on state radio and offering concert venues. 
Members of the youth sub-cultures that developed around rock music were against doing 
regular work and preferred instead part-time work or work which required little commitment 
from them in order to spend more time on rock music. They were also against military 
service. In Poland distinctive rock groups such as Manaam developed from the 1970s with 
their own following. It would be wrong to say therefore (as the authorities did) that these were 
simply western imports.
The way in which Bulgarian authorities fought back can be seen as typical and took two 
main forms. First they tried diversion by attempting to win over young people by staging 
official collective events which would typically include music, entertainment and activities 
which could be officially controlled and gave the right ideological messages. However, these 
staged events were not popular with young people and they were unwilling to participate in 
them (Stefanov 1975). Secondly they acted repressively by tightening control over schools 
and University programmes and finally by passing a decree in 1987 which forced students up 
to the age of 18 to wear uniforms, short hair and allowed them out after 8pm only in the 
company of their parents and only to approved venues. Such clumsy efforts of controlled 
provoked even more outraged disapproval from young people who interpreted this as a 
violation of their rights as citizens. As one young man put it:
This order is unconstitutional. Since I am 18 years old, I have civil rights and 
the prohibition on me visiting theaters and restaurants and ordering me to put 
on my pajamas is not right. Why is it possible for me to be allowed to vote 
alone but not to visit a restaurant except in the company of my mother?
Perhaps the President thinks that participation in an election is of less 
importance (Mitev 1988: 94)
In Russia there were similar attempts to first of all condemn and later incorporate youth 
popular culture through the reform of the Komsomol. Pilkington (1994) argues that the issue 
of youth became increasingly politicized through the glasnost era. There it ended not in the 
overthrow of the regime by popular movements but rather in the weakening of state authority 
and the loss of direction in youth policy. The result of such oppressive measures was to 
politicize the conflict. However, it was not a struggle by youth for a share of power that was 
important, so much as a confrontation between those who had the power to impose their 
tastes and cultural standards and those who wished to escape such control and to pursue
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their own tastes. Although this did not begin as a struggle to question the legitimacy of the 
regime, when young people were cast in the role of agents of alien capitalist interests in this 
way, they began to re-consider their attitude towards the state.
However, other, more reform-minded party officials saw this struggle as provoking 
unnecessary antagonism and recommended that crude state intervention be replaced by a 
tolerance of youth taste and individualized differentiation, using youth culture as a 'social 
safety valve' for youthful energy and enthusiasm (Michajlov 1986). Such reformist recom­
mendations, did not win much favour. Yet by the 1980s saw the growing importance of youth 
sub-cultures helped to further break down this old order so that the authorities were forced to 
tolerate them, being increasingly unable to control them.
In Russia, the issue of controlling the explosion of youth sub-cultures during the 1980s took 
the form of trying to distinguish those who could easily be incorporated into the official youth 
provision, those who could be wooed to acceptance and those who were simply anti-social, 
to be suppressed. The association of some sub-cultural groups with fascism was of particular 
concern to the authorities for whom the use of the swastika symbol, such as that used by 
punks in London, was anything but playful given the bitter history of Russia’s experience of 
the Second World War. This resulted in some quite imaginative efforts by Komsomol 
members to offer opportunities for bikers for example to practice their biking in controlled 
circumstances and to negotiate between them and the traffic police, with whom they were in 
constant collision (Pilkington 1994). However, as in Bulgaria, many sub-cultures rejected the 
idea of becoming incorporated into official structures and institutions and the reform activities 
of the ‘grass roots’ Komsomol organizers was often frustrated by conservative colleagues 
higher up the hierarchy.
Youth Sub-cultures
So far we have looked at youth cultures as an aspect of consumer society and mass media 
more generally. Now we shall consider more youth sub-cultures as more specific in time, 
place and style. The term is used rather loosely to denote specific local activities and also to 
describe more widespread styles such as 'punk' 'hippie' and so on.
There have been a number of ways in which sub-cultures have been approached by 
sociologists and these have been extensively reviewed by Brake (1980, 1990), Pilkington 
(1994) and Wulff (1995) among others. This approach began with the study of delinquent 
groups in the USA in the 1920s and 1930s and was later reproduced in Britain and 
elsewhere. The most common approach until recently was to focus on working class young 
men and their assertion of a 'space' as a source of control between home, work and school 
(Ashton and Field 1976, Corrigan 1979, Willis 1977, Robbins and Cohen 1978). Since they 
were granted little status in the outside world, young men created their own sense of status
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and this was linked to the fact that these were the group with the highest disposable incomes. 
Sub-cultures according to Brake (1980) were associated with a particular style of dress and 
behaviour, a particular argot and a particular kind of music and these were a response to the 
'contradictions’ in the parent culture and in the world around them. These early sub-cultures, 
mostly associated with small, localized groups, provoked angry reactions from adults and 
from mainstream society who associated then with violence, sexual promiscuity and lack of 
respect for adult values. However, as these 'anti-social' elements were given considerable 
publicity, the sub-cultures spread to other areas and became more generalized in Britain. 
One famous example of this were the Bank Holiday fights between Mods and Rockers which 
were analyzed by Stan Cohen as 'moral panics' which paradoxically served to further 
enhance the sub-culture (Cohen 1972). The condemnation of such ‘folk devils’ by the mass 
media encouraged a ‘backlash’ that 'something should be done’ which further encouraged 
others to imitate the sub-culture,
Cohen's work was further developed in by the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
(CCCS) and others ( Hall and Jefferson 1976, Mungham and Pearson 1976) who used 
variants of Marxism to show how different youth sub-cultures represented different social 
classes. Although only a small minority of young people joined such sub-cultures, they could 
be seen as a 'metaphor for social change' representing in dramaturgical form the issues 
facing more conformist youth. They rejected the notion of age as a theoretical concept and 
argued that youth cultures should be understood by reference to class (Murdock and McCron 
1976). They also rejected the 'classless' conception of youth put forward by the media. 
Another influential perspective was that of Phil Cohen (1972, 1997) who indicated that the 
class contradictions which young people faced were related to material changes in their own 
neighborhoods - the decline of the working class communities following the destruction of the 
old houses in urban renewal programmes, the building of tower blocks and the drift to the 
suburbs, the decline of many traditional jobs in the East End of London. Skinheads, he 
argued, tried to recreate 'magically' the lost solidarity of their parents class and hence 
provided 'solutions' at an symbolic level to these contradictions. At the same time it posed a 
symbolic resistance to the dominant hegemony dictating 'correct' behavior by both drawing 
on working class traditions and providing some innovations. In addition more ethnographic 
approaches looked at car thieves (Parker 1976) or cultural groups in housing estates 
(Jenkins 1983) to understand the importance of sub-cultures for working class young people. 
Some of the best publicized of these cultures was that of the football supporters who would 
violently defend the honour of their club against other fans and who followed British football 
teams around Europe.
The perspective developed by the CCCS was enormously influential in understanding youth 
sub-cultures and was used for analyzing such groups all around the world from Sydney to 
St.Petersburg. The CCCS approach of classifying and describing sub-cultures in terms of 
their class location and describing their behaviour and style was imitated in many different 
contexts. They described Teds, Skinheads, Rockers, Mods, Hippies and so on as an
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historical procession of class-based groups. Others, such as Hebdigde (1978, 1988) have 
tended to emphasize the spectacular aspects of sub-cultures and their emphasis on style 
itself as a signifier, cut loose from material conditions. Hebdidge analyzes youth styles as a 
kaleidoscope of gestures, as reactions to one another as much as to social conditions. By the 
1990s it became more difficult to identify the class components of sub-cultures such as 'punk' 
or ‘Acid House’ which tended to be eclectic in their social mix and to become incorporated 
very quickly into main stream fashions (Redhead 1990). Furthermore, the 1980s saw the 
very rapid producaiton and reproduction of sub-cultures as old ones were invented, new ones 
revived and some, such as Acid House in Britain or stiliagi in Moscow, adopted some of the 
styles of previous sub-cultures as self conscious 'quotations' (Pilkington 1994). The 
development of sophisticated and reflexive sub-cultural awareness and the media search for 
new trends and styles amongst youth resulted in a very rapid turnover or sub-cultures. This 
means that styles which were intended to shock mainstream culture are very rapidly 
absorbed back into mainstream culture and turned into commercial consumer artifacts. This 
reflexive relationship between sub-cultures and commercial culture is reflected in popular 
music as we previously described, but also in fashions, dances and vocabulary. The display 
of the body, the adoption of fashionable styles becomes something for everyone, not just for 
youth. Furthermore, such sub-cultures were no longer so strongly associated with youth as 
older sub-cultures, such as hippies or rockers, continued to exist along with many of their 
increasingly older adherents. Thus, even age as an aspect of youth sub-culture started to 
dissolve (Lury 1996).
Steve Redhead (1990) argues that not only is the analsyis of youth sub-cultures in terms of a 
succession of symbolic resistences to class positions impossible to sustain in the 1980s, but 
that it was probably a mistaken approach even previously. Drawing upon Baudrillard, he 
argues that sub-cultures can better be analyzed in terms of ecstatic spectacle, escape and 
attempts to have fun. He bases his ideas on the study of ‘Rave Culture’ associated with large 
parties of up to 5000 young people drawing upon a range of sub-cultures and meeting at 
venues in the countryside or in warehouses. Indeed, 'having fun’ became almost a social 
movement as there were attempts to legally prevent such organized parties from taking place 
and to introduce a 3 am curfew on dancing.
The traditional studies of sub-cultures were predominantly about white, male working class 
youth. This prompted criticism of the absence of other groups and studies which aimed to 
document those other groups. Hence studies of black and Asian young people emerged 
(Cashmore 1987, Back 1996, Pryce 1979), as did studies of more middle class sub-cultures 
(Aggleton 1987) and a strident feminist critique encouraged more studies of girls’ sub-cultural 
activities which we address in the next section. The ethnographic tradition of studying small 
groups of young people as sub-cultures continued, however, as can be seen in the 
contributions to Redhead (1993), Pilkington (1994) and others.
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One of the interesting features of the ubiquity of sub-cultures since the 1980s is their 
internationalization. Styles and music can be spread very rapidly across international 
frontiers, especially using new media technology, but is a punk in Moscow the same as a 
punk in Manchester? What meaning do such sub-cultures have in different international 
contexts? For example, whereas in Britain 'punk1 was seen as both 'dole queue rock’ and the 
result of alternative artistic movements originating in Art Colleges (Laing 1985), in Germany, 
the 'punk' sub-culture, was not so much a response to rising unemployment as in England 
where it originated (according to Lindner 1985) but to the increasing institutionalization of 
youth as an age-phase and to the 'hippie' orientation of the parental generation. The punks 
were nicknamed the 'Null Bock' generation (Lindner 1985, Preuss-Lausitz 1983) because 
they rejected everything - not just the consumer and moral values of the restoration but also 
the critical values of their parents. The critical middle class had by this time become 
installed as the teachers, youth workers and social workers of the system and these were 
the people that the new generation came into contact with (Linder 1985, Preuss-Lausitz 
1983). Being the generation most subject competition for educational and training places, 
they were aiso the generation most likely to reject or reverse such aspirations in their sub­
cultures. 'Null Bock’ was also the reaction against the extension of adolescence and the 
increasing dependency of youth upon parents, education and training (Büchner 1990). Thus, 
similar sub-cultures in different parts of Europe were the result of different pressures and took 
on different meanings.
Youth Sub-cultures under Communism
The concept of sub-culture is useful too when considering the expressive behavior of young 
people in the ex-communist countries of eastern Europe. Under the former regimes youth 
cultures were a form of 'resistance' because any non-conformist expression of style became 
an act of defiance, even if it was not intended that way. The idea of youth sub-cultures 
developed in a West European context can therefore help us to understand the development 
of stylistic resistance and small alternative groups under the former regimes, particularly 
during the latter decades of communism. We have already touched upon the threat which 
youth culture posed to communist authorities during the 1950s, 60s and 70s. By the 1980s 
these regimes were suffering economic crisis and it was evident to many that living standards 
were falling far behind the consumer oriented western Europe, which some were able to 
watch on their TV screens. Attempts to respond somewhat to the consumer demands of their 
citizens resulted in a growing dependency upon foreign loans in many countries, during a 
decade squeezed by an international debt crisis and rising interest rates. The stagnation in 
the labour market and in young people's prospects was further compounded by the 
ideological exhaustion of the regimes. In the last decade of communism youth cultures 
ceased to be seen as threatening and became more widespread. The state monopoly on 
broadcasting and the arts was undermined by the spread of new media technologies such as 
satellite TV and the clandestine circulation of cassette tapes and later videos, which could be 
easily copied and pirated. Music replaced cinema as the most popular form of entertainment,
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accessible to small groups and helping to create a private space around which small sub­
cultures could develop in a way not conceivable in more collective forms of entertainment 
(Mitev 1988).
Whilst in the 1950s small numbers of young people had modeled themselves on the 'beats' 
and in the 1960s the 'hippies', in the 1980s sub-cultures became both more common and 
more diffused. Punks appeared even in what was to become Russia, where they were 
termed 'British horrors' and sub-cultures took on a self-conscious form of stylistic political 
opposition (Svitek 1990, Riordan 1989b). The enthusiasm for music allowed personal tastes 
to be developed outside of 'official' state control and could be interpreted as a reaction to the 
devaluation of words into official slogans: music by contrast offered a direct, hedonistic and 
sensual form of expression beyond and incorruptible by linguistic communication (Mitev 
1985a). It was also diametrically opposed in form to the technological orientation of the 
official Komsomol organizations with its progress-dominated 'movement for scientific and 
technical development' (Okeanov-Dimitrov 1989). Thus the pleasure seeking aspect to music 
offered an escape from the rationalistic-technological official values and in doing so, 
subverted them.
However, music was not the only basis for creating youth sub-cultures. Participation in 
certain sports as both actors and fans also constituted a basis for the formation of youth sub­
cultures. Small knots of young people followed football teams, football players or started 
skate-boarding cliques, developing their own rituals of interaction and specific values. This 
too could be seen as a reaction to the over-bureaucratized, over-formalized state 
organization of 'mass physical culture and sports'. Playing sports in non-formal, non-official 
groups was a way of searching for self-identity and expression under a communist regime. 
Thus these groups became knows as the 'non formáis' and could encompass a variety of 
activities from local neighbourhood gangs to alternative social movements.
Young participants in these small, spontaneous groups, which developed in many places 
throughout eastern Europe, saw sub-cultures as a style of living and a way of searching for 
authentic self-realization, created and reinforced by group identity. These offered an escape 
from the discipline and formal regulation of daily life. Whilst official policy and media treated 
all these groups as the same, for young people the specific characteristics of each group 
made all the difference in the world and this explains the clashes and sometimes even 
outbursts of violence between sub-cultural groups, as happened in Kazan in Russia 
(Pilkington 1994). In Russia such groups became based increasingly on territorial control: 
gangs of youths from one suburb would fight against those from other suburbs and those 
from one sub-culture would hunt and fight those from another (Riordan 1989b).
The sub-cultures of the 1980s were fundamentally different to the mass youth culture of the 
1960s and 1970s. Whereas in the former times a common love of rock music and 
unconventional dress had fused young people into a general force as 'we the restricted'
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against the gerontocracy of 'they the restricters' (Stojchev 1989), the later youth sub-cultures 
represented a different phenomenon. They were dispersed into different kinds of groups and 
cliques with different identities and purposes. However, there were still important differences 
between these and western sub-cultures. Sub-cultures in eastern block countries could not 
be so easily identified with particular social strata, but rather with age and with region, with 
whether they lived in an urban or a rural context. The spread of such cultures was a 
manifestation of the conflict between formal institutions and the non-formal forms of youth 
spontaneity and initiative; between an official, state-supported culture and an unofficial more 
direct and meaningful forms of cultural expression. This espousal of alternative forms of 
expression lead to conflicts within the home too (Mitev1988).
Research on youth sub-cultures was carried out in the early 1980s in Bulgaria inspite of 
official pressure, but the final report was censured: officials stated that no such groups 
existed. Nevertheless the report (which carried the stamp 'top secret' and is now a 
bibliographical rarity) found that there was a definite change in the formation of sub-cultures 
in the 1980s with more groups being formed and more members in them (Mitev 1984). The 
most numerous group were the 'poppers' who were teenagers from the elite grammar and 
specialized schools. From wealthy parents, they were able to visit restaurants frequently and 
use imported tobacco and alcohol. Heavy metal followers also existed and these were mostly 
workers of between 20 and 22 along with students in technical schools. Hippies were mostly 
students in Higher Education, especially in arts and humanities faculties of Universities, 
whereas the punks were mainly from evening schools, professional and secondary schools. 
They aimed to be the most provocative „Not everything can be explained in words. ... We are 
generally against every theory“ (ibid.: 9). Rocker groups were associated with the cult of the 
motorbike (even though not all of them owned motorbikes). Music was very important for all 
these groups „Through their songs the punks express that they have their freedom, that they 
do what they like" (Mitev 1984:19). However, non-formal groups were also concerned with 
styles of clothes, poetry, songs and theatre performances - all manner of forms of 'self 
expression'.
In the Soviet Union there was a veritable 'youth revolution' in the 1980s as perestroika 
allowed the emergence of groups that had previously been underground and encouraged the 
formation of new ones. Some of the best known include groups who wore western clothes 
and followed western fashions (the 'muzhery'). As a reaction, other, anti-western groups 
formed, one of these being the 'Lyubery' named after an industrial suburb of Moscow. They 
practiced physical fitness and set themselves up as vigilante groups who attacked 
westernized youth and aimed to rid their areas of corruption. One initiation ceremony was to 
beat up punks. Riordan (1989b) attributes their existence to the bleak lives of young people 
in the industrial cities who were envious of the more cosmopolitan existence of young people 
in the big cities where there was greater access to cultural resources. Another group which 
he identifies are the 'Afgantsy', veterans from the Afghan war who were unable to settle back 
into civilian life and were embittered by the changes they found on returning to their homes.
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Like the Lyubery, these were 'muscular socialists'. These became of the objects of 
recruitment by nationalist parties, and there were even some fascists sporting neo-nazi 
insignia. Rockers were an already well established group who emerged into greater 
prominence with perestroika, and these were joined later by punks. To some extent these 
were only anti-establishment posturing „If Pravda's for it, I'm against it" in the words of one 
group member (ibid.: 135) but there was also a tendency for neighbourhood gangs to form 
who became involved in drug taking, black market trading and other forms of illegal activity.
There were a large number of people studying the youth sub-cultures at this time in Russia 
according to Pilkington (1994) and numerous explanations were offered by psychologists and 
sociologists for the presence of such groups. During the Perestroika period, explanations 
began to emerge which did not simply follow the line that these were examples of western 
subversion. Rather, they were explained in terms of the mental ‘sickness’ of the adherents 
(many punks for example were treated for mental illness) or in terms of the contradictions of 
late Soviet society, or because of their alienation from official structures of power. Pilkington 
(1994) offers and fascinating and comprehensive analysis of these explanations.
Studies carried out in the Czech Republic also found youth sub-cultures had formed by the 
1980s. One group had a western orientation and were mainly consumer oriented. For them 
the communist system prevented them from pursuing the consumer life-styles which they 
believed they would be able to do in 'the West'. These frequented discotheques, wore 
western clothes and were concerned with having and spending money. The second group 
were more idealistic, associated with movements for ecology or social reform. In religious 
areas they were also associated with religion. The final group were the 'negatives' who were 
mostly working class and apprentice youth who joined punk and other opposition sub­
cultures and were sometimes involved with drug-taking. Theirs was not so much a political 
protest as a desire to shock (Stastna 1988 unpublished report).
Although in Britain sub-cultures were associated mainly with working class youth - at least in 
the early decades after the Second World War - in communist countries they were often quite 
privileged groups of people. The rockers who could gain access to motorbikes and those who 
were able to dress in western clothes were children of privileged elite parents who could 
afford to subsidize this kind of life-style: it was out of reach for normal youth. Therefore, 
ironically, it was the sons and daughters of the elite who espoused this kind of cultural 
protest.
In Bulgaria, the reaction of the authorities to youth sub-cultures in the 1980s was in some 
ways similar to that of twenty years earlier. The hostility was more open this time and 
became a topic of concern at the highest levels of the party hierarchy where the 'non-formals' 
were declared as one of the three main enemies of society according to a circular letter by 
one of the party secretaries (Raychev 1989). The Communist Party engaged the official 
youth organization, the Komsomol, In the struggle against non-formal youth activities. In a
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report to the Central Committee of the Youth League at its XV congress in 1987 the main 
strategy was proclaimed to be „to foresee and prevent the possibilities of negative, anti­
social directions in their (the youth groups') activities ... and to start categorical action with no 
hesitation“ (Stojkov 1987). The sub-cultures were declared as 'alternative' or 'negative 
deviations' and were accused of being agents of capitalist countries, or simply indoctrinated 
by them. Many such activates became criminalized and Ovchinskij (1987:86) after a survey 
of 386 such groups in the Soviet Union carried out between 1981 and 1986, found that nearly 
half to the leaders had been sentenced in court and spent time in penal institutions. Noting 
that the legal offenses of the non-formal youth groups were very wide, ranging from stealing 
to 'group hooliganism', the author warned of the danger of 'such seemingly sub-cultural 
deviations' leading young people further into a life of crime. However, attempts to suppress 
youth sub-cultures served to further alienate young people. As one said:
I want to dress as I like, to listen and watch punk groups over the radio and TV.
They do not issue punk music and even if it is introduced it would be forbidden 
because they are afraid that people would say immediately that this is a 
western tendency and it is not compatible with socialist ethics, that youth 
should not be corrupted. In this way I became embittered (Mitev 1984)
Other, more moderate attempts to stop the formation of such groups used instead what we 
might term a tactic of 'diversion'. This took the form of attempts to direct young people's 
tastes and activities into more 'normal' or conventional directions through administrative 
measures. State institutions such as the radio and the schools competed to counterpoise 
every new wave of music or style with old models, propagating a return to the sentimental 
music of the 'town shlagers' of their parents twenty years before or encouraging amateur art 
activities (Mitev 1988).
This strategy was grounded in the explanation of youth sub-cultures as mere imitations, 
copies of western styles with no cultural roots in eastern European countries. The 
explanation preferred to ignore the fact that new styles and music had also developed within 
communist countries and some of the information were spread from there. As one 
respondent put it:
It should be taken into consideration that gramophone records of heavy metal 
are issued in the USSR and that the badges and stripes that we wear are 
made in Hungary, another socialist country. They are not a western influence 
(Mitev 1984:19).
The 'imitation thesis' claimed that youth sub-cultures were rooted in the specific conditions of 
capitalist countries where 'youth is poor, hungry and unemployed' and hence there were no 
reasons for such deviant behavior under communism where such conditions did not apply
136 — Wallace and Kovatcheva /  Changing Times, Changing Lives — I H S
(Lisovkij 1985), Therefore youth who participated in such activities were accused of 'political 
apathy and lack of elementary political culture'.
However, this explanation of duplication and mimicry of western sub-cultures does not 
explain ail the variations which were found in eastern Europe. Lisovskij (see Mitev 1985a) 
described sub-cultural groups in Russia which had no counterpart in West Europe. The 
'Teljagas' defined themselves as a patriotic group and wore a 'teljega' - a type of jacket which 
had been common after the Second World War. All over eastern Europe music fans followed 
musical groups which adapted popular music in a national context and often achieved a 
considerable national following. In Poland, for example there were a number of waves of 
passing fashions of this kind. In Russia in 1983 alone, 42 music bands were disbanded by 
an order of the Ministry of Culture because they „did not meet elementary moral-aesthetic 
criteria'' (Lisovskij 1985, Kozakevich 1985).
A more popular explanation for youth sub-cultures and the following of music in Bulgaria was 
that this was an aberration, a means by which young people escaped from the 'true' 
problems of society. Sub-cultures were „a substitute for the true self-realization of youth" 
(Mitev 1985a:63). It was also claimed that in escaping institutional regulation, young people 
were merely trying to avoid their citizen's duties (Okeanov-Dimitrov 1989). This explanation 
lead to a third 'solution' to youth sub-cultures: one of incorporation. This was pursued by the 
Komsomol who tried to incorporate such groups within its organizational structure by 
accommodating 'groups according to interests'. This legalization and recognition of diversified 
groups was aimed to 'prevent their development into forms of protest or de-socialization' 
(Mitev 1988). This approach accepted sub-cultures as a normal part of youth behavior which 
may be 'alternative' to existing institutions but not necessarily hostile to them. This strategy, 
recommended by the Youth Institute, tried to steer a course between repressive measures 
and complete tolerance. This approach tried to channel the aberrant forms of 'self-realization' 
into more recognized official organizations; to formalize the 'non-formal' groups. The groups 
'according to interests' were granted access to premises and up-to-date technological 
equipment in return for incorporation and surveillance by Komsomol. These new tactics of 
incorporation, whilst recognizing youth sub-cultures, were an improvement on the clumsy 
efforts of the Komsomol in previous decades. However, they were still unable to fully 
institutionalize youth cultures.
Even these limited attempts at incorporation were met with fear and suspicion by senior party 
and Komsomol officials. They feared the disruption and fragmentation of the Youth League, 
seeing this as a rupture in its organizational unity. They accused the new strategies of 
'tearing apart the organization and leading to a drift towards, breakaway groups', thus causing 
a 'reduction of organizational-political influence of the Youth League' (Balkanski 1981). In the 
Soviet Union too, there were attempts to incorporate 'non formal' groups into Komsomol 
during the 1980s rather than suppress them, or deny their existence, in a belated attempt to
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reform the Communist Youth League. However, it was too late: the growth of the 'non 
formals' was by this time uncontrollable
The analysis of the 'problem' of youth sub-cultures under communism and the different 
solutions which flowed from that analysis all reflect a view of such spontaneous and non- 
formal activity as a threat to the mainstream institutional activity. Strategies of repression, 
diversion and incorporation all admit a fear of such forms of collective or individual 
expression. Although youth groups made no attempt to challenge political power, they 
challenged the regime by undermining the very basis of its functioning - authoritarian power 
and conformity. In fact sub-cultures sprang more from a desire to escape than to confront 
and allowed a cultural 'space1 where alternative identities could be formed (Svitek 1990). 
This was therefore a kind of spontaneous, unorganized protest which confronted the old, 
orthodox and conservative generation with new, fresh and spontaneous values.
Young Women and Sub-Cultures
The early feminist critiques of sub-cultural theories, such as that of McRobbie and Garber 
(1976) pose the question: can the absence of young women in sociological accounts be 
explained by the fact that they were really not active in sub-cultures, or were they rendered 
'invisible' by male researchers? It is likely that the radical male researchers who did the field 
work into youth sub-cultures identified with the excitement, the machismo and the iconoclasm 
of masculine sub-cultures which made them in turn critical of the role of the home and family 
which young women appear to represent: „The writers, having defined themselves as against 
the family and the trap of romance as well as against the boredom of meaningless labour, 
seem to be drawn to look at other, largely working class groups, who appear to be doing the 
same thing" (McRobbie 1978:39)
McRobbie and Garber answered their own question by arguing that young women were not 
present in male sub-cultures - apart from as girlfriends and hangers-on - because they 
have their own cultural forms of expression based upon the retreat from male defined 
situation into an alternative culture of 'femininity' based around the girls' bedroom and being 
a 'fan', which is seen here as a very restricted role. Working class girls' sub-culture was 
portrayed as peripheral to that of working-class boys and to the working-class as a whole 
and as being the most victims of packaged and commercialized culture which lead to me to 
be absorbed into an ideology of romance (Sarsby 1983, Sharpe 1976).
An alternative view of working class girlhood emerges from the study of young delinquent 
women, girls In gangs and young black women. In these studies young women are seen as 
more actively participating in sub-cultural groups or as forming their own sub-cultural groups 
or gangs and being critical of male superiority (Fuller 1980, Shacklady Smith 1978, Wilson 
1978, Campbell 1984). Despite this defiance, however, they still felt compelled to conform
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to the 'oppressive triangle' of love, sex and marriage in order to legitimize their participation in 
street culture. Sue Lees (1986) illustrated the way in which control was exercized over young 
women throuhg the use of negative sexual labeling, particularly the label of ‘slag’. Barbara 
Hudson (1986) using a more Foucauldian approach considers instead the contradictions 
between the discourses of youth, encouraging experimentation, storm and stress and those 
of femininity which encourage instead more passivity and conformity. Nevertheless, young 
women managed to create their own cultural spaces with friendship groups (Griffin 1985).
The feminist emphasis upon gender as an aspect of sub-cultures lead some people to re­
consider the role which masculinity plays within them. The necessity to assert masculinity 
through talk or through behaviour leads young men towards aggressive posturing, extremely 
sexist language and homophobic discourse and at times even real violence (Wood 1984, 
Mac an Ghaill 1994, Halson 1990). Masculine codes of conduct, it seems, oppress not only 
women but also men themselves.
In studying young women in Soviet society, Hilary Pilkington (1992a, 1992b) found that 
during the perestroika period young women were largely absent from descriptions of the 
many youth sub-cultures which were starting to develop there. Young women were portrayed 
in terms of their sexual relations with gang members, such as with rocker bike gangs for 
example, or disapprovingly in terms of their promiscuous sexual activities or involvement in 
prostitution. However, in her own study of one sub-culture she found that girls predominated, 
dressing in more masculine 'chic' styles in the manner of favourite female popular singers 
whose style and self-assertion were admired. They manipulated commercial culture in order 
to develop their own styles. On the other hand she finds considerable reference to the sexual 
regulation and subjugation of young women by youth gangs. Gang rape was an accepted 
way of controlling young female members in many parts of the former Soviet Union and from 
the perestroika period onwards, prostitution offered an apparently easy route to money in 
order to participate in new consumer styles. In her follow-up of the Moscow youth cultural 
scene in the post-communist era, Pilkington (1996) found greater use of drugs, the increasing 
importance of the club scene, the increasing influence of nationalist and chauvinist politics 
upon youth cultures (including the appearance of 'skinheads’) and an emerging gay and 
lesbian scene which was formerly heavily suppressed. There was greater diversification of 
youth cultures and some influence of national politics, a subject we take up in the next 
chapter.
Youth Sub-cultures and ethnicity
In the USA, sub-cultures were frequently studied in terms of ethnicity (see for example Whyte 
1944) and this developed from the classical 'urban ecology’ approach to their understanding. 
In Europe however, the study of sub-cultures looked mainly at white youth. Nevertheless, the 
presence of ethnic groups, especially black ones, were seen as having a significant effect on
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white sub-cultures which adopted black vocabulary, music and styles even whilst defining 
their identity through racism. Hebdige (1979) and Chambers (1985) even argued that youth 
culture has been a process of continual dialogue with black music and sub-culture, even 
when it was suppressed to an 'underground’ strand of popular culture.
Jazz from the USA took root in many parts of Europe and became influential in shaping 
musical tastes and the later black American soul music later came to dominate discotheques 
from the 1970s onwards. From the late 50's reggae music was imported into Britain by 
immigrants from the Caribbean and marketed through specialist ethnic record shops and 
labels for that community only. However, its influence soon spread as ‘reggae’ music and its 
various variations became part of mainstream popular culture. Some of this drew on 
elements of 'Rastafarianism', a Jamaican cult which drew upon pan-African ideas (Cashmore 
1987, Chambers 1985). The 'dread locks' of the Rastas became a popular emblem although 
there were only a small number of real adherents, the vocabulary and symbolism - for 
example the red, green and gold hats - were more widely adopted as elements of style 
throughout the world, especially by young black people. This and other black consciousness 
ideas were promulgated through reggae music. Through the use sound systems, DJ's 
developed their own distinctive commentary through ‘rapping’ - talking over the music - a 
form of rhythmic poetry expressing the condition of black youth, which in some variations was 
antagonistic towards white society. Nevertheless, rapping was soon taken up in many 
countries and many languages, used to express a range of feelings and issues which had 
little to do with the experiences of urban black people in the USA or Caribean islands where it 
originated. This could be seen as examples of the ‘post-colonial’ character of musical styles 
and sub-cultures. The ‘hip hop’ music, clothing and dancing which accompanied it, began as 
a 'street theatre’ among ethnic groups in blighted city districts of New York was also seen all 
over the world (Rose and Ross 1994).
The importance of black Americans for American popular music and the dissemination of 
their styles through the domination of US mass media has been a new source of meaning for 
young black people all over the world in very different communities. However, it also 
influenced youth in quite other contexts. In Hamburg during the Third Reich, for example, 
young people who were unwilling to conform to homogenizing demands of the youth 
organization and nationalist politics, identified with black American jazz and swing music as 
that of an oppressed group - but oppressed in quite a different way (Polster 1989). In 
traveling to Southern Africa, black American music has interacted with African music to 
create ‘township’ jazz which could in turn be reimported into mainstream western European 
musical styles. There is thus a ‘post-colonial’ dialogue between different cultures through 
popular music. Nor is it only black young people who have used musical sub-cultures to forge 
new ethnic styles. In Britain young Asians have combined disco music with traditional Asian 
sounds to create 'Bhangra’, sometimes in combination with other ethnic sub-cultures, whilst 
young Muslims in arab countries have also developed their own musical styles and 
identification through music (Schade-Poulsen 1994). The energy, vitality and originality which
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ethnic groups are able to bring to popular music has helped contribute to the diversification of 
popular culture and more post-modern styles of cross-cultural identification.
However, the other side to this 'post-colonial' diversity is the increasing racism, nationalism 
and intolerance which is also expressed through youth cultures - something we address in 
the next chapter.
Conclusion: the End of Youth Sub-cultures?
Youth sub-cultures have taken on different forms under different conditions. In the 
communist world they were a form of expressive escapism against forma! disciplinary control 
and the over-regulation of youth as an age group, whilst in western Europe they were 
interpreted as a form of escapism from the regulation of work life, made possible through 
possession of an income. Now that repressive control in eastern Europe has vanished and in 
western Europe working youth in a conventional labour market become increasingly rare, 
would we expect youth cultures to disappear?
We argue that this is not the case. The removal of some of the formal structures of an 
oppressive state and the increasing disappearance of affluent working class youth mean that 
youth cultures are not formed so often as reactions against this experience. But it is evident 
that in the 1990s some new dynamics are operating. The interaction of leisure with new 
consumer markets and technologies has meant an expanding range of styles and choices for 
young people whereby all the previous youth cultures are simultaneously present. The 
generally greater acceptance of popular music and sub-cultural styles is indicated in the fact 
that the BBC world service publicizes a range of music and analyzes their styles: from 
'Seattle grunge to Birmingham Bhangra' as they proudly announce. English teaching 
programmes translate and explain the text of popular songs as popular music moves from 
the margins to the mainstream. Communications technologies have made possible the 
broadcasting of stations devoted to specialist musical tastes.
However at the same time independent youth incomes have fallen. The evidence would 
seem to suggest that it is now students who are the most active participants in youth cultural 
activities whereas working class youth on training schemes, unemployed or on reduced 
wages are not so easily able to participate (Roberts, Campbell and Furlong 1990). These 
latter groups are most likely to be excluded from cultural participation. The escape from 
institutionalized regulation and control is that of the college, the University or the training 
scheme rather than the job or the state organization. It is no longer a case so much of 
Saturday night escapism being the only form of excitement because young people can 
escape all week in the more relaxed organizational environment of college or the University. 
Further and Higher Educational institutions offer the additional advantage of subsidized 
cultural activities, 'Student Unions' and a variety of clubs for organizing leisure events. Such
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institutional settings are perhaps more tolerant of individualized styles and tastes which may 
allow more fluid and evanescent sub-cultures. Moreover it is evident that young people can 
move around between sub-cultures and utilize different aspects of mass culture to suit their 
own needs.
The early penetration of western mass culture following the opening of the eastern European 
societies after 1989 took the form of a wave of pornographic and violent literature and media 
which was cheap and easily sellable. At the same time, the institutional arts have collapsed 
following the withdrawal of public subsidies and steep price rises which put other forms of 
culture out of the reach of young people. The national folk culture and music which had been 
fostered under communism was replaced by an internationalized pop culture. A retreat from 
ideologies and official, institutionalized politics means that more privatized forms of 
consumption and leisure have been further encouraged. The circulation of cassette and video 
tapes is still important, made accessible by the extensive 'shadow' market of illegal copies. 
One recent survey found that two-thirds of the households in which young people lived in 
Poland had a video player, one third had satellite dishes and over 90per cent had record or 
cassette players, which was not far behind many western European countries. But the videos 
are at present mainly copies of western movies, often junk ones. (Prompting the joke: Is the 
movie good? No, it's American).
Research in a number of post-communist countries seems to indicate an increasingly peer- 
group and youth-centered pattern of cultural interaction (Molnar 1992, Kjulanov et al. 1991). 
This has been interpreted as a reaction to the dissolving world of adults where older 
authorities have been displaced and discredited - a response to anomie rather than 
repression, of under-determination rather than over-determination. Peer groups offer a mode 
of communication and socialization in values and attitudes, sexual and social preferences. 
The old values and certainties against which popular opinion clashed was replaced by a 
period of rapid change and increasing uncertainty. Stable pay structures and inter- 
generational relations are replaced by ones of fluidity as young people are left to find their 
own age-status transitions in an increasingly diversified world. One product has been the 
rapid circulation of evanescent styles and sub-cultures and the co-existence of a variety of 
sub-cultures - but no longer as oppositional 'resistance'. However, there is in turn a reaction 
against the 60s-style 'alternative' dissident generation in the sharp cut suits and severely 
short hair of the young 'businessmen'.
However, there are still important regional differences, with access to cultural consumption 
concentrating in big cosmopolitan centres In regional areas the levels of individual 
consumption are extremely low or non-existent and most leisure time is spent with family and 
friends rather than consuming commercial leisure (Roberts et al. 1995). Consumer items 
owned by households are a shared resource and this is why the 'privatization' of consumption 
described by Jung (1994) is important because new technologies give access to international 
mass culture which can be enjoyed without leaving the living room. The generational
142 — Wallace and Kovatcheva /  Changing Times, Changing Lives — I H S
changes and self-assertiveness of youth needs to be seen in the context of very family- 
centred societies where soiidarity to ones own family still usually takes precedence 
(Pilkington 1994, Wallace 1995).
To return to our earlier question: is this the end of youth sub-cultures? It seems that the 
proliferation of sub-cultures and their absorption into commercial mass media, rock and 
fashion industries has on the one hand resulted in the increasing importance and acceptance 
of them but at the same time youth as a cultural force is dissolved. Youth cultures are 
endlessly recycled through retrospective nostalgia {60s parties etc.) and also through 
‘quotations’ such as ‘sampling’ - the replaying of excerpts of previous songs re-mixed 
together using computerized technology. Youth becomes style and style is for everyone. 
Youthfulness is still important but it is no longer only young people who should be youthful: 
everyone should keep abreast of styles and fashions and maintain vigilance over their bodies 
to keep them youthful. Youth is no longer a ‘brief flowering’ between education and work but 
rather an extended period, which can extend to middle age and afterwards.
However, young people are still a creative and innovative force in this process. They have 
helped to ‘juventicize’ society, the words of the Romanian sociologist Fred Mahler. Even 
those increasingly marginalized youth such as the so-called urban underclass in the USA are 
able to create new styles in dance and music which can inspire people at the other end of the 
world. The globalizing of youth as an idea, as a style and as a commercial product is both an 
example of cultural colonization of countries where ‘teenagers’ did not previously exist, but 
also encourages new configurations of ethnicity, meaning and belonging in an increasingly 
disembedded world.
Whilst youth culture and youth sub-cultures can be seen as ways in which youth are defined, 
or indeed, define themselves, the absorption of youth cultures into mainstream commercial 
culture also leads to their undermining a distinctively youthful styles. The commercialised and 
idealised view of ‘youth’, previously assoiated with a a stage in the life cycle, becomes 
detached from the reality of life for most young people. As it becomes something to which 
everyone should aspire, the problems and misfortunes of young people are forgotten or 
ignored. Some young people are themselves excluded from ‘youth’.
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Chapter 6
Young People’s Political Values and Participation1
Throughout this book so far we have argued that youth was the result of the construction 
age-specific categories through the process of modernization and we have illustrated how 
these were more 'strongly' constructed under some political state regimes than others. But is 
'age' a sufficient basis for political mobilization or representation? In this chapter we explore 
some circumstances under which generation does indeed serve as the basis for a political 
movement and we also consider the political orientations of young people more generally. 
Since 'youth' is necessarily a transitory phenomenon, because people grow up and therefore 
leave youth movements, age serves as a rather different basis of ’interest' or political 
organization than does other forms of social structure such as ethnicity or social class.
In considering youth and politics in East and West Europe, we must take a broader definition, 
to include the political participation and representation of youth at different levels of the 
political structure, their integration or disaffiliation and their activities which support or subvert 
the social order of the societies in which they live. This is not because we see youth as an 
'essential' or normative social group; rather we use the framework of 'youth' as a socially 
constructed group within the context of particular nation states and particular political 
systems. Young people's position within political structures is a factor for constructing youth 
in the same way as is their place on the labour market. Since this group can be both 
subordinated and privileged, their activities have greater or lesser significance at different 
points in time and one of the features in which we are interested is the way the activities of 
youth can have important political consequences at certain critical historical junctures. Some 
questions we address are: why do youth coalesce into a political interest group at certain 
points in time? How does their political involvement relate to their position in the social 
structure? What impact does this have on politics generally? What sorts of issues do youth 
become involved in?
The attitudes and activities of young people cannot but be shaped by the events taking place 
around them. When there are dramatic historical changes young people play a very important 
part and this can serve to politicize them and to create 'youth' as political force. Such 
changes would include the civil rights movements of the 1960s, the protests against nuclear 
weapons and environmental destruction of the 1970s and 1980s and the popular movements 
against repressive governments in state socialist countries in the late 1980s and 1990s 
followed by the rise of nationalist populist movements.
1An earlier version of this chapter appeared as 'Why do youth revolt' Kovatcheva and Wallace (1994) Youth 
and Policy 44 : 7-20
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Such changes affect everyone. So why should youth be a particular focus? Some have 
argued that psychologically youth are in an unstable life-stage and this would account for 
their more radical and romantic tendencies or that there is an inevitable conflict of 
generations (see Schneider 1990 for a review). However, we would not support such 
arguments. Rather it seems to us that young people encounter political and social institutions 
or events less encumbered by the weight of previous socialization than do their older 
contemporaries and that their transitional position between family of origin and family of 
destination and between education and work makes it more easy for them to adopt critical or 
oppositional postures: they have invested less in the status quo than have older people. 
However, age alone does not lead to a likelihood of political activity. This requires 
crystallization through external political and social events. In this way we can identify the 
influence of 'generations' in politics (Mannheim 1952) and this has lead Braungart and 
Braungart (1990) to argue that distinct political generations can be identified dependent upon 
the interaction of historical periods and generational cohorts. In Europe we can see the 
influence of the Second World War on creating a certain generational consciousness - an 
awareness of hardship and a more conservative, more puritanical orientation towards the 
post-war status quo. The fact that it was young people who were largely active in wartime 
resistance or fighting helped to forge the consciousness of that generation. The post-war 
generation of the 1960s, growing up in an affluent society, were more concerned with 
consumption and leisure than the older generation, producing a certain generational conflict 
in both East and West Europe. The rising youth unemployment and media saturation since 
the 1970s, along with the numerical decline in the numbers of young people, help to bring 
into focus a new set of issues and new political constellations. Now the rise of nationalism 
and ethnic politics does the same.
Patterns in Youth Politics
The romantic idea of youth as 'idealistic' assumes that they are believed to be more inclined 
towards involvement in extremist politics. In particular, it was believed that rising unemploy­
ment and the direct experience of economic collapse may push young people towards 
extremist politics as happened in Germany in the 1920s and 30s. However, successive post­
war surveys have indicated that young people are generally not politically radical, even in 
conditions of high unemployment. Recent studies of young people's political orientations 
found that patterns of political support tend to follow those of parents and the regions in which 
they grew up (Evans and Heinz 1994, Banks et al. 1992, Bynner and Roberts 1991).
Most young people are not interested in mainstream politics at all - and neither are most 
adults. Table 6.1. shows the numbers of people who said they were 'very interested' or 
‘somewhat interested’ in politics. There does not seem to be a radical East-West split in this 
respect. In those countries where the adults were interested in politics, so were the young 
people and vice versa. In some countries many people, both young and old, were interested 
in politics - for example in the two Germanys ( perhaps because of the unification issues in
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the early 1990s when the survey was carried out). We could hypothesise that the interest in 
politics may have been because some particular political event was taking place at the time 
of the survey.
Table 6.1. Interest in politics by country by age. 1990-1993 
Per cent who said they were ‘very interested’ or ‘somewhat interested’ in politics in each 
age group
Spain 
France 
Russia 
Hungary 
West Germany 
East Germany
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Source; Basanez at al. 1997 World Values Survey of 43 countries 1990-1993
In one comparative survey of Britain and Germany covering 16-19 year olds, only about half 
of respondents said they would not vote or did not know what they would vote (Bynner and 
Roberts 1991). In more economically depressed regions in Britain even less young people 
expressed an interest in conventional politics or political parties and this was more evident 
the lower down the socio-economic hierarchy they came from (Banks et al. 1992). 
Furthermore, most of the young people never talked about politics at home with their parents 
as it was thought to be a rather dull subject (Corr, Jamieson and Tomes 1990). However, 
interest in politics varies with the level of education: the higher up the educational system, 
the more interest in politics (Banks et. al. 1992). Thus it would appear that the more a young 
person is integrated into society through their education, the more interest they have in the 
way that society is governed. At the other pole, the unemployed are politically marginalized 
and perhaps increasingly 'disaffiliated' from dominant political and social system and also the 
least likely to vote - although this in itself could be seen as a radical political gesture.
146 — Wallace and Kovatcheva /  Changing Times, Changing Lives — I H S
Although young people do not show great interest in joining mainstream political parties in 
most countries, they are much more likely to engage in direct political action, including 
occupying buildings, participating in unoffical strikes, signing petitions, joining boycotts, 
joining demonstrations and so on (Basenez et al. 1997). This seems to imply at least some 
level of youth idealism.
When they are interested in politics, young people show different political sympathies to 
adults. We can see from table 6.2. that there are generally more left wing people in western 
than in eastern Europe and many of these are young people. This may reflect the disillusion 
with socialist or communist politics following the revolutions of 1989 and afterwards. 
However, we should bear in mind that by the mid 1990s socialist and reformed communist 
parties were doing very well in elections in the region and in many countries had taken 
power. This disillusionment may therefore have been a temporary phenomenon to be 
followed by disillusionment with the alternative to socialism. Furthermore, whereas in western 
Europe young people are more likely to be left wing than were adults, in eastern Europe, the 
reverse was the case. This corroborates other data which show young people more in favour 
of the new regimes in eastern Europe and of market capitalism than the older generation 
(Wallace 1997). In eastern Europe being left wing is associated with the conservatism of the 
former communist regimes rather than being for radical change of the social order, whereas 
in western Europe it is more likely to be the other way round.
Table 6.2 Left-Right Self Placement by age. 1990-1993.
Percent placing themselves on the ‘left’ in each age group.
□  50+
■  30-49 
016-29
Source: Basanez et al. 1997 World Values Survey for 43 countries 1990-1993
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Nevertheless, there are circumstances under which young people can make a political 
impact. Among the highly educated group, student politics and protest at the end of the 
1960s reflected a radical disaffection with the political system. Riots in many University cities 
such as Berkeley, Paris and Berlin, and a flowering of an alternative political consciousness 
which left a legacy in the development of counter-cultural movements such as radical left, 
feminist and alternative religious movements (Rootes 1990, Brake 1990). Although these 
may not have had a direct impact upon mainstream party politics, they did have an effect 
upon popular culture and perhaps a delayed effect upon political culture as many of the 
radical ideas for ecology, feminism and so on did enter mainstream politics many years later. 
More recently, there have been protests throughout Europe in the 1970s and 1980s against 
US military bases, against nuclear power plants and nuclear arms and against 
environmentally damaging projects such as dam, airport and motorway building. Young 
people have been very active in these movements, although again outside of mainstream 
politics, and it is these issues which have helped to shape the consciousness of the present 
generation. Sexual as well as gender politics have occupied the generational consciousness 
with a more visible gay and lesbian community also willing to take to the streets on occasion. 
Therefore, it is not so much the conditions of young people or main stream political issues 
which have mobilized youth: it is alternative issues. In general, young people do not seem to 
mobilize so readily in favour of their own interests. The introduction of educational fees and 
the erosion of student grants in western European countries such as Britain, the removal of 
social security and housing benefits did not provoke much protest. The major exception 
perhaps is the recent wave of protests by young people in France over the lowering of their 
wages in favour of a training allowance, provoking mass student demonstrations in March 
1994. Neither did the rapid introduction of educational fees and the deterioration in conditions 
of life for young people in eastern Europe, despite their succesful political activision only a 
few years previously.
Some would argue that the disaffiliation of young people from mainstream political life means 
that they turn to other kinds of expression such as 'passive alienation' which can express 
Itself in rioting (Ridley 1980) or crime. Perhaps the riots of 1981 and 1985 and the 1990s 
amongst deprived inner city centres throughout Britain can be seen in this light. The social 
and economic changes experienced by working class young people shape their attitudes and 
behaviour in many ways - in the post war period they were the first to encounter and to shape 
the 'consumer society’ and later on they were the first to suffer from rising unemployment, 
deteriorating public services, homelessness and escalating ethnic tension. Although less 
likely to join political movements, they have been important in shaping the 'cultural politics' of 
youth sub-cultures which have taken on a different dimension in the context of the 'new 
Europe' (see chapter 5). It is they who have confronted police and fought other groups in a 
struggle for control of the streets and shopping malls (Presdee 1990). Such unarticulated and 
spontaneous actions can also be seen as an indirect form of political protest.
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Youth Politics in Eastern Europe under Socialism
The establishment of the communist system in Eastern Europe meant the ending of 
autonomous youth political activity and the organization of youth into 'official' youth 
organizations. Prior to this, the main political involvement of youth had been in the nationalist 
revival and liberation movements which lead to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and 
Turkish empires and also in social revolutions like that in Russia in 1917. There had also 
been a variety of other youth political, cultural and sport groups. Student demonstrations 
were an established form of political protest, especially where the 'intelligentsia' were seen 
as the bearers of national consciousness (examples include student demonstrations which 
resulted in the closure of Sofia University in Bulgaria in 1907 and Charles University in 
Czechoslovakia in 1938).
We have already described the way in which young people were created as bearers of the 
'bright new future' under communism in Chapters 1 and 2 and the way in which this was 
associated with the lackof any real power or autonomy for young people. This poweriessness 
existed at the same time as a 'strong' construction of youth within the political and social 
structure: they were the builders of the socialist future and enjoyed representation as an age 
group at various levels of the political and state organizations. For example within the 
Communist Party itself youth were represented as an age group, as they were in parliament. 
Their most important representation was through the Communist Youth Leagues. However, 
this was in many ways a way of controlling youth and keeping them at a distance from any 
real power (as we analyze in Chapter 2). In practise, they were rather alienated from these 
structures, but alienated in a silent, unobtrusive way. For young people, politics was a tool 
for managing society and was perceived as an activity over which common people have no 
influence - the realm of the authorities, of those above (Marody 1991). Indeed, retired people 
were in practice more politically active than youth in most activities such as attending political 
meetings, writing letters to public officials or making proposals at public meetings (Mitev, 
1982).
Under these conditions of forced political and stylistic conformity, anything which deviated 
from officially-sanctioned activity and behavior was seen as threatening to the authorities. 
Thus we could say that everyday life was over-politicized when even small gestures of 
personal self-expression were seen as threats to the political authority of the system and 
rendered deviant activity. This of course made such actions all the more tempting for some 
and resulted in a constant struggle over cultural expression as we saw in Chapter 5. 
Although it was very difficult for young people to openly adopt such sub-cultural styles, they 
became an important source of unofficial culture. For young intellectuals there were informal 
clubs which discussed various problems from arts to morality through samizdat publications. 
However, even dissident clubs tended to discourage young people from becoming too 
actively involved for fear of 'ruining their future'. Since any kind of political expression was 
forbidden except through official channels young people carved out space for autonomous
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activities in other ways. In Lithuania they joined choirs, in Latvia they cultivated gardens, in 
other countries they helped in family projects to build country homes and they also 
participated in informal economic activities such as trading (Gomulka and Polonski 1990, 
Csepeli and Orkeny 1992, Smollett 1986).
Young people and the political transformations at the end of the 1980s
Given the general exclusion of young people from the political process and their political 
apathy and cynicism it seems surprising that they played such an important part in the 
'gentle', and sometimes not so gentle, revolutions of 1989 and afterwards. In fact there had 
been the growth of political movements through the 1980s with such young people playing an 
important part in such things as 'Eco glasnost1, an ecological movement in Bulgaria and in 
Solidarity in Poland from the its formation in 1980-1. Many demonstrations were organized by 
students over ecological issues. One example in Plovdiv was a protest at the official decision 
by the central authorities to tackle the vole population by poisoning them - an agricultural 
exercise which was so clumsily executed that it killed most of the local wildlife in the food 
chain. Students arrived in the city carrying strings of dead birds and rodents which they had 
picked up from the surrounding fields as a protest. Young people demonstrated over the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros damn on the borders of Hungary and Slovakia.
Why was it that young people suddenly became an active political force? It has been 
suggested that it was precisely the labelling of youth sub-cultures as subversive activity 
which may have helped young people to form a more critical detachment from the system 
than other groups (Kabatek 1990). Another explanation lies in the fact that this generation 
had been born after the terrors of the Stalinist era and after the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
following its experiment with reform communism in 1968. This generation were therefore not 
as frightened of military intervention or the more extreme forms of political repression, such 
as deportation to concentration camps or execution, as were their predecessors. Having had 
no direct experience of the Second World War, this generation could see little reason for the 
continued occupation of their countries by Soviet troops. Finally, since much of the most 
militant activity came from students, we could argue that their position was the most 
unsatisfactory. Full employment along with economic stagnation and gerontocratic forms of 
elite-recruitment meant that many were forced to take jobs for which they were over-qualified 
on graduation. The extraordinary success of the socialist educational reforms in creating a 
relatively large University educated population in what had sometimes been semi-literate 
societies over the space of one or two generations helped to raise meritocratic aspirations 
enormously and these aspirations could not be fulfilled except by participating in the 
Communist Party. This lead to increasing discontent amongst educated groups.
This generational explanation is supported by the student activists interviewed by 
Kovatcheva in Bulgaria. For them, anyone associated with the former regime bears 
responsibility for the guilt of that regime „there was no open protest, not even the slightest
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attempt - nothing to wipe the shame from their [the older generation's] faces" in the words of 
one student. In other words, anyone who conformed to the previous regime, bears the 
responsibility of guilt for that regime (in fact this is not a very accurate assertion because 
there were many individual protests especially in 1968, but it is indicative of the feelings of 
the present youth activists). Another expressed the opinion that the political culture of the 
country could only change once all of those 'born in slavery' were dead.
It was a demonstration by students in November 1989 in Wencesias square which lead to the 
toppling of the communist leadership in Czechoslovakia and young people's participation in 
the 'singing' revolution in Lithuania helped to trigger the changes there. In some countries 
young people's demonstrations lead to violent confrontations as in Tianamen Square in 
China in 1989, in Romania in 1990 and in Tadzhikistan in 1991. In Bulgaria it was student 
occupations of University buildings in 1990 which prompted and accelerated changes in the 
governing elite. The first wave of occupations throughout the country came soon after the 
parliamentary election of June 1990 when it became clear that the former Communist Party 
had gained the majority of seats and ended at the beginning of July with the resignation of 
President Mladenov. The second wave of demonstrations in November through to December 
was better organized and promoted the resignation of Prime Minister Lukanov and his 
socialist government. In the Ukraine student demonstrations and hunger strikes forced the 
resignation of the Prime Minister and withdrawal from the Russian-dominated Commonwealth 
of Independent States which replaced the Soviet Union. Further demonstrations in 1992 
forced the resignation of unpopular Prime Minister Vitold Fokin. Thus, it was student 
demonstrations that played an important part in triggering the major political changes in the 
region.
In Hungary the Alliance of Young Democrats was formed by a few dozen University students 
in 1988 as an alternative to the Communist Youth League and this was Hungary's first 
independent political organization (Pataki 1993). The age limit was 35. In the 1990 elections 
and subsequently it proved to be one of the most popular political parties for both younger 
and older voters because it represented a new, fresh generation untainted by involvement in 
the system. This was clear in their election poster which pictured two repellent and wrinkled 
old communist leaders kissing each other in greeting juxtaposed with an attractive young 
couple embracing. The slogan invited the population to choose between them. The election 
campaign included a popular music song and other youth cultural referents. The style of the 
Young Democrats was unconventional and they wore blue jeans and T shirts in Parliament or 
grew their hair long in defiance of contemporary conservative norms.
In Poland young people joined the 'flying university' in the 1980s - an unofficial alternative 
university held in the private homes of professors - organized the Catholic Academic Youth 
and participated in the crucifix revolt in 1984 when the authorities tried to remove crucifixes 
from classrooms. They also organized against military service. In Romania, students 
organized protests and demonstrations in Timosoara in 1989-90 and in Bucharest and set up
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the Free Student Union. In the then-existing Soviet Union students and young people were 
prominent in the various protests by national liberation struggles in Lithuania, Georgia and 
Armenia, in Latvia and elsewhere and in all countries occupied by Soviet troops there was 
increased resentment against them. In the DDR it was students at the Humboldt University 
which lead some of the demonstrations and protests and in Leipzig, they joined candlelight 
demonstrations.
The increasing importance of mass media in influencing public opinion and politics means 
that this kind of symbolic political gesture, designed to attract attention and capture the public 
imagination, can be more effective than mass rallies or mass party membership. The peace, 
ecology and anti-nuclear movements use such symbolic gestures very effectively, as when 
Greenham Common missile base was surrounded by singing women holding hands and 
attaching personal artifacts to the wire fence. In eastern Europe, the politicization of youth 
cultures discussed in Chapter 5 meant that they were well practiced in symbolic protests 
which later took the shape of theatre plays and dramaturgical gestures such as the satirical 
burial of communist „Good Fortune" by students in Bulgaria. However, mass rallys were used 
too, as in the gathering in November 1989 in Wenceslas square which brought down the 
regime in Czechoslovakia. Generally speaking young people eschewed any membership of 
formal organisations, preferring the kind of organization developed through the 'non formal’ 
sub-cultural groups. Despite the temporary power which such symbolic protests held, they 
did not coalesce into formal political organisations or movements, but rather tended to 
evaporate once the protest had been made. This illustrates the weakness of such form of 
protest as well as its strength: when the powers against which it was ranged collapsed, so did 
the opposition.
This prominent role of youth in pressuring change towards democracy in East-Central Europe 
suggests some comparisons with the student movement in the western countries in the late 
1960s. However, whilst the student movement in central and eastern Europe began with 
protest leading towards changes in the political system and then later moved towards reform 
of Universities, the student movements in the West started as local incidents protesting 
against University authorities and only later moved towards broader political issues (Rootes 
1990, 1980). The research on student radicalism in comparative perspective and of 
Kovatcheva on the student movement in Bulgaria reveals a deep, moral anxiety amongst 
student activitiesm (Habermas 1969, Kovatcheva 1995, Bertaux 1990). The protests 
campaigns in the welfare capitalist and post-communist societies, although varying in their 
demands and tactics, manifested a common desire for self-expression and more meaningful 
political participation. The student movements in communist countries were more directly 
successful. Their direct impact can be traced in important personnel changes in the 
governing elite, in election results, in changes in the legislative systems and in new 
constitutions which no longer privileged the leading role of the Communist Party. This implies 
that at moments of an extreme crisis in political legitimation, youth, especially student 
protests, can represent a new force of change and can have a profound political influence.
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Young People in Post-Communist Politics
Although young people played such a key role in toppling the communist state authorities in 
many countries, in most places this activism did not continue for long. In the more western 
post-communist countries (Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland), the official Communist 
Youth Leagues disappeared and were not replaced by any equivalent organization. Whilst 
young people are no doubt thankful for this relief from official duties, it means that young 
people’s interests are no longer presented, even in token form, at any level of society. 
There are no longer quotas for age or gender, as in the past. When the election system was 
opened to competition at a national level in 1989 in the then Soviet Union, there was a 
significant decline in the number of young people elected to the USSR Congress of People’s 
Deputies. Among the 2,249 deputies only 187 were aged under 30 (8.3per cent), although 
40per cent of these seats were guaranteed to the Komsomol under the 1988 Election Law 
(Lentini personal communication). However, there were also new opportunities for young 
politicians who were seen to be untainted by the former political regime and could not be held 
to political ransom on that account, as was the case with many of the older leaders. Many 
very young people became prominent in politics as it was possible to find Ministersin their 
early 30s. Although individually, there was a rejuvenation amongst the leadership, young 
people no longer existed as a political group. Indeed youth have disappeared as a strongly 
constructed category as other interest groups have emerged.
Instead there emerged a variety of shifting and fragmented parties, organizations and interest 
groups, along with a profusion of youth unions, societies and federations which rapidly come 
and go. Very often such organisations have already dissolved by the time their emergence is 
announced in the media. In Bulgarian, Komsomol was reconstituted in 1990 but as a 'non 
political' organization, whiles a small part of its members formed a Socialist Youth Union. 
The weakness of such organizations was partly due to suspicion towards any organized 
activity requiring discipline and structure - an attitude inherited from the over-organized past 
(Kovatcheva 1995). Young people prefer to pursue semi-spontaneous movements rather 
than organisations which would require a more routinized activity. Whereas in the past the 
enemy was obvious and could be confronted, in a situation of political and economic 
liberalization responsibility is de-centred and it is difficult to see whom to blame. There are 
also other outlets fro the politically and economically ambitious, for example in business.
The Young Democrats in Hungary who traded on their youthful, untarnished political image in 
the early 1990s, had to adopt more conventional styles of activity. The age limit of 35 for 
membership has been abolished and members now nominate older and more experienced 
candidates. They have also abandoned their blue jeans for suits (Pataki 1993). The Young 
Democrats also lost their innocence, now being now accused of corruption and 
authoritarianism. In the more traditional Ukraine the student organizations reflect those of the 
dominant political alignments, so there is not so much a disappearance of old formal 
structures as their re-grouping, thus along with the reconstituted Komsomol, there is a
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Students Unions, a pro-socialist, pro-Russian organizations an the Union of Ukrainian 
Students, a western oriented, nationalist origination based mainly in Western Ukraine and 
supported by the Ukrainian Diaspora. These organisations reflect the main political power 
blocks in a divided region.
In the elections immediately following the transformations of 1989/90 voter turnout was high 
and young people participated activity in this, with voter turnout something like 75-80per cent 
in Bulgaria, for example. Young people were more likely to vote for the new anti-communist 
parties (Tonchev and Jordanova 1991) and this was also found in a recent survey in Poland 
in which it was evident that young people were most likely to vote for reform parties such as 
the Democratic Union rather than the communist and socialist alliances which in fact won the 
recent elections there (Roberts et al. 1995). However, this initial electoral enthusiasm has 
been replaced throughout the region by political disillusionment. Now voter turnout has 
dropped considerably as young people and others no longer see any point in participating in 
elections and the early very high aspirations for democracy have not been met. In Hungary, 
young people have turned once more away from politics (Molnar 1992) and in Poland a 
35per cent of young people said that they would not vote at all in the next elections whilst
31 per cent were undecided (Roberts et al. 1995). Qualitative interviews revealed a general 
cynicism about politicians and the political process which was felt to have little connection 
with young people’s daily concerns. Three was a similar disillusionment with the role of the 
Church in politics, although it had enjoyed substantial support during the communist period. 
This perhaps means that young people in eastern Europe are becoming more similar to their 
western peers. As in western countries, it is the better educated, particularly students who 
are most likely to have an interest in politics and more likely to engage in radical activism 
rather than mainstream politics (Roberts et al. 1995).
Gender plays some part in youth participation in post-communist politics. Women’s equal 
access to political citizenship was officially proclaimed by communist ideology and was 
reinforced through formal legislation. There were quotas for women in political institution with 
representative functions like parliament but their number in central and regional party 
committees - where real decision-making took place - was very small. Data indicate in the in 
the post-communist period things are taking a turn for the worse. For example, in Hungary 
21 per cent of those in parliament were women in 1985: in 1990 there were only 7per cent. 
The corresponding figures for the Soviet Union are 32.8per cent in 1984 and 15.7per cent in 
1989. In other post-communist countries the figure is even lower (Dahlerup 1991).
Whilst women were active in dissident groups in the region such as Charter 77 in 
Czechoslovakia, they have tended to disappear from the post-communist political scene. 
Some of the most well-known groups organized by and for women are done on the basis of 
women’s traditional roles rather than against them. For example in Prague and in Bulgaria 
there was a campaign by mothers to demand clean air for their children. This can be 
attributed to the economic crisis and the necessity for household survival strategies of which
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women form an essential part (Balbo 1987). However, a closer scrutiny reveals the 
continuing influence of traditional gender ideologies dominating eastern European societies 
where women carried not a double, but a triple burden: housewife, productive worker and 
political activist (Kjuranov 1987). After the start of the transformation traditional gender 
ideologies were even strengthened by the common disenchantment with communist ideology 
and Its version of women’s liberation.
When age is taken into consideration, women’s access to politics is even more restricted. 
Kovatchea's (1992) student on the student movement indicated 4 to 5 times less female than 
male presence on the governing committees of the two occupations and the different newly 
formed student organizations. Perceptions of women students who took part in the 
organization of the occupations were heavily sexualized both by non-participating students 
and by adult society in a fusion of gender and age stereo-typing. The most common negative 
images used by opposing parties was of ‘red old woman’ - comparing the socialist party to an 
unloved, aging woman - and 'blue young hooligan’ for the supporters of the Union of 
Democratic Forces.
Feminism is not popular in eastern Europe. This attitude can be explained by the fact that the 
introduction of liberal economic ideologies have tended to reinforce a conservative model of 
the family in which the man is the main breadwinner and in the fact that in eastern Europe 
women would frame the gender question differently than in the western Europe(Wallace 
1995). As Ferge (1990) has argued, the argument that ‘personal is political’ is directly 
contrary to the common desire in post-communist countries not to let the political into private 
life. In addition, there is a lack of feminist research into women’s issues and instead a 
tendency to continue the soviet practice of seeing 'isolated shortcomings’ of gender equality 
as a 'side product’ of studies about 'more substantial Issues’ (Voronina 1988). This reflects 
the common attitude of not accepting gender problems as important or as being in need of 
any policy solutions. However, a new feminist politics is also emerging (Mueller and Funk 
1993).
In table 6.3 it is evident that in western European countries young people value gender 
liberation through work more than older cohorts. However, in Sweden and in eastern 
European countries where there was more likelihood that women were working outside the 
home, the situation is reversed: older generations preferred the employed woman as option. 
This perhaps reflects the disillusionment with emancipation which we discussed previously. 
In the countries of southern Europe which experienced delayed modernization, there is even 
more affirmation of work for women as a means of Independence. It seems therefore that 
those countries in which women’s participation in public working life was strongly 
institutionalised are the ones where young people are least likely to see this as a form of 
independence. The exception is for East and West Germany where women’s independence 
through work was valued in both countries, with very different experiences of this in practise.
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Table 6,3 Attitudes towards Women and Work by Age. 1990-1993.
Respondents were asked “Having a job is the best way for a woman to become an 
independent person” (per cent strongly agree or agree) in each age group
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Young people are in a state of confusion and uncertainty in post-communist societies, but 
this reflects the general confusion of the political situation. There is a battle field of conflicting 
social and political theories, reflecting the rapid state of change in societies which have 
lurched from one system to another in the space of a few years. There are few stable political 
tendencies - for example in Poland almost none of the parties in the first government exist 
any more. The confusion in public life is reflected in political attitudes expressed in many 
surveys where old stereotypes are mixed with new beliefs (Gerogiev and Zhelev 1992). 
There is not always a clear right-left divide in politics around which parties and groups are 
aligned and political alliances rapidly come and go. Politicians often have more following than 
do their parties or other institutions which they represent (Marody 1991). The orientation 
towards persons is linked with an inclination to asses their qualifications in moral rather than 
meritocratic term which means that politicians are open to accusations of past or present 
corruption or collaboration with the communist authorities. This trend can also be seen in an 
attraction towards colourful political personalities rather than concrete programmes (Schôpflin 
1991). For example the Canadian émigré Tyminski who received a quarter of the vote in 
1990 presidential election in Poland was replicated in Bulgarian presidential election in 1992 
in the case of George Ganchev who brought from his stay in England the image of a
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self-made man instead of any clear political program. Politicians are usually seen as being in 
politics for their own benefit rather than because of any ideas they represent. The 
disillusionment of young people with politics is not difficult to understand in these 
circumstances.
Nevertheless there is evidence of a generational shift in post-communist attitudes. The 
results of a survey of 11 post-communist countries found that younger people rejected both 
the communist political system and the communist economic system more than older 
generations. Although they may be cynical about the present political situation, they were 
certainly not nostalgic about the past (Rose and Carnaghan 1994). Furthermore, 'pro- 
capitalist' economic values were more likely to be found among younger men than among 
older people and women implying that the younger generation were looking forwards to a 
market-oriented future (Wallace 1997). Perhaps this reflects those who are 'winners’ and 
'losers’ in the changes.
One of the results of the student protest campaigns throughout the region was the increased 
participation on different levels of university decision-making was conceded - from one third 
in Bulgaria to one half in the former Czechoslovakia of the representatives on the main 
University committees. In Donetsk there is 20per cent representation on the equivalent of the 
academic Senate. The system of electing professors and those in key positions means that 
students can potentially have a very important means of political leverage through these 
committees. However, less than half of the student representatives in academic assemblies 
and councils at Plovdiv University have ever attended a session of these Committees and 
this was true for other universities as well. In Prague the students are disillusioned with this 
representation and feel that it achieves very little (an attempt by Sociology students to have 
reduce the amount of statistics they had to learn failed to have any effect). This behaviour 
confirms the observation of Bok (1991:3) on Hungarian and Czech systems of Higher 
Education that despite their prominent role in the change from communist to democratic 
regimes, students seem „apathetic and uninterested in participating actively in the university 
governance". Although young people express concern about the archaic methods of teaching 
and assessment, low quality of some lecture-courses, difficulties with getting the necessary 
information and acute shortages of equipment, these attitudes have not yet produced mass 
student activism. Having developed the consciousness about the need of changes, students 
lack the motivation to put them into practice. Their realistic fear of unemployment and 
conviction that there is no relationship between their academic performance and their access 
in finding a good job are all factors that discourage students from their efforts for 
re-structuring the system of Higher Education. Over the last four years fees have been 
introduced into Higher Education and the costs of studying have risen considerably as 
students now have to pay more for dormitories, for books and for other materials. In many 
countries fees for University study have now been introduced or are being discussed. 
Students have failed to react to this privatization of their institutions and to the worsening 
conditions of study. There have been few political protests over these changes. In Bulgaria
I H S — Wallace and Kovatcheva /  Changing Times, Changing Lives — 157
in the beginning of 1994 Sofia University was occupied with the demand for a larger share of 
the state budget for Higher Education. However, in contrast to previous protests, the interest 
among student population was low and this was accompanied by the organized protest of 
those financing their studies themselves. The occupation spread over few other universities, 
but it failed to win any change in state finance for Universities.
Young people can quickly mobilize again when the political or economic situation changes. 
Although the Bulgarian students had de-mobilized after the occupations in 1990, they were 
protesting again in the winter of 1996/7 in the Serbian Republic and in Bulgaria. Rather than 
being apathetic towards politics, young people become Involved in direct and indirect action 
when they are sure that they can make some impact and in situations of acute political crisis.
Young People’s Political Values
It is claimed that young people are more likely to espouse 'post materialist values' - 
associated with self-fulfillment and self-expression in all countries than were adults. 
According to Inglehart (1990) and colleagues, on the basis of a comparison of 43 different 
societies over time, there is a shift in political values which accompanies modernization. In 
'traditional' or developing societies there is more concern with primary economic needs and a 
more rigid adherence to authority and traditional or religious values: these are termed 
'materialist' values. However, with growing affluence these needs are fulfilled and there is a 
shift instead towards ‘post materialist' values concerned with aesthetics, life style and other 
goals. Furthermore, these more advanced industrial societies are moving towards a 
‘postmodern’ phase with the break up of affiliation to traditional parties based upon class or 
religion and a move towards concern with issue politics and political movements such as 
environmental concerns, movements to do with abortion rights, recognition of gay and 
lesbian equality, women’s issues and so on (Inglehart 1997). The hypothesis of Inglehart and 
colleagues engaged in this study is that there is a generational shift in political attitudes 
because young people experience a different set of values as they grow up and these tend to 
carry these with them through life. This results in what could be termed a 'juventicization’ of 
society. Post-materialist values are evident in all parts of Europe as the table 6.4 indicates. 
However, it also indicates that former communist countries (except for East Germany) had 
less ‘post materialist' values in general. The people in the more affluent and 'western’ 
oriented post-communist societies such as Poland and the former Czechoslovakia, were 
more likely to hold ‘post-materialist’ values.
Young people are also conspicuous in movements for gay and lesbian rights, New Age 
Travelers and so on. They are more likely to be tolerant of ethnic groups, foreigners, 
homosexuality and sexual emancipation (Basenez et al 1997). The general European trend 
is for young people to be identified with new social movements and 'post-modern' politics.
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Table 6.4 Post-Materialist Values by Age. 1990-1993. 
Percentage in each age group who held post-materialist values
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Young people and populist political movements
Although young people are not very active in mainstream political movements, in one 
particular area they have received a great deal of press attention - their participation in 
movements of the 'new' neo-fascist right. In particular there is the association between a 
skinhead sub-culture and the neo-fascists. Skinheads began as protest sub-cultures in the 
1980s in the most western communist societies and have spread gradually further 
eastwards. However, under the influence of their western neighbors they turned from small 
cultural forms of protest into more organized political groups after the changes of 1989/90. 
Unlike other forms of youth protest, these are mainly youth from the lower social strata and 
are overwhelmingly men. In Britain it seems that it is mainly those from depressed areas who 
are likely to turn to extreme political solutions (Roberts and Parsell 1990) although in Central 
Europe it seems that these are mostly young people who are in work. Rather than the 
'lumpen' image which skinheads have in Britain, in Central Europe they portray themselves 
rather as disciplined vigilantes who undertake physical training and try to keep the streets 
clean of foreigners and criminals. They seem to enjoy some support from police and 
population for this.
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Originating in East London in the early 1970s, the skinheads were associated with a tough, 
fighting masculine image, support for particular football teams and racism (Cohen 1997). 
They are characterized by a distinctive uniform of rolled up jeans, shaved heads and 'Doc 
Martins' boots. This image spread to Europe as a result of roving football club supporters and 
their media coverage. It was only later that they began to be recruited into neo-fascist parties 
such as the British Party and the National Front and began to adopt nazi symbolism such as 
the 'Sieg Heil' salute.
Skinheads were active in Germany through the 1980s and were associated there with the 
revival of 'neo-fascist politics'. In the 1990s however, racism is increasing all over Europe, 
including Britain, and far right movements have enjoyed something of a revival. Racist 
feelings and racist attacks are on the ascendant throughout Europe and some parties 
previously associated with the political fringe, have had considerable electoral success in 
Austria, Belgium and France. These parties have capitalized upon the fears of immigration 
generated by the opening of the borders t the East. In Germany, skinheads have attacked 
mainly Turks, but also homeless people, mentally and physically handicapped, and 
homosexuals. In the Czech lands and Hungary they are thought to number about 6000 
according to the popular press and have targeted their attacks mainly against Roma. In 
Pardobice 300 skinheads marched through the city center shouting 'Czech lands for the 
Czechs' and 'Gypsies to the Gas' in February 1993 and later in the year a youth was beaten 
to death by skinheads. Attacks on Vietnamese are also a common occurrence but are 
seldom reported to the police. The Czech skinheads eschew the neo-nazi symbolism 
because of the unfavorable historical associations it holds in a country previously occupied 
by the Third Reich. In Germany the 40,000 or so right-radical sympathizers published their 
own magazines with names such as 'Skinhead Zeitung' 'Frontal' and 'White Power'. In each 
country skinheads are follow particular kinds of bands and music, often with racist lyrics. In 
1992 in Germany they accounted for some 1600 attacks, 17 deaths (Spiegel 49/92) whilst in 
Britain there were seven deaths attributed to such causes in 1992. One of the best known of 
these was an attack on 23rd November in Mölln when a whole Turkish family were killed in a 
fire attack. However, this was only one of many fire-bomb attacks and beatings (Hockenos 
1993).
Some attribute the growth of these far right groups in Germany to the problems of unification 
and opening the eastern borders (Hockenos 1993). Factors including the collapse of the former- 
East German economy, the very high rates of unemployment amongst people accustomed to 
full employment, the crisis of ideology amongst those for whom the promise of the West turned 
out to be a disappointment and the general disorientation of youth brought up in disciplinarian 
organizations now finding themselves in a .post-communist confusion. The politicization of 
immigration has affected Germany as well so that the skinhead's attacks are directed against 
the refugees and asylum seekers and the seasonal and foreign workers who have entered 
since unification from or through eastern Europe.
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However, German researchers from the Youth Institute stress that there is no simple 
explanation for the rise of right wing violence and that it is not only associated with young 
people. Racist attitudes are more likely to be espoused by adults than by the young and the 
skinheads represent only a small minority of young people (Schneider 1990, Hoffmann- 
Lange and Eilders 1990). They also point out that many of the explanations which have been 
advanced for accounting for neo-fascist youth groups are not equally valid in both halves of 
Germany. Thus for example, the dramatic rise in unemployment or disillusionment with 
capitalism does not explain skinhead activities in West Germany or elsewhere.
The skinheads are perhaps an extreme example of a much publicized minority group, but the 
revival of nationalism and the mobilization of young people in such nationalist movements is 
a new dimension to cultural politics which is far more significant in the context of fragile 
economies and democracies and the weak social integration in eastern Europe than it was in 
Britain where it originated. They can be compared with nationalist and authoritarian socialist 
youth movements such as the 'Afgantsy' - vigilante groups of Afghan veterans - and the 
Luybery in Russia. Both of these youth groups are pledged to fight what they see as 
corruption and western decadence in their society (Riordan 1989b). Youth sub-cultures in 
Moscow have also been influenced by the growth of chauvinist politics (Pilkington 1996). Far 
more sinister than the marginal skinhead youth groups are the nationalist demagogues which 
have arisen in the region and have the capacity to stir up a witch's brew of potential 
xenophobic and racist attitudes from positions of power within the state apparatus. The 
mobilization of young people through war, as in the former Yugoslavia, encouraged the 
development of sub-cultures based upon predatory masculinity which, with the breakdown of 
law and order which accompanies civil war, were tragically destructive.
Despite the association of young people with racism and political extremism described 
above, systematic comparative analysis shows that the majority are in fact more tolerant than 
other age groups. Young people are more tolerant of foreigners and less likely to see 
themselves as nationalist than are other age groups. Furthermore, they are also more 
tolerant of other kinds of 'difference', whether sexual, political or ethnic, than were other age 
groups and generations. It was older people who are more likely to hold stereotypes about 
minority groups (Basanez et al. 1997).
Conclusions
To summarize, the situation of youth politics in communist and post-communist societies can 
be characterized by one of an over-politicized age group (in reality one expressing cynicism 
and apathy) which can quickly mobilize to become a creative political force but which can 
later rapidly de-mobilize again into apathy. The current situation can be described as one of 
confusion and uncertainty with a range of unstable groups coming and going, but the growing 
importance of national or ethnic identities in politics.
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In eastern Europe the official category of 'youth' as a modern political construct has 
disappeared along with the official youth organization and with it many forms of youth 
representation in the political structure. However, because youth occupied an over-politicized 
space, their activities acquired a political character. This political consciousness was only a 
temporary and transient articulation of interests which later evaporated to be replaced by a 
rapidly changing plethora of groups and interests which have yet to cohere into a clear 
political map. The alternative non-politicized articulation of interests through a strong civil 
society has yet to emerge in many places.
In western Europe young people remain both politically and economically marginalized 
because they do not represent a strong political force despite the existence of formally 
organized youth wings in Churches, political parties and so on. A large minority do not vote at 
all and are not even interested in mainstream politics. Their marginalization from mainstream 
political representation means that youth concerns seldom appear on the political agenda - 
youth and their growing economic marginalization remains unchallenged. Under normal 
democratic systems, ‘youth’ is not a category sufficiently strong or cohesive enough for 
permanent political mobilization - a ‘weak’ model of youth prevails - and this changes only 
under certain heavily ideological regimes such as communism, fascism or nationalism. In 
some post-communist countries, nationalism is being used at present to mobilize young 
people under a 'strong' concept of youth.
Instead, most young people are active in more ‘post-modern’ forms of protest - symbolic and 
cultural challenges to the dominant system of rules and regulations and to dominant values 
and assumptions of good taste. These are often spontaneous and ephemeral. Young people 
use ‘cultural politics’ of youth styles which are also implicitly critical of the dominant order. 
These ’cultural politics' can move from symbolism to more or less explicit political 
identification in some circumstances and thus help to articulate the interests and experiences 
of sub-groups of young people. Under both capitalist and the former communist regimes they 
could be a subversive influence, but in the latter case they could also be a more direct 
political threat because of the politicization of everyday conduct.
Issues that young people in both East and West Europe are most concerned with are issues 
of the environment and social justice rather than 'mainstream' politics. In both East and West 
Europe, most young people are cynical about 'mainstream' politics and alienated from the 
political process. However, under some circumstances, when there is an overall crisis of 
legitimacy in the dominant order, youth politics can play a pivotal role, for example in the 
’evenements' of 1968, or in the changes of regime in 1989 in eastern Europe. This is not so 
much the product of youth organizing as a coherent interest group, as young people, 
particularly students, being seen as a 'new force' against the 'old order'.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions: Postmodernization and the deconstruction of youth
In this book we have attempted to show some of the ways in which youth are constructed at 
different historical periods and within different state formations. By comparing capitalist with 
state socialist systems and 'post-industrial' with 'post-communist' systems we have tried to 
chart elements of change and continuity. Whilst our data derives mainly from contexts with 
which we are familiar, it is evident that in the former socialist countries the forced 
homogeneity of political and social orders is rapidly diversifying and such countries as the 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine are developing in very different directions. 
Rather than convergence, there is divergence. By contrast, the European Union is now 
imposing more uniformity on western European states than had existed in the past and it is 
easier to draw comparisons between them. At any rate it is easier to find comparative 
statistics which make the kind of analysis presented here for western Europe more 
accessible.
Our argument is that whilst modernization constructed youth as a social category, post­
modernization is de-constructing youth. The evaporation of concepts of youth intervention 
mean on the hand less forced participation for young people, but also less state support, 
leading to individualization and privatization of young people’s problems and the social 
exclusion of some groups of young people from mainstream life.
It is evident on both sides of Europe that similar economic and social forces have shaped - 
and are shaping - developments there but that these forces have different impacts depending 
upon the social, cultural and historical configurations of the society. For example, whilst all 
states have experienced modernization and industrialization, this has taken place in very 
different ways - in some cases through capitalist free market development (with more or less 
state direction) and in other cases through rapid communist modernization. Although the 
character of modernization and industrialization is disputed, they nevertheless created state 
bureaucracies and state-directed institutions such as education systems which have served 
to define age-status categories. Furthermore, state bureaucracies have used age as a 
principle for classifying and regulating citizens - for example in access to voting, pensions, 
punishments and rewards and so on - important as an organizing principle in all modern state 
systems. However, the implications of this are very different. In some states, youth are 
identified as a target for intervention whereas in others this is less the case and hence there 
are both 'stronger' and 'weaker' models of youth constructed under different state and social 
systems. Communist, fascist and nationalist states construct a very strong model of youth 
since youth was the group with the strongest potential to be mobilized and upon which rapid 
modernization could be built (Mitev 1996). Within welfare capitalist societies there are 
contrasts between stronger and weaker constructions of youth - as for example between 
Germany and Britain.
I H S — Wallace and Kovatcheva /  Changing Times, Changing Lives — 163
The homogenizing tendencies associated with modernization have given way in recent 
decades to countervailing post-modernizing tendencies. The growing importance of culture 
and particularly youth culture in defining social groups is evidence of this and has helped to 
undermine 'modern’ communist regimes based upon rigid categories of ‘youth’ defined by 
biological, developmental or materialist concepts. Youth culture, by contrast is a more non­
material in form, relying on the transmission of styles and music, and it also expressive and 
evanescent. Other post-modernizing tendencies associated with young people include the 
increasing non-correspondence and fragmentation of life course transitions and their 
diffusion across different age groups. Whereas through industrialization, youth had been 
associated with a specific age between school and work, when courting, hedonism and 
experimentation took place before settling down to family, household and job, it is now an 
indefinite period. Family, household and job no longer coincide and are quite remote or even 
undesirable goals for many young people.
Also associated with the post-modern erosion of traditional social classes and occupations is 
the social exclusion of a substantial fraction of young people (some 40 per cent in some 
regions) who are more or less permanently sub-employed. As the economic independence of 
all young people has been eroded through the withdrawal of state support, the contracting 
and privatizing of the welfare state and the increasingly lengthy and indefinite extension of 
the youth phase, those unwilling or unable to resort to parental support are stranded. There 
is evidence that young people in this situation create their own lifestyles through crime or 
through the informal economy and informal mechanisms of support (Carlen 1996, Coles
1995). These are not so much the working class disadvantaged (formerly the objects of state 
intervention and concern) as the non-working class disadvantaged and the state is 
concerned with them generally when they break the law or cause a public nuisance by 
sleeping in doorways. Otherwise solutions for them are privatized and individualized as 
responsibility is shifted back towards the individual or the family.
Rigid divisions associated with sex and ‘race’ also start to dissolve with postmodernization. 
Essentialist notions of sex and a women’s or man’s role for which they must be educated 
have been challenged by postmodern theorists (Butler 1990). Young people have lead the 
way in forging new roles for men and women which broke with the past. Under market 
capitalist regimes this has meant increasing androgyny and the movement of women into 
Higher Education and into men’s jobs (although there are also limitations to this). In the 
former communist countries, it has meant increasing differentiation as a reaction to the forced 
homogenization of the sexes. Similarly, ‘race’ was previously associated with ‘immigrant 
groups’ or with categories of ‘black people’ ‘jews’ and with scientific theories which were 
products of modernity (Bauman 1989) resulting in ‘holocaust’ or ‘apartheid’ resolutions. By 
contrast, second generation young people are developing a range of hybrid and creative 
styles using elements of diasporic, post-colonial and local cultures (Back 1996). Recognition 
of cultural difference rather than assimilation or apartheid become the governing concepts. 
However, a counter reaction to this is the aggressive assertion of ethnic chauvinism among
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some sub-cultures and among some political leaders. Such 'postmodern' recognitions and 
tolerance of diversity may be an ideal among academic writers such as Bauman (1992) but it 
is not necessarily very widespread within populations of Europe generally. The erosion of 
nation, race, gender cleavages and taken-for-granted age categories is also a threat to their 
assumed ideas of what is natural and normal and inherited from the past.
Next we shall summarize the contents of each chapter in order to show how we have 
developed this argument. In the first chapter we considered theories of youth and the ways 
in which these were used to legitimize various kinds of intervention by states, political parties 
and voluntary organizations in the lives of young people. We considered developmental 
theories, social theories and critical theories and theories of youth developed in communist 
countries - not just as descriptions of intellectual history but as active models of intervention. 
In this chapter we also considered the main arguments for modernization and post­
modernization, but rejecting the view that modernization is linear, uniform or leading towards 
convergence in European societies. Finally, we considered sources of differentiation in youth, 
in particular ethnicity, gender, class/educational level and differentiation according to different 
regions and parts of Europe. Post-modernization has lead to an increasing awareness of 
different sorts of differentiation and their importance for young people's experience of 
growing up in Europe. However, it makes it more and more difficult to impose an 
homogenous age-stratified concept of youth.
In the second chapter we took an historical look at modernization and postmodernization of 
the life course. We considered the way in which industrialization, urbanization and the 
expansion of the state had helped to construct youth as a social category. Our argument was 
that although ‘youth’ may have existed previously, modernization created an idea of the life- 
stage associated with precisely calibrated time and used age as a way of classifying people 
and distributing services. Through legislation for working conditions, for education and in 
order to ‘save’ young people from crime a particular idea of youth was born. However, most 
important were voluntary youth movements of various sorts which helped to construct a 
model of youth as objects of intervention which was later absorbed by the welfare state. 
Although at first churches, sports organisations, trades unions, important everywhere in 
attempting to deal with the problems caused by industrialization, in East-Central Europe 
youth organisations became increasingly politicized. In countries taken over by either fascist 
or communist regimes, youth were more or less compelled to spend much of their spare time 
in youth organisations and were seen as the bearers of the ‘bright new’ future. However, the 
youth organisations were also a method of surveillance and control over young people. The 
creation of professions associated with young people followed these patterns as the non- 
democratic countries created a political cadre of youth leaders linked to the Communist 
Party, whilst in democratic countries the youth professions struggled with various models of 
intervention and professionalization. The collapse of communism also lead to the 
disappearance of the youth organizations but at the same time increasing problems for youth 
of unemployment, lack of recreational facilities, along with the continued lack of housing -
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problems which were increasingly privatized and individualized. In western Europe post­
modern ideas of fragmented transition and de-centralized authority lead to notions of 
'empowerment’ and ‘leading from below’.
In the third chapter we considered transitions in training, education and work. Just as 
modernization helped to construct universal education systems and therefore an age-specific 
entry into employment, post-modernization lead to indefinite and extended education and 
training, casualized jobs and perhaps no certainty of permanent work. In the early stages 
schooling was geared to the labour market at different levels and towards male and female 
skills, these more standardized routes have given way to more androgynous and less clearly 
stratified pathways into work. Rather, people move in and out of training, school, college and 
work at different levels. This means that rather than being ‘young workers’ on leaving 
compulsory schooling, young people are more likely to become trainees or students for 
longer and longer periods of time. This is true as much for those from upper social 
backgrounds as those from lower social backgrounds. These changes occurred partly 
because the nature of work itself started to change following post-modernizing tendencies 
towards temporary and insecure employment with frequent skill changes. As welfare states 
retreated and a market model of welfare and education started to predominate, so strong 
concepts of intervention also disappeared and pathways through an array of education, work 
and training schemes is individualized and privatized at all levels. These changes have been 
a feature of eastern European as much as western European societies - only in post­
communist countries the changes happened more rapidly. When considering the different 
social groups within youth however, we find that young women have in many ways benefited 
from changes in education and the work place: they are no longer held down by ‘modernist’ 
ideas of their roles and status. Furthermore, ethnic groups are better able to assert their 
‘difference’ and to resist assimilationist policies. Postmodernization brings greater freedom as 
well as greater chaos.
In chapter four we looked at family transitions, and the way in which the nuclear two-parent, 
gender structured nuclear family insitutionalized in various ways by modern state systems 
served to structure the passage from home of origin to home of destination. In both 
communist and welfare capitalist countries, this was supposed to take place in structured 
and orderly way, coincident with labour market transitions to a full time job (even if in 
practice, lack of housing may not have allowed it to happen). Now new trends in family 
formation lead by young people including single households, cohabiting, single parenthood, 
the coming out of gay and lesbian relationships and the increasing fragility of family bonds 
such as marriage has lead to these transitions no longer being strongly structured or 
predictable. German and continental social theories have emphasized the increasing 
negotiation and flexibilization of roles between parents and children and between partners, 
whereas Anglo-American social scientists have emphasized the post-modern tendencies in 
family relationships leading towards fragmentation and differentiation. Rather than being 
imposed,upon young people, relations with relatives can be chosen. However, this is
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combined with lack of housing for young people in all parts of Europe and their decreasing 
economic independence, leading to problems of homelessness and social exclusion. The 
retreat from welfarist models of youth intervention means that here is a privatization and 
individualization of the problems of family transition - it is up to you to find solutions for 
housing, childrearing and partnership yourself {or to hope for support from parents). In post­
communist countries the strong traditions of family solidarity, especially between generations 
means that they are more likely to seek family solutions, whilst in western Europe, young 
people increasingly simply have to fend for themselves.
In chapter 5 we looked at the most ‘post-modern’ tendencies of all and those were 
associated with youth culture. We distinguished between youth as an aspect of popular 
culture in general and stylistically specific youth sub-cultures. Popular culture became more 
and more important as an aspect of late twentieth century society, something which pervaded 
everyone’s lives. Youth sub-cultures were at first more class and regionally specific but were 
soon taken up by the mass media and spread everywhere. Young people participated 
through following popular music, fashions and styles and age-specific literature. In the 
communist countries listening to popular western music and adopting sub-cultural styles was 
a form of subversion and we describe the various ways in which the authorities reacted with 
repression, with denial or with attempts at assimilation. None of these were successful, but 
they did serve to politicize youth sub-cultures into a form of resistance. This helped to 
undermine those regimes which were revealed as ridiculous in their reactions and quite out of 
touch with young people’s needs. By the 1980s and 1990s youth sub-culture proliferated and 
as in western Europe took many and diverse forms with the continuation of previous sub­
cultures at the same time as new ones were being created. Furthermore, rather than being 
seen as subversive they were quickly adopted by popular culture and used by politicians and 
commercial interests for publicity. Communications technology and commercialization meant 
that youth cultures and sub-cultures (it became more difficult to distinguish them) could be 
spread very rapidly around the world, creating a general model of desirable, hedonistic youth 
as an aspiration. However, this generalization of youth as a social category also dissolved it 
as an age-specific phenomenon, because ‘youth’ is seen as something everyone should 
aspire to. The modernizing tendencies to construct youth as an chronologically defined 
category was undermined by these postmodernizing tendencies.
In Chapter 6 we considered young people and politics. We considered both their participation 
in politics and the political values and attitudes which they supported. Young people are 
leading the world in every country in the espousal of 'post materialist' values associated not 
so much with physical survival but with self-fulfillment and self-expression. They are 
associated with the replacement of a work-achievement ethic with a leisure-expressive ethic. 
In general however, they are not very interested in mainstream politics and large numbers do 
not vote at all. Instead they are more interested in the sorts of ‘new social movements' 
associated with postmodern politics, including ecological issues, animal rights and issues 
associated with womens’, sexual and racial emancipation. In general they are more tolerant
I H S — Wallace and Kovatcheva /  Changing Times, Changing Lives — 167
in their attitudes than are adults. Young people are also involved in more ‘symbolic’ politics 
of style and we saw in Chapter 5 that these sub-cultural politics can become politicized under 
some circumstances. In the 1980s and 1990s right wing and nationalist political movements 
came to be associated with particular youth sub-cultures, especially ‘skinheads' and these 
have been spreading through Europe from Britain where they originated. However, as with 
youth sub-cultures we should be aware that the same style can have different meanings in 
different places. The chapter also considered how under some circumstances youth could 
mobilize as a political force, for example in the revolutions in eastern Europe at the end of the 
1980s, but one which was temporary and confrontational rather than long term and 
organizational in character.
Young people are associated with post-modernizing tendencies in European societies and 
we can summarize these in the table below:
Modernization Postmodernization
Youth defined by precisely celibrated age Youth as an age group dissolves
Work-achievement ethic Leisure-expressive ethic
Distinguishing youth by male and female 
(separate schooling, youth provision etc.)
Mixed provision
Ethnic groups defined as ‘immigrants’, 
assimiiationist model through social policies
Range of ethnic hybridisation and 
differentiation through youth cultures multi­
cultural models
Separations by class/education linked to 
levels of the labour market - more education 
for some and work or training for others
More and more education and training for 
everyone
Youth culture associated with specific 
'courting period’
Youth culture associated with all periods of life
Youth as a period between family of origin and 
family of destination
No clear division between family of origin and 
family of destination - perhaps no family of 
destination
Working class most disadvantaged youth Non-working class most disadvantaged youth
Politicization of youth movements and youth 
as bearers of the bright new future
De-politicization of youth
Conventional right-left politics New social movements
We can see that these postmodernizing tendencies intersect with all areas of young people’s 
lives. But they also affect the construction of youth itself. In western Europe postmodernizing 
tendencies could be seen developing over several decades alongside modernization, but 
accelerated by the collapse of traditional industries, the growing fiscal pressures on the 
welfare state and the rise of then 'new right’. In eastern Europe there was a very sudden
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plunge into deindustrialisation and postmodern laissez faire privatization and individualiza­
tion. These societies lurched from one system to another, although there are also important 
lines of continuity. In the countries of eastern Europe experiments in privatization of state 
assets, the withdrawal of the state and rapid commercialization were introduced in a very 
radical way, ideas which were often still only being discussed in western Europe. In some 
respects therefore, especially in terms of these economic experiments, eastern European 
societies were leading the west rather than vice versa (Mestrovic 1994). Young people 
however, felt the brunt of these changes and were also the leaders of these changes under 
both systems.
We have described the processes whereby 'youth' has become increasingly fragmented and 
diffuse. From labor-market and family transitions being strongly linked, as in western Europe 
in the post-war period, they are now de-coupled. Instead there is an increasing diversity of 
styles of life and living arrangements with people moving in and out of different stages of life 
rather than making standardized and regular transitions. In post-communist Europe, the 
standardized age transitions which were regulated by the official youth organizations have 
disappeared along with the youth organizations as youth is no longer as strongly constructed 
or controlled as a group. However, we do not wish to argue that youth has disappeared. 
Rather, young people face new problems of identity and social support in this more chaotic 
situation. Changes in education and the labour market mean that they are more than ever a 
marginalized and vulnerable group having to depend increasingly upon families or state 
institutional structures. The universal inclusiveness which is implied by the ubiquity of mass 
media and sub-cultural communications conceals the fact that young people are very 
differently located in terms of access to leisure facilities, jobs and independent incomes. 
Their inclusion or exclusion from social goods depend upon their gender, their ethnicity, their 
religion, their social origin and educational advantages and these are in turn exaggerated by 
the different regions of Europe. Increasing problems of homelessness, crime and unemploy­
ment affect young people more than other groups. What is needed is a conception of 'youth' 
which does not allow it to disappear but rather considers the significance of age in 
determining exclusion or inclusion in different regions. In this way more humane forms of 
intervention can be devised to tackle the real and growing problems of the new generation. 
The lack of any consensus on social policy amongst European states and the collapse of 
social intervention for youth in post-communist Europe reveals a gaping hole in the ways of 
thinking about generational relations and the social construction of age and In dealing with it 
in concrete policies.
In developing the themes in this book we drew upon a number of theoreitical sources. For 
example, we did find some evidence for the 'juventicization' thesis of the Romanian 
sociologist Fred Mahler as societies are regenerated through the ideas and activities of 
young people in politics and in youth culture. In times of rapid social change and increasing 
use of information technology, young people are often ahead of adults, so this thesis seems 
particularly apposite. However, we also found evidence for the 'generational' thesis of Karl
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Mannheim as different generations of young people grow to maturity bearing with them the 
ideas or experiences which impressed them in their youth. However, it applies to a greater or 
lesser extent in different historical epochs.
We do not wish to argue that modernization or the collapse of communism have lead to any 
kind of convergence in European experiences. Rather, the divergences between different 
styles of marketization and between different parts of Europe are becoming more readily 
apparent. Increased communication does not necessarily lead to increased uniformity. 
However, the same trends within modernity can be experienced in very different ways in 
different places. Social policies for young people will have to recognize this as well and to 
leave space for the ‘solutions’ which young people already found for themselves.
Many youth policies are now initiated at a pan-European level through the European Union or 
the Council of Europe. There is therefore a growing need for comparative materials to 
document the lives of young people. No systematic data exist, something which was a handi­
cap to us in writing this book. The experience of writing this book has shown us in a very 
stark way how important it is to be able to compare the experiences of young people in dif­
ferent parts of Europe and also how necessary it is for policies to be formulated which are 
sensitive to the national differences which we have described but also to the real problems of 
young people in contemporary Europe. Here, we have provided some ways of conceptualis­
ing this. What is needed now is more comparative research on a systematic basis.
In this book we have struggled to develop concepts which can explain developments in llfe- 
course transitions among youth in different parts of Europe. In doing so, we have not been 
able to cover all parts of Europe as comprehensively as we would have liked. We lack the 
appropriate materials and detailed experience. We confined ourselves to Europe because 
youth as a product of welfare states and state Intervention Is mostly a European 
phenomenon and we are confined by our own ‘Eurocentric’ experiences. Youth studies 
generally have been Eurocentric and in this respect we follow a trend of which we are also 
critical. However, we have tried to go beyond the technique of simply juxtaposing different 
countries in different chapters. This has proved an immensely challenging experience and it 
therefore took us a long time to write this book. We hope that others will be able to take this 
challenge further In explaining and understanding contemporary Europe as well as other 
parts of the world.
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